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ABSTRACT 
John McDowell’s debates about concepts with Robert Brandom and Hubert Dreyfus over 
the past two decades reveal key commitments each philosopher makes. McDowell is 
committed to giving concepts a role in our embodied coping, extending rational form to 
human experience. Brandom is committed to defining concepts in a way that helps make 
rationality distinct. And Dreyfus is committed to explaining how rational understanding 
develops out of lesser abilities we share with human infants and other animals (I call this 
“Dreyfus’s challenge”). These commitments appear irreconcilable. I argue to the contrary 
that they are, in principle, reconcilable, provided we give up their shared “rationalist” 
commitment to the idea that the rational use of language is necessary for having concepts. 
First, I exploit Brandom and McDowell’s debate to motivate abandoning the rationalist 
commitment. Next, I exploit Dreyfus and McDowell’s debate to establish the need for a 
broader notion of concepts to answer Dreyfus’s challenge. I turn to Elizabeth Camp’s 
broader notion of concepts as spontaneously, systematically recombinable 
representations, and establish that it lacks resources for distinguishing human rationality. 
To resolve that weakness, I integrate Camp’s notion of concepts with John Haugeland’s 
theory of objectivity, which does make rationality distinct. Finally, drawing my 
integration of Camp and Haugeland, I propose a way to answer Dreyfus’s challenge, 
which I call “relaxed holism.” The core of relaxed holism is a cumulative, developmental 
sequence of three related cognitive abilities: representation, concepts, and metacognition. 
I argue that relaxed holism also reconciles both McDowell’s commitment to giving 
normatively governed concepts a role in embodied coping, and Brandom’s commitment 
to defining concepts in a way that helps make rationality distinct. 
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In abstract, nothing prevents us from dissecting surrounding material into fragments 
constructed in a manner completely different from what we are used to. . . . [W]e could 
build a world where there would be no such objects as ‘horse,’ ‘leaf,’ ‘star,’ and others 
allegedly devised by nature. Instead, there might be, for example, such objects as ‘half a 
horse and a piece of river,’ ‘my ear and the moon,’ and other similar products of a 
surrealist imagination. 
 — Leszek Kolakowski, “Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth” 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. The Manifest Image 
One of the central problems of modern philosophy of mind is a conflict between two 
ideas. The first idea is that we have rational, objective knowledge of the world. In order 
to be rational and objective, our capacities for such knowledge must somehow rise above 
biological necessity and stand up as distinct from the natural, physical order of the world. 
The second idea is that because we are nonetheless part of the natural order of the 
world—a particularly successful (so far) species of great ape—these same rational 
capacities must be in some sense continuous with those of other animals, most 
immediately with those of other great apes. I assume that we cannot give up either idea. 
How can both ideas be true? 
Wilfrid Sellars offers an answer to this question in his “Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man.” To Sellars, these two ideas represent two “complete picture[s] 
of man-in-the-world” that constitute “two differing perspectives on a landscape,” and the 
solution is to embrace a “stereoscopic vision” in which they “are fused into one coherent 
experience.”1 The “manifest image” of “man-in-the-world” is committed to the first idea 
I introduced above, emphasizing our self-understanding, our rationality, our ability to 
think and “measure one’s thoughts by standards of correctness, of relevance, of evidence” 
(ibid. 6). The manifest image embraces an “irreducible discontinuity” in the world, i.e., a 
“radical difference in level between man and his precursors” (ibid.). Moreover, “the 
                                                
1 Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” 4. 
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primary objects of the manifest image are persons,” making them inextricable 
components of the landscape onto which it opens us (ibid. 9). Finally, the manifest image 
contains the alleged paradox that “man couldn’t be man until he encountered himself” 
and—in a delightful phrase—this paradox evinces “the last stand of Special Creation” 
(ibid. 6). In other words, to put it glibly, our commitment to making human rationality 
distinct, and all the complicating factors that come with that move, constitute a kind of 
religious hangover: we let the gods die but cling tenaciously to the god-given guarantee 
of our knowledge and rationality. 
The “scientific image” of “man-in-the-world,” by contrast, is committed to the 
second idea I introduced above and finds the difference between “man and his 
precursors” to be “reducible” (ibid.). While the manifest image is philosophical, critical, 
rational, and even fairly scientific, what makes the scientific image unique by comparison 
is that only the latter, Sellars claims, proposes “imperceptible entities, and principles 
pertaining to them, to explain the behavior of perceptible things” (ibid. 7). Today, armed 
with this scientific technique, we are surrounded by astonishing advances in comparative 
psychology and ethology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, genomics, and biophysics 
that assume no such difference between us and our precursors and are succeeding at least 
in part because they assume no such difference. 
How are we to fuse these two perspectives into a unified, stereoscopic vision? The 
task, in part, is to not allow one perspective to dominate or reduce the other—we cannot 
“look through a stereoscope with one eye dominating” because to do so is to distort the 
other image (ibid. 8). Rather, we must see how the two images join together and mutually 
reinforce one another (ibid. 40). The manifest image contributes rational intentions, 
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persons, and communities and the scientific image is left to define, explain, and 
characterize everything else (ibid.). In other words, “by construing the actions we intend 
to do and the circumstances in which we intend to do them in scientific terms, we directly 
relate the world as conceived by scientific theory to our purposes, and make it our world 
and no longer an alien appendage to the world in which we do our living” (ibid.). 
One could argue that Sellars does unfairly squint into his stereoscope after all, that 
with this resolution he distorts the manifest image by putting undue emphasis on the 
scientific one. Instead, I would like to challenge something more basic to his scheme, 
namely, the idea that the manifest image can rest content with its paradox, its special 
creation, that it is simply a fact of the manifest image that it must have this internal 
incoherence. That is, I aim to spell out—in at least a preliminary way—how this 
irreducible discontinuity, this paradox of the manifest image, can be overcome, by 
explaining the steps involved in becoming rational in a novel way. And while it goes 
beyond the bounds of what I can defend here, I suspect that without that curious mark 
Sellars gives the manifest image, his distinction between it and the scientific image must 
collapse. 
 
2. Three Incompatible Commitments about Concepts 
While I have begun with Sellars, it is not my intention to engage him directly in this 
dissertation. Rather, I focus on three contemporary philosophers who have been 
influenced by Sellars, each of whom takes a different attitude toward the prospect of 
reconciling the two ideas I began with—again, the idea that there is something distinctive 
about rationality that sets it apart from other cognitive abilities and the idea that human 
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cognition must be in some sense continuous with that of other animals. The three thinkers 
are Robert Brandom, John McDowell, and Hubert Dreyfus. These philosophers share a 
number of ideas inherited from Sellars, not least of which is a rejection of the Myth of the 
Given, i.e., the idea (in its epistemological form) that it is possible for mental contents or 
a mental state to serve as a foundation for knowledge and yet be completely independent 
of all of our other knowledge. I join them in rejecting the Myth of the Given. For my 
purposes, though, the most important mark of Sellars’s influence on them is a 
commitment these three philosophers make to the ontological priority of language, i.e., 
the idea that to have a concept is to have mastered the use of a word. 
Along with this shared commitment, each of these three philosophers makes a 
further commitment that appears irreconcilable with the commitments of the others. 
Briefly, Brandom is committed to clearly defining the function of concepts in a way that 
helps make rationality distinct. His goal is to differentiate and demarcate rationality from 
all other animal or mechanical capacities, and he defines concepts narrowly, to explicitly 
support that goal. McDowell is committed to a minimal form of empiricism that gives 
normatively governed concepts a role in experience and action. His goal is to make 
coherent the idea that, sometimes, to experience something is to experience it as a reason 
for thinking something is true. In the extended debate between Brandom and McDowell 
that began in the 1990s, it becomes clear they agree that their two commitments are 
irreconcilable. That is, they agree that one cannot both define concepts in a way that 
helps us clarify what makes rationality distinct and also retain a minimal form of 
empiricism. 
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Dreyfus—the least Sellarsian of this trio—is committed to explaining how 
rational, conceptual understanding emerges out of lesser abilities we share with human 
infants and other animals. In making this commitment, Dreyfus breaks with the Sellarsian 
view in an important way, because his commitment asks us to overcome the paradox 
Sellars finds in the manifest image. Explaining how rational understanding develops out 
of lesser abilities step-by-step would effectively eliminate the apparent discontinuity that 
Sellars thinks characterizes the manifest image. Dreyfus inherits this commitment from 
his existential phenomenological heroes, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
He reads them—as do I—as committed to overcoming the discontinuity in what Sellars 
calls the manifest image. Importantly, though, he notes that neither succeeds in keeping 
that commitment, and nor does he himself offer a solution. Rather, in his critique of 
McDowell’s Mind and World, Dreyfus issues a general challenge to the philosophical 
community to find a way to keep this commitment. He closes out his critique thus: 
The time is ripe … to begin the challenging collaborative task of showing 
how our conceptual capacities grow out of our nonconceptual ones—how 
the ground floor of pure perception and receptive coping supports the 
conceptual upper stories of the edifice of knowledge. Why not work 
together to understand our grasp of reality from the ground up? Surely, 
that way we are more likely to succeed than trying to build from the top 
down.2 
 
McDowell, for his part, rejects the challenge. In his view, to be seized by this challenge is 
to have failed to understand Mind and World. In the extended debate between Dreyfus 
and McDowell that Dreyfus prompts with his essay, it becomes clear that their respective 
commitments are just as irreconcilable McDowell’s and Brandom’s. And although 
                                                
2 Dreyfus, “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of 
Everyday Expertise,” 61. This is the challenge that names and defines the task of this dissertation. 
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Dreyfus and Brandom have not had a debate, Brandom makes it quite clear that he rejects 
Dreyfus’s challenge too. 
I accept Dreyfus’s challenge. However, I also think Brandom’s and McDowell’s 
respective commitments are worth keeping; and therefore, work that aims to reconcile all 
three commitments is worth doing. Brandom’s commitment to the idea that, whatever 
concepts are, our definition of them ought to help us understand what is distinctive about 
our rational grasp of the world is intuitively right and appealing for anyone inclined to 
retain what is best about what Sellars calls the manifest image. McDowell’s commitment 
to the idea that our experience is imbued with concepts and thereby takes on a rational 
form is also intuitively compelling because, thereby, he saves the basic, empiricist insight 
that experience provides a rational constraint on what we believe. And Dreyfus’s 
commitment is intuitively compelling too, insofar as one agrees that it is untenable to 
accept a paradox at the heart of the manifest image. If these three commitments are 
incompatible, we must reject some or all of them. If they can be reconciled, there is hope 
for overcoming the paradox in the manifest image. But, can they be reconciled? 
My claim is that they can. In this dissertation, I aim to show that one can answer 
Dreyfus’s challenge while retaining Brandom’s and McDowell’s respective commitments 
by rejecting the crucial Sellarsian commitment all three make to the idea that having 
language is necessary for having concepts. Abandoning that idea opens up the space 
required for redefining concepts in a way that helps to make rationality distinct, 
explaining how normatively governed concepts play a role in our experience and action, 
and giving a step-by-step account of how discursive, rational understanding comes on the 
scene. I am not proposing a step back into the Lockean atomism about concepts that 
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Sellars critiques, but rather, I am proposing a step forward that offers a richer and more 
complex account of the conceptual holism that Sellars, Brandom, McDowell, and 
Dreyfus all espouse. 
Atomism and holism (not to mention molecularism) are discussed in many ways 
in philosophy of mind, from a variety of perspectives.3 I appropriate the terms for my 
own use in the following way: atomism is the idea that concepts can have a meaningful 
use independently of other concepts, whereas holism is the idea that concepts only have a 
meaningful use insofar as they are recombined with other concepts. Astringent holism—
the view held by Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus—is the idea that the capacity for 
explicit, rational discourse is necessary for the meaningful use of concepts to be possible. 
Relaxed holism holds that the meaningful use of concepts does not require a capacity for 
explicit, rational discourse. The view I propose in Chapter V is a form of relaxed holism 
because the animal use of concepts in problem solving requires that representations that 
count as concepts are systematically recombinable: all use of concepts derives meaning 
from systematically recombining concepts with other concepts. One advantage of this 
view is that, on the whole, it complements rather than undermines Sellarsian ways of 
thinking about linguistic meaning.4 
 
3. Outline 
In Chapter I, I investigate the debate between Brandom and McDowell and make two 
main arguments. First, I argue that McDowell’s idea that concepts function in our 
                                                
3 For a useful overview, see Jackman, “Meaning Holism.” For a discussion of atomism as the 
abstractionism set forward by the “Lockean Picture,” and the responses this view elicits from Sellars, 
Brandom and McDowell, see also the chapter on belief in Maher, The Pittsburg School of Philosophy: 
Sellars, McDowell, Brandom, 20–41. 
4 This advantage, I hope, becomes clear in Chapter V. 
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experience does not make sense under an intellectualist (Sellarsian) definition of 
concepts. Second, I argue that Brandom’s denial that concepts can function in our 
experience leads to a bizarre dualism in human awareness: we must have two distinct 
forms of awareness, but these two forms cannot contribute anything to each other. If we 
accept their debate on its own terms, there appears to be a forced choice between these 
two problematic positions. Yet I argue that rejecting their shared, intellectualist approach 
to concepts suggests a way to avoid the forced choice while also retaining their two 
respective, attractive commitments about concepts, i.e., the role McDowell gives to 
concepts in experience and Brandom’s idea that our definition of concepts should help us 
explain what makes human rationality distinct. 
Chapter II takes a similar approach to the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, 
also involving two main arguments. First, I argue that Dreyfus’s rejection of McDowell’s 
conceptualism involves a notion of concepts so narrow that it would prevent Dreyfus—
should he ever attempt it—from answering his own challenge. Second, I argue that while 
McDowell’s notion of concepts is broader and more flexible than Dreyfus’s, it does not 
offer resources for answering Dreyfus’s challenge either (admittedly, this is not a 
surprising result considering that McDowell rejects Dreyfus’s challenge). 
Taken together, Chapters I and II suggest an alternative, non-Sellarsian, non-
intellectualist approach to concepts will be required if there is any hope of answering 
Dreyfus’s challenge while reconciling Brandom’s and McDowell’s attractive 
commitments. Here I turn to the work of Elisabeth Camp, who makes concepts 
instrumental in the problem-solving abilities of intelligent animals, including (it appears) 
great apes, corvids, elephants, and cetaceans. Camp argues that, on an empirically useful 
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approach to concepts, conceptual cognition is a capacity with distinct advantages, shared 
by a small cadre of species. However, only in humans do concepts come to be 
incorporated into a capacity for explicit error recognition and an objective understanding 
of the world. Crucially, she draws on the intellectualist tradition to require that, to count 
as conceptual, cognitive abilities must be capable of functioning independently of 
environing stimuli. She defines concepts as revisable representations that can be 
spontaneously, systematically recombined. That is, to use concepts is to think, and to 
think is to have active control over what we represent and when. Camp’s definition of 
concepts lays the groundwork for relaxed holism, which I propose as a way to reconcile 
the respective commitments of Dreyfus, McDowell, and Brandom in Chapter V. 
While Camp critiques the Sellarsian, intellectualist tradition for setting the bar for 
having concepts too high, she does not answer their epistemological motivation for doing 
so. Consequently, her instrumentalist theory of concepts leaves us wondering how 
objective knowledge is possible. In Chapter IV, I turn to the work of John Haugeland—
another intellectualist by Camp’s standards—and argue that Haugeland’s theory of 
objectivity can be profitably integrated with Camp’s theory of concepts. 
Armed with the combined strengths of Camp’s theory of concepts and 
Haugeland’s theory of objectivity, in Chapter V, I return to the commitments of 
Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus, to reconcile them under the banner of relaxed holism. 
First, I propose a way of answering Dreyfus’s challenge, explaining in a series of steps 
how our rational understanding develops out of lesser abilities we share with other 
animals, by drawing on both instrumentalists and intellectualist insights into our 
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cognition. I then argue that my proposed way to answer Dreyfus’s challenge allows me to 
accommodate both McDowell’s and Brandom’s respective commitments. 
 
4. Shared Components 
The view I defend holds that concepts are components of our rational form of cognition, 
but that we nonetheless share these components with nonrational animals. This is not an 
especially intuitive idea, even perhaps for philosophers willing to embrace some kind of 
continuity between human and other animal minds. After all, human and other animal 
minds can be continuous in other ways (say, with respect to perception or emotion), yet 
discontinuous with respect to the components of rational thought. Before I begin, then, let 
me try to motivate the idea that we share the parts of our rational, objective comportment 
to the world, but not rationality itself, with prerational humans and nonhuman animals. 
The idea that “rationality” is a thing we have whose parts are not shared with 
other animals should be at the very least disturbed by the reasonable assumption that 
objectivity—in the sense of explicitly holding that our thoughts may be true or false 
independently of what we believe of them—is perhaps only a few thousand years old. So 
what was there prior to objective knowledge? Think of all those tens of thousands of 
years of linguistic activity that was certainly “instrumentally rational” (spontaneous, 
goal-oriented, problem-solving) without being objective. I imagine this takes us back into 
the worst (yet, perhaps historically, the most powerful) way of settling beliefs that 
Charles Peirce lays out: following the leader.5 
                                                
5 I refer to Charles Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief,” where he suggests the “method of authority” for 
fixing our beliefs stands behind many of the greatest monuments of human history (Peirce, Collected 
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume V: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, CP 5.379-80). 
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In light of our natural history, from an evolutionary perspective, it is surely more 
reasonable to suggest that our cognitive abilities have been selected for conformism and 
normativity and socially instituted rule following, and not for a rational, objective grasp 
of the world in any robust sense. For evidence that nature has selected an irrational, un-
objective set of cognitive proclivities—ways of using our conceptual grasp of the 
world—see the extensive array of cognitive biases that keep us half-blind even when we 
are adept at recognizing them. The full-blooded objectivity that makes rationality 
rationality in the robust sense that animates Sellars, Brandom, McDowell, and 
Haugeland, is essentially tradition: a tradition of negotiating our existential commitments. 
To me, this suggests that the elements of human cognition, upon which we 
depend for everything rational we do, did not evolve for us to have objective knowledge 
of the world at all. Rather, it evolved for us to adapt to and navigate our physical and 
social environments—to survive. How different is the cognitive ability to entertain 
multiple representations of things and situations one encounters (an ability seen in all 
great apes and likely other species too) from metarepresentation, i.e., the ability to 
represent representations as representations?6 
Assuming our metarepresentational abilities are shaped and constituted in large 
part by social practices suggests there must be, in our natural history, a mutual 
dependence between the development of metarepresentational practices and the 
concurrent development of our neurobiology. Like climbing a vertical rock chasm, 
suspended between two walls, we gained the heights of human rationality through 
exerting sustained pressure on two sides: advancing ever-more demanding cognitive 
                                                
6 I refer to the notion of metarepresentation developed by Josef Perner, which I explain and put to use in 
Chapter V, §2.3.1. See Perner, Understanding the Representational Mind, 7. 
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practices, on the one hand, and naturally selecting for greater neurobiological capacities, 
on the other hand. 
The point is that our human, metarepresentational, rational abilities—even though 
they no doubt require a neurobiological architecture that only we have—depend upon a 
presumably unbroken tradition of humans attributing to each other what Josef Perner 
calls a representational theory of mind. Without that tradition, we would fall back into a 
merely animal form of life. We share the components of our rational cognition because 
our rational, human grasp of the world is something we do with and for each other as 
humans, with only animal capacities—specialized though they must be—with which to 
do it. To appropriate and complicate Gadamer’s metaphor of distance: nature supplies us 
with some distance from our environment, as the conceptual grasp of our surroundings 
we deploy in our problem-solving; yet a human form of life opens up a second, further 
distance from our own conceptual grasp of an environment, giving us a world, a product 
of human culture so powerful it has been written into the neural architecture of our 
bodies. 
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CHAPTER I: BRANDOM VERSUS MCDOWELL 
 
1. Epistemological Intellectualism 
John McDowell and Robert Brandom have long debated whether experience contributes 
anything to knowledge. Nonetheless, they share an epistemological concern: both view 
traditional empiricism as a failed enterprise, leaving open the question of how we can 
justify our empirical judgments. Traditional empiricism fails because, in their view, it 
presupposes mind-independent foundations of empirical knowledge where there can be 
none.7 Without a coherent alternative to traditional empiricism, it’s not clear how we can 
have empirical knowledge at all. This shared epistemological concern leads both to focus 
on the conditions for the possibility of having objective knowledge of the world. Both 
define concepts and judgments narrowly, as functions for knowing the world, for the 
express purpose of explaining just how it is that we can justify empirical knowledge. To 
this end, they treat the rational use of language as necessary for having concepts and 
making judgments, and thereby treat concepts and judgments as the exclusive domain of 
rational animals. I’ll call this their rationalist commitment. 
The problem with their rationalist commitment is that it leaves them with the 
problem of explaining how our ability to perceive and responsively adapt to the world 
could be something we share with other animals and prelinguistic humans, thereby 
creating and enforcing a gap between rational and all other animals. That is, by 
emphasizing what is distinct about rational cognition, Brandom and McDowell enforce a 
                                                
7 In this, they follow Sellars’s critique of the “Myth of the Given.” I spell out the issue in detail, below. 
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strong break between it and nonrational forms of cognition (using “cognitive” in a broad 
sense).8 An excessive emphasis on the epistemological dimension of human cognition 
can make it seem as if capacities that aren’t involved in objective knowledge shouldn’t 
qualify as cognition at all or are wholly different from our intellectual form of cognition. 
I’ll call Brandom and McDowell’s enforcement of a gap or break between rational and 
nonrational capacities or animals “intellectualism.” Brandom and McDowell’s 
intellectualism is a direct result of their rationalist commitment, i.e., the commitment to 
making the rational use of language necessary for having concepts. 
Intellectualism is nothing new, and neither is opposing it. McDowell himself has 
encountered a fair amount of resistance to the version of it that he espouses.9 Against 
their intellectualism and the rationalist commitment it arises from, it is intuitively 
appealing that rational and nonrational animals share some cognitive abilities because the 
cognitive capacities of rational individuals develop by degrees from their prerational 
infancy, and the cognitive capacities of our species developed by degrees from our 
prerational ancestors. Put simply, our rational form of cognition is surely distinct, but 
                                                
8 As I explain below, the “break” between the rational and the nonrational occurs in different places in 
McDowell and Brandom. McDowell makes the break primarily between rational and nonrational animals, 
because he thinks the perception and action of rational animals belongs to their rationality. Brandom makes 
the break primarily between rational and nonrational capacities, and restricts rational capacities to 
linguistic capacities of rational animals; for him, the perception and action of rational animals involve only 
nonrational capacities. 
9 Hubert Dreyfus accused McDowell of intellectualism, sparking their debate (see Dreyfus, “Overcoming 
the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”). 
Ironically, Dreyfus himself buys in to aspects of intellectualism, as respondents to their debate have 
recently pointed out (Noë, “On Overintellectualizing the Intellect”; Rouse, “What Is Conceptually 
Articulated Understanding?”; Siewert, “Intellectualism, Experience, and Motor Understanding”). Noë, 
Siewert, and Rouse all draw on Merleau-Ponty’s broad critique of intellectualism in Phenomenology of 
Perception. In Chapter III, I draw on another attack on Brandom and McDowell’s intellectualism arising 
from research into animal cognition that offers compelling reasons to attribute concepts to animals, in 
Camp, “Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence.” Camp, arguing 
against McDowell and others, usefully defines concepts as representations that can be actively deployed 
independently of environing stimuli and spontaneously recombined in various ways, showing how concepts 
thereby satisfy Gareth Evans’ generality constraint “in a robust way” (“Putting Thoughts to Work: 
Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence,” 291). 
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intellectualism seems like an excessive way of making that distinction. If there were a 
theory that made rationality distinct and answered the epistemological concern that 
motivates Brandom and McDowell without the rationalist commitment that leads to their 
intellectualism, then this theory would be much more compelling: it would provide the 
advantage of intellectualism—securing a theory of knowledge that responds to the failure 
of traditional empiricism—without the drawbacks of intellectualism.  
To be fair to Brandom and McDowell, both admit the cognitive capacity of 
rational animals must be, in some sense, a development of more basic animal capacities, 
but they tend to be vague and evasive as to how while over-emphasizing the break 
between rational and nonrational capacities. Again, this break frustrates any appeal to 
similarities between nonrational and rational cognitive capacities that can help to explain 
the development of the latter from the former. It is by defining concepts for the exclusive 
purpose of making and justifying knowledge claims that Brandom and McDowell enforce 
this gap. In their view, the essential function of concepts lies in the normative activity of 
“giving and asking for reasons,” and because no nonrational animals give and ask for 
reasons, they have no use for concepts. Therefore, they do not have concepts, no matter 
how intelligent they seem. Putting things this way overlooks the considerable nuance of 
Brandom’s and McDowell’s respective views, but it nonetheless presents the core of their 
intellectualism. 
Here again are three terms I’ve introduced: 
(i) Epistemological concern: Brandom and McDowell’s shared concern 
that traditional empiricism has failed, requiring a new account of how we 
can justify our empirical judgments. 
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(ii) Rationalist commitment: Brandom and McDowell’s shared 
commitment to defining concepts and judgments as essentially functions 
of the rational use of language and objective knowledge. 
(iii) Intellectualism: A specific result of the rationalist commitment that 
imposes a break between rational and nonrational forms of cognition.  
Part of the aim of this dissertation, again, is to show that we do not need Brandom and 
McDowell’s rationalist commitment to satisfy their epistemological concern, which 
means we can respond to the failure of traditional empiricism without embracing their 
intellectualism. Rather than impose the difference between rational and nonrational 
cognition by granting concepts to the former and denying them in the latter, I propose to 
give concepts to both, and explain the difference in terms of the self-relation of 
conceptual capacities that underwrites language, self-consciousness, and rationality. 
Brandom alludes to and dismisses as a dead end something similar to what I am 
proposing here. However, when Brandom considers the option of overcoming the break 
between rational and nonrational capacities, he only considers it in the context of 
upholding the rationalist commitment. Thus, for Brandom, the challenge is to “assimilate 
conceptually structured activity to the nonconceptual activity out of which it arises,” and 
he argues that to emphasize assimilation is to be “in danger of failing to make enough of 
the difference” between the conceptual and the non-conceptual.10 Later, he characterizes 
John Dewey’s attempt at assimilation as failing to “demarcate,” i.e., to define and 
explain, the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual practices.11 To be clear, 
this challenge that Brandom defines is not the one I am taking on, at least, not exactly. 
Unlike Brandom, I am giving up the rationalist commitment, leaving me free to take up 
                                                
10 Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, 3. 
11 Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary, 28. 
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what Brandom sees as the challenge of assimilating the conceptual to the non-conceptual 
as, instead, the challenge of assimilating the rational form of the conceptual to the 
nonrational form of the conceptual. This is not a merely terminological dispute. The 
substance of the dispute is over whether the rationalist commitment is necessary for 
answering the epistemological concern. If it is not—if some revision of their respective 
ways of answering the epistemological concern can be made to work without the 
rationalist commitment—then the rationalist commitment can be discarded, and with it 
the problem of intellectualism should evaporate. 
Part of the aim of this dissertation is to give an outline for a theory that answers 
the epistemological concern that motivates Brandom and McDowell to make their 
rationalist commitment without, myself, making it. The aim of this chapter is to work 
through the debate between Brandom and McDowell to assess advantages and 
disadvantages of their respective views (for my purposes), and to foreground the 
rationalist commitment as a shared assumption that blinds them to the kind of view I aim 
to develop. In §2, I give an overview of their debate to highlight issues that pertain 
closely to my concerns. In §3, I address Brandom and McDowell’s disagreement over 
whether or not concepts are exclusively functions of judgment. There I show that while 
McDowell’s minimal empiricism is intuitively appealing, his ideas about how concepts 
function in experience—his older idea of propositional form and his later idea of 
conceptual intuition—contain serious problems. By comparison, I show that Brandom’s 
clarity about the function of concepts in judgment makes a much stronger case for his 
position. In §4, I illuminate a strange and overlooked aspect of Brandom’s position that 
requires rational animals to have two distinct forms of awareness, and compare it to 
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McDowell’s position, showing that the latter is more intuitively appealing. Finally, in §5, 
I draw attention to their shared rationalist commitment, and suggest that rejecting that 
commitment offers a way to retain strengths from both Brandom’s and McDowell’s 
positions while avoiding the intellectualism that makes the views of both philosophers 
unattractive. Brandom’s strong commitment to making rationality distinct, and 
McDowell’s commitment to retaining a minimal form of empiricism can be reconciled—
despite all appearances from their debate—provided one can answer their epistemological 
concern without their rationalist commitment. 
 
2. Overview: Externalist Rationalism vs. Minimal Empiricism 
Brandom and McDowell both follow Wilfrid Sellars in rejecting the “Myth of the 
Given.” The Myth of the Given, again (in its epistemological form), is the idea that it is 
possible for mental contents or a mental state to serve as a foundation for our knowledge 
and yet be completely independent of all the rest of our knowledge.12 While they both 
reject the myth, Brandom and McDowell have engaged in nearly two decades of debate 
over how to reject it. In print, this debate began shortly before the publication of 
McDowell’s Mind and World and Brandom’s Making It Explicit. McDowell attacked the 
kind of epistemological externalism that Brandom went on to endorse in Making It 
                                                
12 Sellars develops his rejection of the Myth of the Given in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. 
Willem deVries gives a clear, general statement of the myth that covers different forms it takes: The Myth 
of the Given takes the given to be both (1) “epistemically independent, that is, whatever positive epistemic 
status our cognitive encounter with the object has, it does not depend on the epistemic status of any other 
cognitive state. Notice that epistemic independence does not follow from immediacy (not being inferred 
from other knowledge) unless the only form of epistemic dependence is actual inference”; and (2) 
“epistemically efficacious, that is, it can transmit positive epistemic status to other cognitive states of ours” 
(DeVries, Wilfrid Sellars, 98–99). Carl Sachs argues that one can attack the epistemological myth and miss 
the deeper target Sellars means to attack: a more general, semantic form of the myth that is “upstream” 
from epistemological concerns. The semantic Myth of the Given takes certain elements of cognition to 
have the “form and content” required to play a role in rational discourse while also supposing they are 
wholly independent of other elements of rational discourse (Intentionality and Myths of the Given: Between 
Pragmatism and Phenomenology, 22). 
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Explicit, and Brandom responded to that attack.13 Their debate continued with four 
exchanges in which they review each other’s monographs and reply to each other’s 
reviews.14 Eventually, this conversation grew to encompass roughly fourteen essays, 
covering questions about what counts as a rational constraint on observational 
knowledge, what counts as an observation report, and including a detailed, exegetical 
dispute over how to read Sellars.15 
McDowell is committed to a form of minimal empiricism that retains an 
epistemological role for experience in justifying perceptual judgments.16 His Sellarsian 
twist on empiricism is to claim that what we perceive in experience depends in a certain 
way upon prior learning and knowledge. Brandom boldly rejects empiricism by denying 
any role for experience in justifying perceptual judgments.17 He understands justification 
to come externally in a form of reliabilism: perceptual judgments can only be justified 
from another perspective that takes into account the reliability of the perceiver. 
                                                
13 See McDowell, “Knowledge and the Internal”; Brandom, “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the 
Space of Reasons.” Brandom’s epistemological externalism is his claim that perceptual judgments are not 
justified “internally” by appealing to the contents of one’s experience, but rather only externally, in the 
endorsement of the judgment from another perspective that takes into account the reliability of the 
perceiver. 
14 Respectively, Brandom, “Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell’s Mind and World”; McDowell, 
“Reply to Gibson, Byrne, and Brandom,” 290–98; McDowell, “Brandom on Representation and 
Inference”; Brandom, “Replies,” 189–93. 
15 Brandom revises his initial review of Mind and World as “Perception and Rational Constraint.” He 
expands on his criticism in a contribution (best known by its unpublished title, “No Experience Necessary: 
Empiricism, Non-inferential Knowledge, and Secondary Qualities”) to a volume on Mind and World, in 
which McDowell also responds (see Brandom, “Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and 
Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell’s Empiricism”; and McDowell, “Responses,” 279–81). Around the 
same time, Brandom looks to shore up his externalist view through a close reading of Sellars in “The 
Centrality of Sellars’s Two-Ply Account of Observation to the Arguments of ‘Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind.’” McDowell responds with “Why Is Sellars’s Essay Called ‘Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind’?” These arguments McDowell revises in an essay for a volume on Brandom’s Making 
It Explicit, in which Brandom, in turn replies (see McDowell, “Brandom on Observation”; and Brandom, 
“Reply to John McDowell’s ‘Brandom on Observation’: Chicken-Sexers and Ryleans”). 
16 This is a central claim in his Mind and World: With a New Introduction. Henceforth MW followed by 
page number. 
17 This is an important idea in his Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment. 
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McDowell agrees with Brandom that there may be some cases where justification only 
comes externally,18 but insists we can justify typical perceptual judgments by appealing 
to experience. Their years of debate have not shifted Brandom’s rationalist externalism 
nor McDowell’s empiricist internalism. Neither gives any ground and it is difficult to see 
how either could convince the other to change his mind. 19 
 The reason neither gives ground is that aspects of their respective commitments 
are fundamentally irreconcilable.20 One central issue concerns how each understands 
rational constraint on empirical knowledge. Without rational constraint of some kind, we 
cannot have true beliefs about the world. McDowell is wholly committed to the idea that 
an observer is not merely constrained by the facts in what she can think about the world, 
but rationally constrained. Whatever we perceive in experience, we perceive it as 
shaping and limiting what we can rationally think is true of the world. As McDowell puts 
it, “responsiveness to rational constraint” means the observer has in view not just what 
                                                
18 McDowell, “Reply to Gibson, Byrne, and Brandom,” 297. 
19 McDowell does eventually modify his position and, while one could argue that it is a small concession to 
Brandom, it is not a concession that ameliorates his opposition to Brandom’s view. Rather than suppose 
that an experience involves all of the concepts one can use in forming an explicit judgment, McDowell 
comes to think it enough that only some of the concepts be involved in the experience (McDowell, 
“Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” 258). He suggests that the concepts we have for the proper sensibles of 
the senses (such as shape for sight) and common sensibles (that allow us to unify what is properly sensed) 
are the ones at play in experience. And rather than suppose that conceptual content is “propositional,” i.e., 
that experiences arrange these concepts into propositional form, McDowell now thinks that the conceptual 
content of experience is “intuitional” (“Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” 260). McDowell’s revision in no 
way concedes Brandom’s rejection of the epistemological import of experience. McDowell’s view remains 
that our conceptual experience delivers intuitions of how things are such that we can, when appropriate, 
discursively judge that they are in fact how they appear to be. 
20 While it does not resolve their dispute, it is worth also noting their methodological differences. Brandom 
is explicitly engaged in a strongly reductive approach to see how far it goes, to see what we can learn; i.e., 
he sees himself as embracing “good Popperian methodology” (“Replies,” 189). In his view, if we can see 
how rational constraint on perceptual judgments is possible without the complication of appealing to 
experience, then appealing to experience is an extravagance that requires its own justification (“Perception 
and Rational Constraint: McDowell’s Mind and World,” 255). McDowell’s consistent, “quietist” approach 
to philosophy—aiming merely to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle—stands opposed to Brandom’s 
more “scientific” approach. For McDowell, the fly bottle in question is the interminable oscillation between 
the Myth of the Given and positions (like both coherentism and Brandom’s externalism) that attempt to 
remove experience from our epistemological picture. The simplest way to show the fly out of the bottle, 
McDowell thinks, is to concede that experience involves concepts. Given their respective approaches, 
neither thinker can find a reason to concede ground to the other. 
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she observes but also its “status as a rational constraint.”21 This is the kind of rational 
constraint that the Myth of the Given promised but failed to deliver (owing to its internal 
contradictions), and part of McDowell’s mission from Mind and World onward is to 
retain the myth’s rational constraint without the myth. To show how it is we have this 
kind of rational constraint without the myth, McDowell endows experience with a 
conceptual form of awareness to which we can appeal in justifying our perceptual 
judgments. From McDowell’s perspective, to give up on this form of rational constraint 
means giving up precisely what empiricism got right about the relation of a mind to the 
world. 
By contrast, Brandom takes the failure of the Myth of the Given to invite a 
wholesale rejection of empiricism and the kind of rational constraint that the myth had 
promised. It is enough to have causal constraint on our noninferential perceptual 
judgments about the world, and rational constraint on the justification of these judgments 
supplied by an external perspective. On this account, there is no epistemological need for 
McDowell’s form of rational constraint, and therefore no need to imbue experience with 
concepts. That is, there is no need for McDowell’s “notion of conscious experience that is 
prejudgmental, but nonetheless through and through conceptually contentful.”22 Brandom 
thus denies that experience can involve concepts because to involve concepts means to 
involve judgments. On Brandom’s view, “to be aware of something … is just to apply a 
concept to it—that is, to make a judgment.”23 Concepts, as he defines them, have no 
function outside judgment. 
                                                
21 McDowell, “Reply to Gibson, Byrne, and Brandom,” 293. 
22 Brandom, “Perception and Rational Constraint,” 369. 
23 Brandom, “Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing 
McDowell’s Empiricism,” 97. 
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This disagreement over rational constraint and the relation of experience to 
knowledge is a fundamentally irreconcilable aspect of Brandom and McDowell’s mutual 
opposition. My aim in this dissertation is, in part, to defend something like McDowell’s 
position insofar as the view I develop retains human experience as a rational constraint on 
knowledge. The problem with McDowell’s position, however, is that his definition of 
concepts and conceptual form is at best unclear and at worst incoherent. By contrast, 
Brandom’s definition of concepts, and the clear function he gives them, recommends his 
view over McDowell’s even if McDowell’s view is more intuitively appealing. The 
purpose of §3 is to bring out this contrast. In §5, below, I propose that abandoning 
Brandom and McDowell’s shared rationalist commitment to defining concepts as 
essentially functions of a rational understanding of the world will make it possible to give 
a functional definition of concepts that matches Brandom’s view for clarity and 
concision, while supporting McDowell’s contention that normative, conceptually imbued 
human experience serves as a rational constraint on knowledge. 
 
3. Against Propositional Form and Conceptual Intuition 
For both McDowell and Brandom, concepts are essentially functions of rational, 
discursive judgment. This contention lies at the heart of their rationalist commitment 
because, under that commitment, concepts are essentially bound up with a rational, 
discursive understanding of the world, such that it makes no sense to attribute concepts to 
nonrational animals. Concepts are essentially functions of judgment insofar as it is only 
by learning to make explicit, discursive judgments that we come to possess concepts at 
all, and the function of a concept in a judgment—the use we make of it in giving and 
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asking for reasons—defines its meaning. McDowell and Brandom both endorse the 
Sellarsian idea that having a concept means mastering the use of a word.24 Only as we are 
drawn into the normative world of language use, learn the language games of our 
community, and practice giving and asking for reasons do we come to have concepts at 
all. Thus we acquire concepts by acquiring the use of words. By claiming that for 
McDowell and Brandom concepts are essentially functions of linguistic judgments, I 
mean to highlight two commitments they make: (1) we only come to have concepts by 
performing acts of linguistic judgment that put words in propositional form; and (2) 
whatever other functions concepts might have (if any), their function in linguistic 
judgments is fundamental and basic to what a concept is. 
While McDowell and Brandom agree that concepts are essentially functions of 
rational, discursive judgments, they disagree over whether concepts are also exclusively 
functions of judgment. By embracing the idea that concepts play a role in embodied 
coping, McDowell rejects the “exclusivity” view by assigning a role to concepts outside 
their essential function in judgment. By contrast, Brandom rejects the role McDowell 
assigns to concepts in experience, maintaining that concepts are not just essentially but 
exclusively functions of judgments. The reason Brandom restricts concepts to judgments 
is because, on his view, rejecting the Myth of the Given means abandoning empiricism 
altogether and thereby giving up on the idea that experience has any kind of 
epistemological function. The upshot is that Brandom recognizes no role or function for 
concepts in experience. McDowell extends a role for concepts outside judgment, again, to 
                                                
24 Brandom often repeats this mantra that to have a concept is to have mastered the use of a word. It never 
appears explicitly in Sellars (to my knowledge), rather, it is Brandom’s way of parsing Sellars’s argument 
in section “III. The Logic of ‘Looks’” in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 32–46. For examples of 
commentary where Brandom deploys his talk of “mastering,” see Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind, 146–47. 
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retain an empiricist grip on the world that does not fall into the Myth of the Given: it 
gives us experience that, because imbued with concepts, can function as a rational 
restraint on our empirical knowledge. 
What I aim to show here is that, while preserving a minimal form of empiricism is 
more intuitively appealing than Brandom’s wholesale rejection of it, McDowell’s notion 
of concepts as operative in both experience and judgment creates significant problems for 
his view. The most glaring of these problems, for my purposes, is that by assigning his 
notion of concepts to experience and perception (beyond judgment) he undermines the 
distinction between experiencing and judging. If experience and perception are not 
clearly distinct from judgment, McDowell loses the friction between mind and world, the 
very source of the spark by which he means to keep empiricism aflame. In light of this 
problem, my aim in this section is to show that Brandom’s more restrictive view of 
concepts is more compelling because it is much clearer and more coherent than 
McDowell’s view. If we wish to uphold McDowell’s commitment to retaining a minimal 
form of empiricism, we will need a more substantive explanation of how experience and 
judgments are distinct, which suggests we need a different notion of concepts than the 
one on which McDowell relies. 
3.1 McDowell’s View  
According to McDowell, once we acquire concepts through normative linguistic 
practices, some of these concepts can come to have a life outside judgment, in 
experience.25 That is, in the episodes of perceptual awareness enjoyed by sapient animals, 
some of the same concepts deployed in discursive judgment come to be involved in 
                                                
25 As I noted, McDowell revised his original view to now claim that only some of the concepts required for 
an explicit judgment play a role in our experience, and he suggests that these may be concepts covering 
proper and common sensibles. 
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embodied coping, outside of their role in judgment. Although McDowell’s view has 
changed since Mind and World, he maintains this basic commitment. The embodied 
coping of sapient animals is rational insofar as it makes use of concepts that we use when 
we make discursive judgments. 
The advantage McDowell sees in this view is that it marks a space between the 
Myth of the Given and coherentism by allowing what appears to be “given” in experience 
to be conceptual. This way, what we experience is already conditioned by concepts that 
are also involved in our justified, true beliefs; the rational, normative, systematic 
conceptual apparatus through which we think is drawn into giving rational shape to the 
very appearance of the world in our experience. For something to appear at all is for it to 
appear under or through a concept or concepts, and thereby have a place in this 
conceptual system. What recommends McDowell’s view, according to him, is that 
experience—because conceptual—can function as a rational constraint on what we think 
of the world. As McDowell puts it, we need “reassurance that when we use our concepts 
in judgment, our freedom—our spontaneity in the exercise of our understanding—is 
constrained from outside thought, and constrained in a way that we can appeal to in 
explaining the judgments as justified” (MW 8). Things can and usually do (barring 
occasional instances of illusion) appear to us the way they actually are, such that it is left 
to us only to endorse or dismiss these appearances in making explicit, linguistic, 
perceptual judgments. Experience, imbued with concepts outside their role in discursive 
judgments, thereby becomes a tribunal for these judgments by providing rational 
constraint on what we can think of the world. 
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The ideas that make this view appealing are the same ones that make the Myth of 
the Given so appealing: the common-sense ideas that (1) our experience generally 
captures how things are such that (2) we can appeal to our experience to justify our 
empirical judgments and (3) our freedom of thought is rationally constrained by 
experience. McDowell retains what is intuitively right about the Myth of the Given while 
avoiding its internal contradictions and staving off what is intuitively unappealing about 
coherentism and Brandom’s own advance on coherentism.  
McDowell has presented two ways to support his common sense view—his 
original view from Mind and World and his more recent, revised view—and while both 
have attractions, both have flaws that make them difficult to accept, even for 
philosophers who join him in rejecting the Myth of the Given. Again, the crucial flaw 
(for my purposes) is that assigning concepts to experience and judgment undermines the 
distinction between them by making perception a form of judgment in all but name. This 
threatens the transcendental friction required for McDowell’s minimal empiricism.26 I’ll 
treat both views in turn. 
3.1.1 Propositional Form in Mind and World 
In Mind and World, McDowell attributes rational form to the experience of rational 
animals. Experience is rational when articulated by normatively governed and 
propositionally structured conceptual content. On this view, the conceptual content of an 
experience, about which one might pass an empirical judgment justified by that 
experience, includes all of the concepts that would be involved in the judgment. Thus, if I 
had an experience that could support the judgment, “the water in the swimming pool is 
                                                
26 I am indebted to a work in progress by Jacob Browning and a conversation with Zed Adams for thinking 
through various critiques of McDowell’s revised view in “Avoiding the Myth of the Given.” 
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warm,” then all of these concepts would have to be part of the experience, including 
“water,” “swimming pool,” and “warm.” Moreover, these concepts would need to be 
propositionally structured in the experience itself, a specific instance of the general form 
x is y. This is what McDowell means when he claims “[t]he relevant conceptual 
capacities are drawn on in receptivity” (MW 9). He continues, 
We should understand what Kant calls “intuition”—experiential intake—
not as a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of 
occurrence or state that already has conceptual content. In experience one 
takes in, for instances sees, that things are thus and so. That is the sort of 
thing one can also, for instance, judge. (MW 9) 
For McDowell, seeing “that things are thus and so” means that perception takes a 
propositional form incorporating all of the concepts one would need to make an explicit 
judgment warranted by that experience. But what does it mean that experience has a 
propositional form? And if perception takes a propositional form, how is it different from 
judgment? McDowell largely declines to unpack and explain this idea in Mind and 
World, and problems arise when one attempts to make sense of it (assuming that 
McDowell’s quietism is too quiet). Many commentators have attacked the idea that 
experience has a propositional form—including those who are sympathetic to the idea 
that experience is imbued with concepts.27 
When McDowell proposes that the conceptual content of experience and 
perception takes on a propositional form, he starts with explicit judgments and then 
retrospectively supposes that the prior experiences that inform and can be made to justify 
those judgments involved the same propositional form and concepts. That retrospective 
                                                
27 See, for example Crary, Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought, 98–99. As another example, 
Crary points to Collins, “Beastly Experience,” 375–80. 
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move makes his proposal sound reasonable. The problem comes to light when we start 
with experience or perception and consider prospectively the nearly infinite possibilities 
of the explicit judgments that could be made with respect to the experience or perception 
in question. As Alice Crary puts it, “the descriptive possibilities [of a given experience] 
are unlimited, and none in particular is given.”28 Moreover, the countless, overlapping 
propositional forms that would have to shape all aspects of one’s experiences about 
which one could later make explicit judgments have no function at all in the embodied 
coping itself, i.e., they have no role to play as we navigate the world.29 We only ever 
actually make use of a tiny fraction of these otherwise useless propositional forms in the 
explicit, discursive judgments we make. The idea that our experiences are tagged with 
(what one might call) propositional and conceptual metadata for every possible judgment 
one might make in virtue of that experience is decidedly counterintuitive, even if it is 
working in service of the intuitive idea that some form of minimal empiricism is true. 
McDowell cannot motivate his view as a common sense approach while harboring this 
idea. 
A second option for unpacking what it means for experience to have a 
propositional form avoids the indefinite array of propositional forms and concepts 
crowding experience by letting experience and perception function as an act of 
discrimination. On this option, only the concepts and propositional forms that I will 
actually come to use in a judgment are involved in the experience or perception. The 
problem is that there is no longer anything substantial to distinguish perception and 
judgment. An experience that is determinately shaped by concepts and propositional form 
                                                
28 Crary, Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought, 99. 
29 Dreyfus repeatedly makes a similar point in rejecting McDowell’s conceptualism throughout their 
debate. I return to Dreyfus’s critique in Chapter II, §§2-3. 
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is a judgment in all but name. There are no resources in Mind and World that allow us to 
differentiate them, on this option, other than the claim that experience and perception are 
passive and judgment is active, and McDowell leaves this distinction underdeveloped 
(again, for quietist reasons). He claims that, “In experience, one finds oneself saddled 
with content. One’s conceptual capacities have already been brought into play, in the 
content’s being available to one, before one has any choice in the matter. The content is 
not something one has put together oneself, as when one decides what to say about 
something” (MW 10). In practice, however, things are not so distinct. Consider the 
experience and perception of a bird watcher actively and eagerly watching birds—does 
she really find herself “saddled with content,” passively undergoing a rearrangement of 
her concepts? Or consider the work of reading, wherein we may be saddled with content 
yet actively engaged in saddling ourselves, or in other instances of reading something 
very familiar, we may find ourselves actively thinking other thoughts while undergoing 
our own intonation of the words we know so well. Passivity and activity are evasive, not 
least because we can find ourselves to be passive with respect to our own ostensible 
activity. One can quibble with these and other examples, but the point is the ambiguity 
that leaves room for the quibbling. If the only thing separating experience and judgment 
is the distinction between passivity and activity, then experience and judgment are not 
sufficiently distinct because passivity and activity are not sufficiently distinct. At the very 
least, the distinction between passivity and activity in perception, judgment, embodied 
coping, and even rational discourse, is enormously complicated and thin appeals cannot 
suffice for McDowell’s purposes. 
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Charles Travis critiques McDowell, more or less, for this failure in his “The 
Silence of the Senses.”30 On his view, by giving propositional form to experience, 
McDowell has essentially conflated experience and judgment. McDowell credits Travis 
with convincing him to give up on the idea that experience and perception have 
propositional form, leading him to revise his view. 
3.1.2 Conceptual Intuitions in McDowell’s Revised View 
To spell out how his view has changed, McDowell writes: 
I used to assume that to conceive experiences as actualizations of 
conceptual capacities, we would need to credit experiences with 
propositional content, the sort of content judgments have. And I used to 
assume that the content of an experience would need to include everything 
the experience enables its subjects to know non-inferentially. But both 
these assumptions now strike me as wrong.31  
Rather than suppose that an experience involves all of the concepts used by an explicit 
judgment it warrants, McDowell now thinks it enough that only some of the concepts 
involved in the explicit judgment are involved in the experience (AMG 259). Which 
concepts? Drawing on Aristotle, McDowell now suggests that we ought to “conceive 
experience as drawing on conceptual capacities associated with concepts of proper and 
common sensibles” (AMG 260). That is, our perceptual episodes of awareness are shaped 
by concepts that allow us to make distinctions in each of our senses (e.g., color concepts 
for vision) and concepts that compare and draw our senses together to yield our 
awareness of things in the world (ibid.).32 And rather than suppose that conceptual 
content is “propositional,” i.e., that experiences arrange these concepts into propositional 
                                                
30 Travis, “The Silence of the Senses,” 79ff. 
31 McDowell, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” 258. Henceforth AMG followed by page number. 
32 As for the common sensibles of vision, for example, concepts involved may include those of “shape, 
size, position, movement or its absence,” ibid. 261. 
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form, McDowell now thinks that the conceptual content of experience is “intuitional” 
(AMG 261). Here, drawing on Kant, McDowell claims that the capacity to bring unity to 
representations in a judgment also brings unity to our representations in an intuition. It is 
worth quoting McDowell at length as he helps himself to aspects of Kant’s view: 
In intuiting, capacities that belong to the higher cognitive faculty [of 
judgment] are in play. The unity of intuitional content reflects an operation 
of the same unifying function that is operative in the unity of judgments, 
in that case actively exercised. That is why it is right to say the content 
unified in intuitions is of the same kind as the content unified in 
judgments, that is, conceptual content. We could not have intuitions, with 
their specific forms of unity, if we could not make judgments, with their 
corresponding forms of unity. We can even say that the unity-providing 
function is essentially a faculty for discursive activity, a power to judge. 
But its operation in providing for the unity of intuitions is not itself a case 
of discursive activity” (AMG 264). 
Setting aside how different this view is from Kant’s, McDowell’s idea is that, once we 
gain the vocabulary and rational, linguistic ability to make discursive judgments, the 
same conceptual ability to bring unity to our judgments engenders in us a kind of reflex 
that brings unity to all our intuitions. All (or almost all) of our experience and perception 
reflects this unity. On this view—although McDowell does not quite put it this way—
concepts are defined as a function of cognitive unity. The concepts for proper and 
common sensibles make up the contents of intuitions, insofar as such content “is in the 
intuition in a form in which one could make it … figure in discursive activity” (AMG 
265). In other words, experience and perception are made up of intuitions, where an 
intuition is a unified bundle of concepts, the same concepts we use to get a grip on proper 
and common sensibles when we make explicit, discursive judgments. 
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If the conceptual unity of a judgment takes a propositional form, and the 
conceptual unity of intuition is, by definition, not propositional, then the question remains 
in what does the conceptual unity of an intuition consist? McDowell’s answer is that 
intuitions, with their conceptual content, allow us to experience or perceive the presence 
of an object: 
The concept of an object here is formal. . . . A formal concept of … a kind 
of object is explained by specifying a form of categorial unity, a form of 
the kind of unity that characterizes intuitions. (AMG 265) 
McDowell’s example of a possible, formal concept that captures the categorial unity of 
an intuition, inspired by the work of Michael Thompson, is the concept “animal” (AMG 
265).33 The idea is that when we are confronted by certain arrangements of shapes, 
colors, and movements, etc., these impart in our minds an intuition wherein the concept 
“animal” supplies the category under which other concepts for proper and common 
sensibles that typically pick up features of the animal are unified. Or as McDowell puts it, 
what he wants to say is that, in experiencing an animal, 
it is given to me in such an experience, not something I know by bringing 
a conceptual capacity to bear on what I anyway see, that what I see is an 
animal—not because “animal” expresses part of the content unified in the 
experience in accordance with a certain form of intuitional unity, but 
because “animal” captures the intuition’s categorial form, the distinctive 
kind of unity it has. (AMG 261) 
Again, the concept “animal” constitutes the unity of the intuition, whose contents 
presumably include other concepts for proper and common sensibles. But it is important 
to McDowell that we are not actively applying the category “animal” to other things 
                                                
33 The work McDowell has in mind is Thompson, “The Representation of Life.” 
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already in view, rather, the whole picture is given at once, in an intuition. And again, 
experience and perception comprise such intuitions. 
On his new view, then, McDowell has replaced the specific unity of propositional 
form with a more general kind of unity, the categorial unity he thinks characterizes the 
intuitions of rational animals. One advantage of McDowell’s new view is that he has 
banished the problem that arose with my first way of unpacking his old view: by 
abandoning propositional form and all but a few, special concepts that play a role in 
experience, McDowell alleviates the worry that experience is plagued with superfluous 
“metadata” for every possible judgment one could make about it. However, McDowell’s 
new view does not evade the problem that arose with the second way of unpacking his 
old view: McDowell is still relying on an altogether vague sense of the distinction 
between passivity and activity to separate experience and judgment. It is true that he can 
appeal to experience being intuitional, non-discursive, and armed with only a limited 
array of concepts, whereas judgment is propositional, discursive, and capable of 
deploying all kinds of concepts, but passivity and activity are essential to the distinction 
between experience and judgment. They are essential because, in order to get the kind of 
friction with the world that is the essence of McDowell’s minimal empiricism, experience 
must be passive in clear contradistinction to the cognitive activity of judgment. And by 
characterizing experience and perception as involving intuitions that enfold in a 
categorial unity an array of concepts associated with proper and common sensibles—
where concepts are the signature of the spontaneous activity of the mind in the Kantian 
tradition he draws from—McDowell undermines the distinction between the passive and 
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active use of concepts. Much like propositional perceptions before them, McDowell’s 
conceptual intuitions are silent judgments in all but name. 
3.2 Why Brandom Makes Concepts Exclusively a Function of Judgment  
Brandom, contra McDowell, maintains that concepts are exclusively functions of 
judgment. Like Donald Davidson (whose “coherentist” view McDowell attacks in Mind 
and World), Brandom responds to the Myth of the Given by rejecting any role for 
experience in his epistemology. Thus, for Brandom, a mere environing stimulus (which, 
by itself, is nothing for us) doesn’t yield a form of awareness in which something is 
“given” to us such that we passively receive it already clothed in our concepts, but rather, 
the environing stimulus prompts or elicits a reliable disposition to actively make a non-
inferential judgment that something is the case.  
Recall that the reason McDowell thinks concepts have a role in experience, 
outside judgment, is to get the kind of rational constraint on our perceptual judgments he 
thinks we need. For Brandom, who has an externalist view of rational constraint, there is 
no motivation to assign a role for concepts outside judgment, in experience. That is, for 
Brandom, McDowell’s view appears to harbor an exotic, unwarranted assumption. 
By making concepts exclusively functions of judgments, Brandom’s account is 
more straightforward than McDowell’s treatment of concepts. Brandom provides a 
wholly clear, definition of what concepts are and what they are for. It is this feature of 
Brandom’s approach that McDowell’s notion of concepts is lacking, and without a clear, 
definition of concepts that makes sense of how they play a role in experience, 
McDowell’s minimal empiricism will remain a much weaker position than Brandom’s 
bold rationalism. 
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4. Forms of Human Awareness 
McDowell’s idea that concepts play a role in experience belongs with his view that 
rational animals enjoy a single, seamless form of sapient awareness that involves both our 
embodied coping and the reflective form of awareness we have with discursive 
judgments.34 All of it belongs to our rationality. I’ll call this view “awareness monism.” 
Brandom rejects awareness monism, leading him to an unattractive commitment: that 
rational animals have two distinct and disconnected forms of awareness (sentient and 
sapient). For Brandom, sentient awareness is a basic form of non-conceptual, nonrational 
awareness of the significance of things that guides the embodied coping of both rational 
and nonrational animals, whereas sapient awareness is rational and only comes with 
explicit, discursive judgments. I’ll call Brandom’s view “awareness dualism.” 
Awareness monism is attractive is because, on reflection, it seems intuitively 
right: it does seem as if we have a single form of awareness as we move between our 
embodied experience and reflecting on that experience to make discursive judgments 
about it. Awareness dualism is unattractive because it suggests that, contrary to our 
intuitions, the kind of awareness we have in our embodied coping is wholly separate from 
the kind of reflective awareness we have with discursive judgments. 
In this section, first I show how Brandom’s rejection of a role for concepts in 
embodied coping leads him into his awareness dualism, then show how McDowell’s 
endorsement of a role for concepts in embodied coping yields his monism about 
awareness, before returning to what is attractive about awareness monism. 
                                                
34 Sapience is not one of McDowell’s preferred words, but I use it interchangeably with rationality in 
reference to awareness. Following Brandom in my use these terms, there is no distinction between sapient 
awareness and rational awareness. 
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4.1 Brandom Excludes Concepts from Embodied Coping 
Brandom denies that concepts play a role in our embodied coping. He argues our 
embodied coping is non-conceptual, governed by mere reliable, differential responsive 
dispositions. Therefore, in our embodied coping, we are a lot like many other animals, 
insofar as we share a basic form of awareness that Brandom calls sentient awareness. 
Sentient awareness is wholly distinct from the sapient awareness that we have in making 
discursive judgments and giving and asking for reasons.  
4.1.1 Sentient Awareness 
Sentient awareness, as Brandom understands it, is a mode of awareness enjoyed by 
sentient animals motivated by desire. Because sapient animals are also sentient, we 
should not be surprised that sentient awareness is also enjoyed by sapient animals, 
although Brandom does not make this feature of his view explicit. Sentient awareness is 
not, for Brandom, meaningful because it involves no concepts, no awareness of the 
inferential roles of words or of making normative commitments or claims.35 Brandom 
reads both Heidegger and Hegel as putting forward non-Cartesian notions of sentient 
awareness as practical, behavioral classification.36 I’ll focus on Brandom’s reading of 
Hegel as it pertains more closely to the issues I want to raise. 
                                                
35 Brandom usually plays down sentient awareness, presenting it as just a dim, physiological function, a 
medium made up of “causally covarying sense impressions” that change with the variation of environing 
stimuli according to processes governed by physical and biological laws (“Perception and Rational 
Constraint: McDowell’s Mind and World,” 255). Elsewhere, however, he is more sensitive to the role of 
animal desire and the contingent significances that sense impressions can thereby yield. For the purposes of 
this paper, I am going to simply set aside this ambiguity in Brandom’s work, to focus on his sophisticated 
development of sentient awareness understood in relation to animal desire. 
36 See Brandom, “Heidegger’s Categories in Being and Time,” 392; Brandom, “The Structure of Desire and 
Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution,” 132 (henceforth SDR followed by pager number). 
It will be open to Brandom, of course, to complain that his view is not Hegel’s view and that I am saddling 
him with what is just his take on Hegel’s treatment of desire. I see my move as licensed by the fact that his 
brilliant reading of Hegel in this essay largely brings the theory of desire and recognition in the 
Phenomenology into conformity with his inferential semantics. 
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In working out the relation between desire and recognition in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Brandom draws attention to the form of awareness enjoyed by 
animals that desire such that things can be something for them (SDR 132). By this, 
Brandom means animals for which a thing can take on a significance for the animal based 
on the thing’s ability to satisfy the animal’s desires. These significances are revisable on 
the basis of the ability of what they pick out to satisfy the desire motivating the 
classification in question. If a thing taken to have a given significance satisfies the 
appropriate desire, that significance is reinforced; if the desire is not satisfied, the thing 
may lose that significance for the animal. This is the essence of what Brandom calls the 
“tripartite structure of erotic awareness”: an attitude of desire, an action, and a 
significance (for example, hunger, eating, and food, respectively) (SDR 133). Hunger 
leads the animal to treat or classify something as food by eating it. This constitutes the 
erotic awareness of the thing eaten.37 
Two points bear mentioning. First, a merely sentient animal might deploy a 
handful of such significances, for example, food (prompting eating), a predator 
(prompting flight or hiding etc.), and a mate (prompting mating behavior), but these 
significances can never form a system, a whole for the animal, because merely sentient 
awareness has no means to unify them as such. Second, sentient awareness is not 
awareness of a thing as an object properly speaking. In taking something to be food, the 
significance “food” constitutes the entirety of the awareness of that thing; it is not a 
substance with properties or a particular instance of a general kind of thing, as we 
understand things when we judge them explicitly, with language. All desire does is 
                                                
37 One advantage of Hegel’s view is that it restricts awareness to a particular class of RDRDs; if all RDRDs 
generate awareness, Brandom remarks, then we are stuck with panpsychism and “pansemanticism” 
(because, for example, iron would be aware of water) (SDR 132).  
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classify things encountered in the world as either having such significance or not. By 
contrast, in our sapient, conceptual awareness, we have access to the thing taken to be 
food from multiple angles beyond our desire; i.e., the thing is an object with properties or 
a particular example of a universal. With sapient awareness, we can be disinterested; in 
merely sentient awareness, disinterest is not possible. 
4.1.2 Sapient Awareness 
Outside his work on Hegel, Brandom mostly discusses sentient awareness as a foil to 
help make sapient awareness distinct.38 In doing so, he generally plays down his powerful 
insight into sentient awareness discussed above. Giving a clear account of sapient 
awareness has been one of his central aims for the past two decades. One place we can 
see that aim is in Brandom’s efforts to summarize Kant’s ideas in a way that directly 
expresses his own. For Brandom’s Kant and Brandom too,  
the minimal unit of experience in the sense of sapient awareness is the 
judgment (proposition). For that is the minimal unit of responsibility. 
Concepts are to be understood top-down, by analyzing judgments (they 
are, he said, “functions of judgment,” rules for judging), looking at what 
contribution they make to the responsibilities undertaken by those who 
bind themselves by those concepts in judgment (and intentional agency).39 
The idea is that we only gain sapient awareness with a judgment that makes an explicit 
claim in the space of reasons. We are responsible for judgments in that we are expected 
to know the implicit commitments we are making by making such an explicit judgment, 
so that we can give reasons for holding them and know how to use them in making 
                                                
38 See the countless instances in which Brandom brandishes his parrot that can say, but not mean, “red.” 
39 Brandom, “Intentionality and Language: A Normative, Pragmatist, Inferentialist Approach,” 354. 
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inferences to other claims. Sentient awareness, by contrast, involves no judgment, no 
concepts, no responsibility, and no rules. 
Another place to see Brandom’s focus on making sapient awareness distinct is in 
his Articulating Reasons. There, he aims to provide  
a clear account of sapient awareness, of the sense in which being aware of 
something is bringing it under a concept … [i.e.] making a claim or 
judgment about what one is (thereby) aware of, forming a belief about it—
in general, addressing it in a form that can serve as and stand in need of 
reasons, making it inferentially significant.40 
Again, unlike sentient awareness, sapient awareness involves concepts, explicit 
judgments, and awareness of the inferential roles of words. We gain sapient awareness of 
a thing we encounter when our various environing stimuli reliably cause non-inferential 
perceptual judgments that actualize our conceptual capacities. Another thing this quote 
makes clear is that Brandom is not simply investigating our sapient awareness, but rather 
he sets out to make it absolutely clear and distinct—i.e., to demarcate it—from mere 
sentient awareness. 
4.1.3 Brandom’s Awareness Dualism 
So far I’ve only shown that Brandom distinguishes sentient and sapient forms of 
awareness. Now I want to show that Brandom is at least implicitly committed to the idea 
that sapient animals have both sapient awareness and sentient awareness. The idea is that 
we move between these two forms of awareness as we make language-entry and 
language-exit moves. When we are not engaged in language use (either as inner speech or 
vocal expression), we are not sapiently aware, which suggests by default that we engage 
in all of our non-linguistic, unreflective activities by sentient awareness alone. Brandom 
                                                
40 Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, 16. 
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nowhere (to my knowledge) denies that sapient animals have experience; he only denies 
that experience makes a contribution to our knowledge of the world. Experience, in this 
sense, is just what he calls sentient awareness, as described above.  
The reason to think that sapient animals also have sentient awareness on 
Brandom’s account—awareness, via environing stimuli, of significances shaped by 
desire—is that we, like other intelligent animals, perform many learned and complicated 
acts unreflectively. If the means to explain those acts in merely sentient animals is to 
appeal to sentient awareness, it follows that the same is true for sapient animals. The 
claim—implicit in Brandom’s thought—is that sapient animals engage with their 
surroundings through merely sentient awareness, when between language-exit and 
language-entry moves, i.e., anytime we are not making anything explicit. 
Can the significance of an entity in our sentient awareness positively contribute to 
that entity being conceptualized through an explicit judgment, and thereby register in our 
sapient awareness? Brandom seems committed to saying no. Sentient contributions to 
sapient awareness would run against his two-ply view of observation that non-inferential, 
perceptual judgments are directly elicited by environing stimuli.41 It would introduce a 
third ply, the sentient significance: non-inferential, discursive judgments, at least in some 
cases, would not be directly caused by environing stimuli but would follow from sentient 
significance, an intermediary which itself was caused by environing stimuli. But 
Brandom nowhere considers this possibility. Rather, Brandom is committed to two 
claims. First, he is committed to the claim that sapient animals have two possible 
responses to environing stimuli: sentient awareness of the significance of things for 
                                                
41 Brandom, “The Centrality of Sellars’s Two-Ply Account of Observation to the Arguments of 
‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,’” 349–50. 
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action and sapient awareness of the meaning of things for thought and discourse. Second, 
Brandom is committed to the claim that sentient significance makes no contribution to 
sapient thought, i.e., awareness dualism. 
Brandom is not troubled by his awareness dualism. There are certainly 
methodological reasons that he does not try to bridge the gap between sentient and 
sapient awareness,42 but there are also substantial reasons. Brandom argues we cannot 
make clear what is distinctive about rationality if we do not entirely separate it from 
everything we do when we are not explicitly deploying concepts in making discursive 
claims. Anything that can be counted as sentient awareness in sapient animals is just 
unimportant in the task of making rationality distinct. And if we don’t get clear about 
rationality, we can’t get semantics and epistemology right; we risk skepticism about 
meaning and knowledge. 
4.2 McDowell Includes Concepts in Embodied Coping 
McDowell endorses the idea that concepts play a role in our embodied coping. He does 
so for reasons already discussed, namely, to retain the idea that experience provides 
rational constraint on our empirical beliefs. Concepts with which we grasp the world in 
thought give rational form to experience. It is the involvement of concepts in our 
                                                
42 Brandom uses the conceptual as the point of demarcation between the rational and merely physical 
aspects of being human. So, for example, in discussing rationality, we can focus on its emergence (whether 
ontogenetic or phylogenetic) out of merely animal capacities, or we can focus on “leverage,” i.e., what 
makes rationality wholly distinct from animal capacities. Brandom’s project consistently rallies around 
leverage, ignores emergence, and uses conceptuality as the point of demarcation that sets rationality apart 
and makes it distinct (Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary, 26–9). 
Along the same lines a decade earlier, Brandom opted to play up the discontinuity between rational and 
nonrational animals, rather than attempt to balance it with the evident continuity (Articulating Reasons: An 
Introduction to Inferentialism, 2–3). Another methodological reason for the separation is that Brandom’s 
project of inferential semantics is a reductionist one, which leads to a theory of empirical knowledge that 
can explain justified true belief without appealing to experience. From his perspective, if we do not need to 
appeal to experience to make sense of empirical knowledge, then we need a good reason to keep the idea of 
justificatory experience around. For Brandom, the intuition that experience does play a role in the 
explanation and justification of empirical knowledge is not enough. 
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unreflective experience and action that enfolds embodied coping in our sapience, our 
rational view of the world. In this section, I flesh out why McDowell takes this view and 
show how it yields a kind of monism about awareness that is preferable to Brandom’s 
awareness dualism. 
4.2.1 Conceptual Form in Embodied Coping 
By giving conceptual form to embodied coping, McDowell can retain what is attractive 
about the Myth of the Given without the myth. Experiences, insofar as they are given, are 
only given through engaging the conceptual apparatus with which we think. The result is 
that we do not just perceive aspects of our environment, but also perceive them as 
rational constraints on what we can think is true of the world. 
McDowell does not give many examples to illustrate this position in Mind and 
World. One example he does give is of color. Here his point is that the capacities 
involved in experience must also be involved in making explicit judgments about the 
world (MW 11-2). One cannot make an observational judgment of the kind ‘x is red’ 
without a “necessary background understanding” of, for example, the appropriate 
conditions for making such a judgment (MW 12). But in Mind and World, McDowell 
also wants to claim we can have an experience such that ‘x is red.’ On this view, the 
necessary background understanding that makes the judgment possible also functions to 
give shape to the experience itself in two ways: (1) All of the concepts one can deploy in 
a judgment that can be justified by appealing to an experience must already be involved 
in the experience; and (2) it is part of McDowell’s view that, as Brandom puts it, we can 
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“experience that things are thus and so,” i.e., in taking on a rational form, experience has 
a propositional form.43 
As I discussed in §3.1, above, McDowell has revised his view since Mind and 
World. He now rejects the ideas that (1) experiences involve propositional content, and 
(2) all of the concepts used in an empirical judgment must be involved in the experience 
it judges. Despite these revisions, McDowell has not given up on the basic idea of Mind 
and World. He still maintains that experience has a rational form to which we can appeal 
in justifying empirical judgments, such that experiences rationally constrain what we 
think is true of the world. McDowell’s view remains that our conceptual experience 
delivers intuitions of how things are such that we can, when appropriate, discursively 
judge that they are in fact how they appear to be. A series of familiar sounds, colors, 
shapes, and movements comes to grip my attention only through an array of concepts of 
common and proper sensibles. And, in experiencing these sounds, colors, shapes, and 
movements, McDowell wants to say, one experiences them as constraints on what one 
can think, because these concepts belong to one’s rational understanding of the world. 
One can then draw the same concepts into a judgment and appeal to those features of 
one’s experience to justify it. McDowell has scaled back the role of concepts in 
experience—he has further minimized his minimal empiricism—but he has not shifted 
his basic position or given up the core commitments of Mind and World. 
4.2.2 McDowell’s Awareness Monism 
On Brandom’s view, sapient awareness is the rational, reflective awareness of the 
inferential roles of words in the game of giving and asking for reasons, and it is made 
possible by the role of concepts. McDowell agrees that a sapient form of awareness is 
                                                
43 Brandom, “Perception and Rational Constraint,” 369. 
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made possible by the role of concepts, but because he thinks concepts are involved in 
experience, he extends sapient awareness to include experience as well as our reflective 
awareness of the inferential roles of words. And because the use of concepts in both 
embodied coping and discursive judgment is governed by the rational, linguistic norms of 
a community, their role in experience enables us, under the right circumstances, to 
experience the world as it is. In this way, experience stands as a tribunal for judgment: we 
appeal to our experience in order to justify perceptual judgments. This is an important 
connection between McDowell’s view of rational constraint on empirical knowledge and 
his idea that sapient awareness includes both discursive judgment and embodied coping. 
Within this extended form of sapient awareness, what makes the moves between 
embodied coping and discursive judgment seamless? In McDowell’s view, concepts 
function in our embodied coping to make features of our surroundings perceptible to us. 
As we move through the world—experiencing and unreflectively performing familiar 
tasks under familiar circumstances—environing stimuli draw on our conceptual 
capacities so as to yield a rational, conceptual form of awareness of the world in 
experience. Concepts are involved in experience without words insofar as embodied 
coping involves neither vocal expression nor silent inner speech. That concepts play a 
role in embodied coping without the words that designate them is important. Concepts 
without words bring the world into view without our awareness of the concepts as 
concepts, whereas the same concepts deployed with the words that designate them bring 
the concepts into view, i.e., meaning, the inferential roles of these concepts. When we 
pivot from embodied coping into language to make discursive judgments, we use some of 
the same concepts by deploying the words that designate them. Because some of the 
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same concepts have a role to play in both our embodied coping and our discursive 
judgments, there is no break in our awareness in moving between them, even though our 
focus shifts from the world to the meanings of the concepts that bring the world into 
view. 
4.3 Awareness Monism Is Attractive 
Awareness monism fits with our intuitions. Phenomenologically, our awareness is 
singular and seamless. It seems to us that we have a single form of awareness as we move 
between our embodied coping in the world and reflectively making discursive judgments 
about it. Awareness dualism is unattractive because it suggests that, contrary to our 
intuitions, the kind of awareness we have in our embodied coping is wholly separate from 
the kind of reflective awareness we have with discursive judgments. Without awareness 
monism, we cannot appeal to our experience to justify our knowledge claims. 
Brandom is not worried about running up against our intuitions. Indeed, he 
suspects that it is only a vestige of bad Cartesian theory that makes us think we can 
appeal to our experience to justify perceptual judgments.44 But as Brandom himself 
admits, one of the blind spots of his inferential semantics and his theory of perception and 
cognition generally is that they leave no space for phenomenology.45 Perhaps it is 
McDowell’s inclination to balance his epistemological commitments with 
phenomenological ones that pulls him back from Brandom’s extremes. 
                                                
44 Brandom, “Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing 
McDowell’s Empiricism,” 98. 
45 Brandom considers the fact that in his view “nothing at all is made of phenomenology” a considerable 
flaw (Brandom, “Reply to John McDowell’s ‘Brandom on Observation’: Chicken-Sexers and Ryleans,” 
322). If Brandom makes commitments in his inferential semantics and epistemology, embraces the upshot 
of these commitments in philosophy of mind, and more or less ignores the implications for 
phenomenology, then McDowell, to his credit, appears more interested in balancing commitments in each 
of these areas.  
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Ultimately, Brandom’s awareness dualism is a strange but viable option if we 
give up our intuition that we have a seamless form of awareness as we move between 
experience and judgment. However, at face value, awareness monism is more attractive if 
it can be made to work without the flaws of McDowell’s conceptualism. 
5. Concepts, Judgments, and Rational Cognition 
So far, I’ve shown how Brandom and McDowell disagree on how to answer two 
questions central to their work. The first question (§3) asks whether concepts are 
exclusively or merely essentially functions of judgment. Brandom argues that concepts 
are exclusively functions of judgment as part of his commitment to clearly differentiating 
human rationality. McDowell agrees that concepts are essentially functions of judgment, 
but allows that they have a role outside judgment, as part of his commitment to retaining 
a minimal form of empiricism. I argued that minimal empiricism—in some form—seems 
preferable to Brandom’s overwhelming emphasis on demarcation, yet Brandom’s 
position has a significant advantage over McDowell’s position, namely, Brandom’s great 
clarity in his definition of what concepts are and what they are for. By comparison, 
McDowell’s account of concepts and the role they play in experience—both his older 
view from Mind and World and his revision of that view—are plagued by ambiguity. If 
minimal empiricism is to be defended by extending a role for concepts outside judgment, 
in experience, it will require a definition of concepts that matches Brandom’s definition 
for clarity and precision. 
 The second question (§4) explores the upshots of Brandom’s and McDowell’s 
respective answers to the first question, by asking whether there are one or two forms of 
human awareness. Brandom’s theory of concepts is implicitly committed to two distinct 
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forms of awareness: an animal form of awareness and the rational awareness involved in 
discursive understanding, wherein the former can contribute nothing to the latter. 
McDowell, by contrast, embraces a single form of awareness for humans—rational 
awareness—wherein the awareness that we have in embodied coping positively 
contributes to our rational understanding of the world. I argued that Brandom’s position, 
despite its strengths of clarity, seems intuitively false. Even if we find reason to reject 
McDowell’s position, an alternate version of McDowell’s awareness monism will be 
preferable to Brandom’s provided it achieves the clarity and consistency that 
recommends Brandom’s view while upholding Brandom’s commitment to making 
human rationality distinct. 
Brandom’s and McDowell’s respective ways of bolstering epistemology in light 
of the failure of traditional empiricism—with their respective strengths and weaknesses—
appear to leave us with a forced choice between the clarity and precision of Brandom’s 
account and the intuitive appeal of McDowell’s account. Either way, we are saddled with 
intellectualism that plagues both their views, namely, the imposition of a gap or break 
between rational, human cognition and the cognitive abilities of other animals and 
prelinguistic children. My aim in this dissertation is to answer their epistemological 
concern without being saddled with their intellectualism, and it is to that end that I 
propose rejecting their rationalist commitment to making concepts essentially functions 
of rational, discursive thought. 
The alternative, which I begin to unpack in Chapter III, is that concepts (and, 
more generally, thought) are better understood as essentially features of the cognition of 
intelligent, problem-solving animals—a category that seems to include corvids, 
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cetaceans, elephants, and all great apes. Defined broadly as part of a form of cognition we 
share with other animals, concepts can then be brought into a theory that shows how their 
normative refinement leads to rational, human understanding. In other words, humans 
(along with a number of other species) develop concepts and make judgments “naturally” 
in the sense that their development and use does not depend upon normativity. However, 
given the right kind of exposure to a coherent set of normative social practices, including 
perhaps most importantly linguistic practices, the human capacity for concepts is drawn 
into a rational, discursive form. 
However, despite rejecting Brandom and McDowell’s shared, rationalist 
commitment to embrace a broader notion of concepts, I am still aiming to answer the 
epistemological concern that motivates it. This requires the careful endorsement of some 
of their other respective commitments. To that end, in what follows, I clarify the criteria 
for the broad view of concepts to succeed, in light of the commitments I aim to carry 
forward from Brandom and McDowell. 
First of all, this broad theory of concepts should match Brandom’s theory in terms 
of clarity and precision, and avoid the ambiguity about concepts that plagues McDowell’s 
view. To this end, the definition of concepts should make absolutely clear what they are 
and what they are for, and it should be a well-motivated theory that gives concepts a 
clear, cognitive function. However, rather than follow Brandom and make concepts 
exclusive functions of rational, human understanding, they will have a function in the 
cognition of intelligent animals that makes clear what their purpose is outside of the 
social norms that fold them into rational human thought. 
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Second, the broad theory of concepts and judgments must be amenable to 
upholding Brandom’s commitment to making rationality distinct. This is not to say that it 
will “demarcate” rationality as Brandom does—after all, I am rejecting Brandom’s 
intellectualism. However, the theory must not fall into the trap that Brandom locates in 
the opposite mistake of uncritically assimilating rational concepts and thoughts with the 
nonrational cognition of other animals and prelinguistic children. Rather, there must be a 
way of using conceptual capacities—defined broadly as something we share with other 
intelligent animals—to help explain exactly what it is that makes human rationality 
distinct. 
Third, the broad theory of concepts must be amenable to upholding McDowell’s 
commitment to giving human experience a rational form, and thereby retaining a minimal 
form of empiricism. That is, defining concepts broadly as part of the cognition of 
intelligent, problem-solving animals must help us explain—more clearly than McDowell 
has so far—exactly how it is that normatively governed concepts play a role in human 
experience and give it a rational form. Not only should such an account retain what is 
attractive about McDowell’s minimal empiricism without the pitfalls, it should also avoid 
the awareness dualism that plagues Brandom’s account. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of my dissertation is to square apparently incompatible, yet eminently attractive, 
commitments made by Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus. Brandom is committed to 
defining concept in a way that is useful for making rationality distinct. McDowell is 
committed to a minimal form of empiricism that casts a role for our conceptual capacities 
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in experience and action. Dreyfus is committed to giving a step-by-step account of how 
our rational, conceptual capacities develop out of lesser abilities we share with 
nonrational animals and prerational human infants. In addition, all three commit to the 
idea that having language is necessary for having concepts and making judgments (what I 
call the rationalist commitment). By giving up the shared commitment and developing a 
more relaxed and inclusive conceptual holism, I aim to square the other three 
commitments. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show what is at stake for this project in 
the debate between Brandom and McDowell, and motivate the idea that the apparent 
stalemate between them can be overcome by abandoning their shared, rationalist 
commitment to defining concepts as essentially components of rational, discursive 
judgment. After giving an overview of their debate in §2, I focused on their disagreement 
over whether or not concepts are exclusively functions of judgment in §3. There I showed 
that while McDowell’s minimal empiricism is more intuitively appealing than Brandom’s 
reliablism, Brandom’s position is more compelling because his definition of concepts is 
clear compared to McDowell’s murkier notions of propositional form and conceptual 
intuition. In §4, I showed how Brandom’s restriction of concepts to exclusively functions 
of judgment results in an unappealing and overlooked awareness dualism: rational 
animals have two distinct forms of awareness—sentient and sapient—where the former 
can contribute nothing to the latter. Once again, McDowell’s view is more intuitively 
appealing. Finally, in §5, I raised the option of abandoning Brandom and McDowell’s 
shared rationalist commitment to defining concepts as essentially functions of a 
normatively governed, rational, discursive understanding of the world. I then clarified the 
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criteria that such a broad view of concepts would need to satisfy in order to answer the 
concerns that motivate Brandom and McDowell’s rationalist commitment. 
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CHAPTER II: DREYFUS VERSUS MCDOWELL 
 
1. Phenomenological Intellectualism 
Chapter I exploited the debate between McDowell and Brandom to motivate abandoning 
their shared commitment to making language necessary for having concepts. McDowell 
embraces a minimal form of empiricism by giving concepts a role in experience—an 
attractive commitment if it works—but his approach leads him to incoherent ideas about 
this expanded role for concepts. And Brandom invests in distinguishing our rationality—
also an attractive commitment if coherent—but it leads him to the unappealing idea that 
rational animals have two distinct and utterly separate forms of awareness. I suggested 
abandoning Brandom and McDowell’s shared commitment that language is necessary for 
having concepts as a way to retain their two respective, attractive commitments. To this 
end, I proposed investigating a broad notion of concepts that can make sense of the role 
they play in our embodied coping, while at the same time being useful for explaining 
what makes human rationality distinct. 
In the present chapter, I turn to the debate between McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus 
over McDowell’s conceptualism. Like Brandom, Dreyfus resists McDowell’s 
conceptualism, but for a largely different set of reasons. To Dreyfus, conceptualism 
makes the mistake of giving rational capacities a role in our embodied coping practices, 
thereby distorting what embodied coping is. It is a mistake because, in Dreyfus’s view, 
the exclusive function of our rational capacities is to render the world in determinate 
judgments, whereas in our embodied coping we respond flexibly and fluidly to 
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indeterminate and ever-changing surroundings. Determinate rational thought and 
indeterminate embodied coping, Dreyfus thinks, are wholly different. To suggest that 
determinate concepts play a role in embodied coping is to distort it.46 
The debate between McDowell and Dreyfus turns essentially on whether or not 
concepts play a role in embodied coping. McDowell defends his conceptualism as, in 
fact, non-threatening to the basic shape of Dreyfus’s embodied coping and, in turn, 
McDowell accuses Dreyfus of failing to see how rational and conceptual norms are 
embodied in our unreflective coping. Throughout their debate, on at least seven 
occasions, Dreyfus poses a question not just for McDowell but for any philosopher 
engaged in debates about conceptualism in philosophy of mind. This question, as I 
indicated at the outset, is the one my dissertation responds to, namely, how does our 
rational capacity for conceptual understanding develop out of more basic capacities we 
share with nonrational animals and prelinguistic human infants? McDowell dismisses this 
question as one we ought not feel compelled to answer. Indeed, as I argue below, his 
conceptualism is not suited to answer it. 
I’ve already taken on McDowell’s commitment to granting a role for our 
conceptual capacities in our embodied coping—this is one of the three commitments I 
aim to reconcile. My aim in this chapter, however, is to show how both Dreyfus’s and 
McDowell’s respective ideas about concepts make answering Dreyfus’s challenge 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. To this end, the chapter is largely structured around 
                                                
46 This seems to suggest that Dreyfus, like Brandom, winds up with rational animals with two distinct and 
utterly separate forms of awareness. However, as I show in this chapter, Dreyfus rejects Brandom’s 
awareness dualism. He argues that awareness of affordances and conceptual understanding form a whole, 
as we convert the indeterminate affordances of embodied coping into determinate conceptual content when 
we think. Dreyfus’s model here is Heidegger’s distinction between things we encounter as ready-to-hand 
(zuhandenheit) and the shift to grasping things (for Dreyfus, conceptually) as present-at-hand 
(vorhandenheit). Heidegger’s point was about different modes of existence things can have. Dreyfus’s 
point is that these are two different, but intimately connected, modes of engaging with things.  
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two sets of interrogations. In §2, I give a brief overview of the debate between Dreyfus 
and McDowell (focused on issues relevant for my purposes) and consider some of the 
responses their debate has provoked. In §3, I interrogate Dreyfus’s attempts in his 
contributions to the debate to show why concepts and rationality can have no place in our 
embodied coping. This interrogation reveals that it is Dreyfus’s commitment to the idea 
that concepts are bound up with language that blinds him to the possibility of concepts 
playing a role in our embodied coping. More importantly, I argue that Dreyfus’s 
commitment to the idea that language is necessary for concepts makes it extremely 
difficult for him to answer the question of how conceptual understanding arises. In §4, I 
interrogate McDowell’s claims about our rational, conceptual orientation to the world in 
our embodied coping to look for resources in his work for explaining how it is we acquire 
our capacity for rational, conceptual understanding.47 This interrogation reveals that, like 
Dreyfus, McDowell’s commitment to the idea that language is necessary for having 
concepts blinds him to the possibility of explaining how our embodied coping comes to 
be permeated by our rationality.48 Thus, I show that both Dreyfus and McDowell are 
misled in different ways by the same assumption. 
 
2. Overview: The Battle of the Myths 
In their debate, McDowell accuses Dreyfus of defending a mythical “disembodied 
intellect,” a notion of conceptual understanding that is not substantially grounded in our 
                                                
47 In all fairness, since McDowell denies that he or anyone else is obliged to give such an explanation, one 
should not expect his work to provide one. Nonetheless, if we want to explain how embodied coping takes 
the conceptual form his conceptualism describes, then interrogating his work for clues is not inappropriate. 
48 To claim for McDowell, as I do for Dreyfus, that he cannot answer the question of how conceptual 
understanding arises because he is committed to the idea that language is necessary for concepts would be 
to miss the point that McDowell specifically rejects any need to answer that question. Indeed, McDowell 
seems to think that by following our philosophical curiosity into such questions we wind up making the 
kind of mistakes his quietist brand of philosophy endeavors to correct. 
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embodied coping. Dreyfus accuses McDowell of defending a mythically pervasive mind, 
a notion of discursive, determinate thought permeating all human activity that thereby 
mischaracterizes our embodied coping. I’ll quickly sketch the key points of disagreement 
(for my purposes) before considering some responses to their debate. 
2.1 Dreyfus and McDowell’s Dispute 
Like Brandom, both Dreyfus and McDowell tie concepts closely to rationality and equate 
having any concepts with having highly developed, linguistic abilities. That is, along with 
Brandom and McDowell, Dreyfus also subscribes to the idea that having a concept means 
having the use of a word. Like Brandom, but contra McDowell, Dreyfus thinks concepts 
are only involved in rational, discursive activity. McDowell agrees that the essential 
function of concepts is to yield our discursive understanding of the world, but (as I 
discussed in Chapter I) he adds that concepts acquired through the development of 
rationality and language can also be involved in our perception and action. In Dreyfus’s 
parlance, McDowell’s idea is that concepts are involved in embodied coping. While they 
agree that concepts are bound up with rationality and language, Dreyfus disputes 
McDowell’s claim that concepts play a role in the embodied coping of rational animals. 
This objection led to an eight-year debate between them that played out from 2005 to 
2013.49  
                                                
49 The debate began with Dreyfus’s critique of McDowell’s Mind and World in his Presidential Address to 
the American Philosophical Association (Dreyfus, “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How 
Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”; henceforth OMM followed by 
page number). As Joseph Schear reports, McDowell responded the following year at an Eastern APA 
meeting, during a session with Dreyfus and John Haugeland that was “organized to thrash out what is at 
stake in the debate” (Schear, “Introduction,” 1). McDowell’s presentation was published in a 2007 issue of 
Inquiry, edited by Wayne Martin, as “What Myth?” (henceforth WM followed by page number). The same 
issue included Dreyfus’s response (“The Return of the Myth of the Mental”; henceforth RMM followed by 
page number); along with two further replies (McDowell, “Response to Dreyfus”; Dreyfus, “Response to 
McDowell”). In 2009, James Conant brought McDowell and Dreyfus together again with a number of other 
philosophers to discuss the relevant issues at a conference in Berlin (Schear, “Introduction,” 2). Following 
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From Dreyfus’s perspective, McDowell is ensnared in the “Myth of the 
Pervasiveness of the Mental,” i.e., an attempt to frame perception and action in terms of 
what they contribute to knowledge that overlooks the indeterminacy of our embodied 
responsiveness to our surroundings. This myth, in other words, is that mind—and with it 
our capacity for discursive, determinate thought—is always involved in every aspect of 
the embodied coping of rational animals. Dreyfus understands the role McDowell assigns 
to concepts in experience and action to mean that we must have a determinate grasp of 
objects in our embodied coping, whereas Dreyfus, drawing on phenomenology, wants to 
show that in embodied coping we encounter things indeterminately, as affordances or as 
solicitations of affordances.50 
McDowell, however, does not think that insisting on a role for mind and 
conceptual capacities in embodied coping saddles him with the idea that, in embodied 
coping, we grasp objects determinately. What McDowell really wants is to allow our 
experience in embodied coping to make a positive contribution to explicit acts of 
judgment wherein we do grasp the world determinately. Part of McDowell’s aim in 
making experience and perception conceptual is to ensure that we can ground our 
knowledge in experience without the Myth of the Given, i.e., that we can appeal to what 
appears in our unreflective experience in order to justify our claims to empirical 
knowledge. From Dreyfus’s perspective, to depict embodied coping as conceptual so that 
it can make a positive contribution to knowledge is to intellectualize embodied coping. 
                                                                                                                                            
that conference, their debate culminated in essays in which Dreyfus and McDowell each revised and 
recapitulated their positions (Dreyfus, “The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental”; McDowell, “The 
Myth of the Mind as Detached”). These were published in a volume of essays reflecting on the debate, 
edited by Schear (Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell–Dreyfus Debate). 
50 I define Dreyfus’s terms, such as “affordances,” below. 
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The mind, as far as Dreyfus understands it, is exclusively concerned with judgments, and 
extending mind into embodied coping only distorts what embodied coping is. 
Dreyfus challenges philosophers to explain how conceptual understanding arises 
out of more basic capacities. Although he inherits (rather than originates) this old and 
challenging question, his particular expression of it bears repeating: The challenge is to 
work up a “step-by-step genesis of the conceptual categories that structure the space of 
reasons from the perceptual ones that structure the space of motivations. . . . The time is 
ripe to begin the challenging collaborative task of showing how our conceptual capacities 
grow out of our nonconceptual ones” (OMM 61). To Dreyfus, the exclusive function of 
“conceptual capacities” is to make determinate, explicit judgments. In embodied coping, 
by contrast, we respond unreflectively to indeterminate aspects of what we encounter 
and, Dreyfus thinks, conceptual capacities can only impede such unreflective coping 
because to use concepts is to be self-aware in a way that breaks us out of the flow of our 
unreflective, habitual practices. The task is to work out an emergence thesis for 
conceptual understanding out of unreflective embodied coping that has no need for 
determinacy, concepts, or reflective self-awareness whatsoever. Dreyfus does not offer a 
way of responding to the challenge (indeed, I argue that he cannot, given his other 
commitments), but his recognition of its importance is part of his inheritance of 
existential phenomenology: on his reading, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty recognize 
the challenge and fail or neglect to answer it (RMM 364). 
McDowell does offer a kind of response to Dreyfus’s challenge, but (as Dreyfus 
notes) it is too thin to be satisfactory. He implicitly recognizes the challenge when he 
argues in Mind and World against “bald naturalism” and defends a quasi-Kantian notion 
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of spontaneity. In McDowell’s view, it is part of our nature—on an expansive notion of 
“nature”—to develop our form of rational, conceptual understanding. Thus, Dreyfus’s 
challenge of explaining the emergence of conceptual understanding from lesser abilities 
appears in McDowell’s work as the need to naturalize spontaneity, that is, the need to 
explain how spontaneity arises for humans from lesser capacities that are not yet rational. 
Rationality is natural to rational animals as we actualize our specific animal potential, just 
as flying is natural to bats as they naturalize their specific animal potential.51 
To naturalize spontaneity, McDowell turns to Aristotle to set up a simile: 
acquiring a second nature of rationally understanding a world is like acquiring phronesis; 
that is, our rational understanding develops similarly to the way Aristotle describes 
humans developing practical wisdom (MW 79, 84). He also likens acquiring spontaneity 
to developing Bildung, in the sense of developing one’s capacities and acquiring culture 
(MW 84). I take this to be a step in the right direction for answering Dreyfus’s challenge, 
but it is insufficient.52 To put the matter bluntly, to have a second nature is to have a 
bundle of contingent habits, necessary only with respect to a particular form of life. 
Surely, there is something right about this, as habit has a long history in philosophy as a 
hinge between freedom and nature. But how are we to understand spontaneity, rational 
understanding, and objective knowledge as a bundle of habits? Brandom makes it very 
                                                
51 McDowell appears to equivocate on the term “natural,” given that we are responsible for our rationality 
in a way that bats are not for flight. However, McDowell arms himself to respond that he is not so much 
equivocating on the term “natural” as he is expanding the notion of nature to accommodate spontaneity, 
i.e., partially re-enchanting nature. The problem then becomes that his re-enchantment of nature is too 
thinly conceived to be satisfying. For a critique of McDowell’s tepid endorsement of re-enchanted nature, 
see Bernstein, “Re-Enchanting Nature.” 
52 McDowell doesn’t bite on the question Dreyfus raises, despite the fact that he raises it more than once. In 
the Afterword of Mind and World, McDowell insists that his “sketchy and unsystematic” invocation of 
second nature “should not invite” questions like Dreyfus’s. We do not, in his view, need to explain how 
second nature “constitute[s] the space of reasons” because the motivation for doing is only prompted by the 
very dualism McDowell is rejecting by claiming that rationality is second nature. Quietism has its merits, 
but I do not think we should be satisfied with this response, and neither do many of his interlocutors over 
the past two decades. 
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clear (as discussed in Chapter I) that if we explain rationality from the bottom up in terms 
of habits, we lose what is distinctive about rationality. 
McDowell disagrees that appealing to habit jeopardizes what is distinctive about 
rationality, but as I showed in Chapter I, the upshot of his view is that experience and 
judgment are insufficiently distinct. Moreover, he argues it is a mistake to think we are 
obliged to even answer the question, because to think we need such an answer is to 
remain in the grip of alternatives from which he is trying to extricate us. The problem is 
that McDowell’s solution to an epistemological puzzle lands him in a much larger 
playing field that includes commitments in phenomenology and philosophy of mind. 
Quietism won’t do. From a phenomenological standpoint—and arguably for philosophy 
of mind, too—we need something more like what Dreyfus called for: a step-by-step 
genesis of conceptual understanding out of a more basic form of cognition, but one that 
still manages to make rationality distinct from the abilities that give rise to it. 
2.2 Responses to the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate 
The debate between McDowell and Dreyfus has sparked many responses, including those 
in Schear’s volume of essays, mentioned above.53 My response to the debate shares a 
perspective expressed in some of the essays in this volume that take Dreyfus (and to 
some extent, McDowell) to task for distorting the views of existential phenomenologists, 
in particular those Merleau-Ponty expressed in his Phenomenology of Perception.54 The 
point, in very general terms, is that Merleau-Ponty rejected Dreyfus’s idea that the 
capacity for conceptual understanding is a discrete means to rationally and explicitly 
grasp a world of objects. Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, the understanding is part of a more 
                                                
53 Schear, Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell–Dreyfus Debate. 
54 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. 
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general capacity to respond spontaneously to our surroundings, in order to better adapt 
ourselves to them and adapt them to our needs, to achieve maximal grip on them in order 
to realize our material ends. A rational, explicit grasp of objects as such is just one of the 
ways we do this. The rational understanding of a world is distinct, but it is the refinement 
of a more general ability to navigate an environment. 
One respondent who critiques Dreyfus for overlooking important features of 
Merleau-Ponty’s view is Sebastian Gardner. As Gardner puts it, “the line that Dreyfus 
draws between ‘conceptual’ and ‘nonconceptual’ does not align with Merleau-Ponty’s 
central distinction.”55 Gardner’s essay, which views the McDowell-Dreyfus debate 
through the lens of transcendental philosophy as an historical project, is particularly 
shrewd in criticizing Dreyfus’s position. In response to Dreyfus’s contention that 
Merleau-Ponty supports his thesis that embodied coping is non-conceptual, Gardner 
wonders what notion of the conceptual Dreyfus thinks is in play.56 Against Dreyfus, 
Gardner points to Merleau-Ponty’s idea that the capacity for rational, conceptual 
understanding is an aspect of a more general capacity that lends a kind of practical, pre-
objective order to our awareness in embodied coping. Quoting the Phenomenology of 
Perception, Gardner insists that “the understanding (l’entendement) ‘needs to be 
redefined, since the general connective function ultimately attributed to it by Kantianism 
is now spread over the whole intentional life and no longer suffices to distinguish it.’”57 
In other words, the gap Dreyfus imposes between conceptual understanding and 
embodied coping is false on Merleau-Ponty’s account. One option for spelling out 
Merleau-Ponty’s account, according to Gardner, aligns well with the notion of concepts I 
                                                
55 Gardner, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Given,” 131. 
56 Gardner, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Given,” 130. 
57 Gardner, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Given,” 131. 
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defend later. If we assume that the understanding involves concepts and extends into pre-
objective embodied coping,  
then we must say that on Merleau-Ponty’s account conceptuality is present 
in pre-objectivity, and so that it must be uncoupled from objective 
thought, which should be defined in terms of a specific form of conceptual 
representation, one generated by analytical reflection.”58 
Distinguishing a general function for concepts from the one they take on in objective 
thought is precisely the approach I develop in Chapters III-V. Gardner is not, however, 
endorsing this view in his essay. Rather, he deploys it to critique Dreyfus’s misuse and 
mischaracterization of Merleau-Ponty’s thought as rejecting conceptualism. 
Alva Noë takes up a position he inherits from Merleau-Ponty in his reading of the 
debate, while assembling some “remarks towards a general theory of access” to the things 
we encounter in thought, perception, and action.59 Like Gardner, Noë draws attention to 
the idea of the capacity for conceptual understanding as one distributed across a broad 
range of human activities, but Noë explicitly endorses a Merleau-Pontyian view. As Noë 
puts it, in a phrase that is critical of both McDowell and Dreyfus, “thought is not prior to 
experience; experience is a kind of thought.”60 The first part of the claim is, at least 
implicitly, a rejection of McDowell’s and Dreyfus’s shared idea that language is 
necessary for having concepts; the second part rejects Dreyfus’s strict partition of 
embodied coping and conceptual understanding. Noë’s leading idea is that we should not 
“over-intellectualize the intellect,” that is, we should avoid the trap of thinking that the 
primary function of our conceptual capacities is obtaining justified, true beliefs. Rather, 
the intellect—by way of our conceptual capacities—is deeply involved in our coping 
                                                
58 Gardner, “Transcendental Philosophy and the Given,” 131. 
59 Noë, “On Overintellectualizing the Intellect,” 185. 
60 Noë, “On Overintellectualizing the Intellect,” 180. 
  62 
practices. He writes, “It is to over-intellectualize the workings of the intellect to suppose 
that every exercise of understanding requires a deliberate act of contemplation of an 
explicitly formulated rule. Such an over-intellectualized conception of the intellect leaves 
out the possibility that intellectual skills themselves may admit of expertise and effortless 
exercise.”61 
By embracing Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about the understanding, Noë comes to 
defend a position quite close to McDowell’s, insisting that concepts have a function or 
use in perception. He writes,  
Concepts and sensorimotor skills get applied in perceptual experience in 
the distinctively perceptual mode. That is, we don’t use conceptual or 
sensorimotor rules to categorize objects or to represent them in our minds. 
Conceptual and sensorimotor skills are not means of representation; they 
are means of achieving access to things.62 
Noë suggests there are different modes in which our conceptual capacities can be active. 
A perceptual mode yields perception and a discursive mode yields an explicit form of 
understanding. Again, Noë takes concepts to be a means of gaining access to things, to 
allow us to gain a better grip on them to better realize our practical intentions, rather than 
a mental representation of some feature of the world that could figure in a discursive 
                                                
61 Noë, “On Overintellectualizing the Intellect,” 182. For a more thorough investigation of the thought that 
explicit thought and judgments can be habitually effortless for the same reason as other repetitive and 
familiar actions, see Braver, “Never Mind: Thinking of Subjectivity in the McDowell–Dreyfus Debate.” 
62 Noë, “On Overintellectualizing the Intellect,” 186. Rather than take concepts to exclusively represent the 
world in a way that is amenable for objective knowledge, the idea is that concepts are learned (and 
therefore revisable) modes of responsiveness to our surroundings. This view, of course, will raise 
Brandom’s hackles (and should raise ours too): by reducing concepts to facilitating abilities we share with 
other moderately intelligent animals, then how do we distinguish the obviously distinct capacity for 
conceptual understanding that rational animals have? This hole in the account of concepts that existential 
phenomenology offers up is part of what Dreyfus alludes to when he declares Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to 
answer the question of the emergence of rational cognition incomplete. Here is a promisory note on the 
view I develop in Chapter III: rather than restrict concepts-use to an objective grasp of the world (as do 
Brandom, McDowell, Dreyfus, Haugeland, just to name a few), my attempt to complete Merleau-Ponty’s 
picture will endorse the broad view of concepts that Noë articulates here and then make the normative use 
of concepts the key condition for having an objective grasp of the world. 
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judgment—a piece of knowledge—about it. As a mode of access, a concept is more like a 
window onto some aspect of the world than a mental picture that does or does not 
correspond to it. 
Finally, Joseph Rouse takes up a similar position on the understanding as a 
capacity distributed through the whole range of human intentional activity.63 For one 
thing, he agrees with Noë that our engagement in rational, discursive practices of 
conceptual understanding is itself a matter of embodied coping. To put the point in 
Brandom’s terms, there is a sense in which language entry moves and language-language 
moves are always—in some respect—desire-driven, reliable differential responsive 
dispositions. Drawing on Brandom’s favorite example of a parrot reliably making the 
sound “red” in response to red things, Rouse points out that just as the parrot is using 
practical, perceptual capacities for this performance, so do we incorporate practical 
perceptual capacities when we say and also mean that something is red, so much so that 
we are not necessarily explicitly aware of the meaning of the words we use when we 
speak. “Rapid, fluent conversation,” Rouse claims, “is not explicitly ‘mindful’ of the 
concepts it expresses. Speakers can respond fluently and smoothly to the solicitations of 
the conversational situation, and often discover what they have to say only when they say 
it.”64 Rouse’s larger point is that, contra Dreyfus, not only should we take skilled, 
absorbed coping practices like speed chess to be examples of the non-discursive, non-
                                                
63 Rouse, “What Is Conceptually Articulated Understanding?” Rouse builds on this idea in Part 1 of his 
recent book, Rouse, Articulating the World: Conceptual Understanding and the Scientific Image. While 
Rouse’s aims are similar to mine in some respects, he retains a gap between human and nonhuman animal 
cognition that I hope to close. 
64 Rouse, “What Is Conceptually Articulated Understanding?,” 256. There would seem to be many shades 
of this phenomenon, though Rouse does not discuss them. The easy case would be appropriately issuing a 
clichéd or stock phrase in response to a familiar situation without thinking the explicit meaning of the 
words. There may, however, be challenging cases that demand a more detailed account that Rouse offers 
here. 
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explicit use of concepts, we should also take paradigmatically conceptual activities like 
verbal exchanges to be examples of skilled coping practices. Dreyfus preserves “a 
fundamental difference in kind between conceptually articulated thought and 
nonconceptual perceptual practice,” but the strict distinction between embodied coping 
and conceptual understanding dissolves under Rouse’s approach into a more relaxed 
distinction between practical-perceptual engagements with our social and physical 
environs that are filled with the content of conceptual understanding and those that are 
not.65 The challenge is to explain how discursive practices emerge and become distinct 
from non-discursive ones, and thereby transcend mere animal activity without “magically 
invoking” language to make the distinction.66 This is Rouse’s own articulation of the 
challenge Dreyfus levels at the philosophical community and it nicely expresses the 
approach I am pursuing here. 
 
3. Concepts and Embodied Coping 
Dreyfus rejects McDowell’s conceptualism and hews to a narrow notion of concepts. My 
aim here is to unpack Dreyfus’s narrow notion of concepts and show how it makes 
answering Dreyfus’s own challenge extremely difficult. 
Conceptualism is the idea that the embodied coping, experience, perception and 
action of rational animals involve at least some of the same concepts with which we 
think. McDowell deploys his conceptualism as a way of inheriting Sellars’s attack on the 
Myth of the Given while at the same time holding onto a minimal form of empiricism. 
                                                
65 Rouse, “What Is Conceptually Articulated Understanding?,” 258–59. 
66 Rouse, “What Is Conceptually Articulated Understanding?,” 260. 
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Dreyfus begins the debate with two crucial questions that McDowell’s conceptualism 
invites: 
Can we accept McDowell’s Sellarsian claim that perception is conceptual 
“all the way out,” thereby denying the more basic perceptual capacities we 
seem to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals? More 
generally, can philosophers successfully describe the conceptual upper 
floors of the edifice of knowledge while ignoring the embodied coping 
going on on the ground floor; in effect, declaring that human experience is 
upper stories all the way down? (OMM 47) 
These are rhetorical questions coming from Dreyfus: his answer to both is emphatically 
negative. Dreyfus approves of McDowell’s claim in Mind and World that embodied 
subjects inhabit a world that is present and open to them (OMM 47). His complaint is that 
McDowell understands this engagement in the world as a “conceptual activity” (OMM 
47). Generally, Dreyfus understands concepts, rationality, and mind to be exclusively 
involved in carving out aspects of what we encounter in embodied coping by making 
determinate judgments. On his view, the grain of what we encounter in embodied coping 
is too fine to be captured by concepts; we are alive and responsive to so much more than 
determinate concepts can ever grasp. Conceptualism constitutes a regrettable flattening of 
experience into knowledge. There is a whole world of indeterminacy in which we act 
when we are not thinking, and he wants to stress the fact that, in our unreflective yet 
skillful embodied coping, we are highly sensitive and responsive to minuscule changes in 
the environment in ways that far outstrip our ability to determine things in propositional 
form by explicitly thinking about them. Moreover, Dreyfus believes, the very attempt to 
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carve up the world determinately, through concepts, actually impedes our performance in 
skilled coping.67 
As I argue below, a central problem with Dreyfus’s position is that his setup has 
“over-intellectualized the intellect,” to repeat Noë’s memorable phrase. Dreyfus notes 
that determinate judgments are only possible against a background that takes shape 
through our embodied coping, but fails to note how explicit, linguistic acts like having a 
conversation are themselves habit-dependent, skilled practices. In the following section 
(§3.1), I consider the narrow view of concepts that Dreyfus embraces and attributes to 
McDowell, and spell out reasons Dreyfus gives for why concepts—on his narrow 
definition—cannot play a role in embodied coping. McDowell’s response is to demur that 
Dreyfus’s narrow notion of concepts is not his. I then (§3.2) consider Dreyfus’s 
arguments against two broader notions of the concept, one which plausibly captures 
McDowell’s notion. Here, I show that Dreyfus’s own definition of concepts and his 
rejection of two other ways of understanding concepts are not sufficient to rule out an 
alternative view that upholds conceptualism without distorting embodied coping. Finally 
(§3.3), I show how Dreyfus’s commitment to the idea that language is necessary for 
having concepts makes it impossible to answer the challenge he raises, namely, to explain 
how conceptual understanding arises out of more basic capacities we share with other 
intelligent animals. 
                                                
67 For a clear and compelling argument that Dreyfus’s hard distinction between reflective thought and 
embodied practice and his claim that thought impedes our performance in expert, absorbed coping, see 
Montero, “A Dancer Reflects.” Montero attacks Dreyfus for adhering to the “principle of automaticity,” 
which falsely holds “that expert action is natural and effortless” (“A Dancer Reflects,” 304). Moreover, 
Montero thinks that expert action involves a form of reflective awareness that Dreyfus denies by reducing 
all reflective awareness to its explicit, discursive form. While I agree with Montero that Dreyfus’s notion of 
the effortlessness of habitual action misses the way in which expert action involves a great deal of effort 
and a form of self-awareness, I do not deploy her arguments in my critique of Dreyfus here. 
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3.1 Dreyfus’s Narrow Notion of Concepts 
Dreyfus spends much of the debate arguing against conceptualism on the basis of a 
narrow notion of concepts that he both endorses and attributes to McDowell (but that 
McDowell does not share). The narrow view of concepts he endorses and falsely 
attributes to McDowell supposes that any and every use of concepts—whether in 
judgments or in embodied coping—involves an explicit, determinate grasp of the world. 
Thus, when McDowell suggests that concepts play a role in embodied coping, Dreyfus 
thinks it must mean that, on McDowell’s view, embodied coping involves explicit, 
determinate understanding. And this is precisely what Dreyfus rejects, on 
phenomenological grounds. Meanwhile, McDowell insists that his (broader) view of 
concepts is in principle compatible with a phenomenology of embodied coping. This 
basic template of their exchange plays itself out a few times, through different issues. 
Among these issues, following rules, awareness, and being-in-the-world stand out. I’ll 
treat each in turn. 
3.1.1. Rule Following 
Dreyfus’s discussion of rules gives us reasons to reject the idea that embodied coping 
involves a discursive awareness of rules governing our normative activities on his narrow 
notion of disembodied concepts. Responding to McDowell’s use of Aristotle’s phronesis 
to bring the notion of second nature into view, Dreyfus writes, “One can easily accept 
that in learning to be wise we learn to follow general reasons as guides to acting 
appropriately. But it does not follow that, once we have gotten past the learning phase, 
these reasons in the form of habits still influence our wise actions” (OMM 51). The key 
phrase here is “reasons in the form of habits.” Dreyfus refuses the very idea that reason 
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can take the form of habits, exclusively relegating reason—as does Brandom—to 
explicit, linguistic acts. And in excluding rationality from embodied coping, he also bans 
concepts. The upshot is that if I learn a complex activity by acting according to explicit 
rules, by consulting the rules regularly in the early stages of the learning process, then 
when I go on to perform the same activity habitually without consulting the rules or 
reflecting on specific details of the activity as I did in order to learn the activity, the 
concepts by which I grasped the rules are no longer involved. Concepts have no place or 
involvement in the habits to which judgments that involve them give rise. 
Dreyfus does not deny outright that rationality influences our embodied coping. 
For example, the rules of a game (and otherwise explicit instructions that are 
conceptually articulated expressions of rationality) do shape our behavior once learned. 
However, Dreyfus denies that the habits acquired that reflect these rules “internalize” 
conceptually grasped rules, where “internalizing” means that the rules are “stored in the 
mind” (OMM 53). Rather, he says that we simply experience such rules as limits on our 
behavior (ibid.). Dreyfus accepts that, in this sense, the rules have become second nature 
to us, but he denies that this second nature puts our conceptual capacities to work. He 
writes, “We should bear in mind that, when [rules] function as second nature, they do not 
function as rules we consciously or unconsciously follow but as a landscape on the basis 
of which skilled coping and reasoning takes place” (OMM 53). It is odd, considering his 
position, that Dreyfus admits that rules “function as second nature” at all; perhaps this is 
just shorthand for the idea that habits can inhabit a shape imparted on them by rule-
following or some other notion that keeps the rules themselves out of the body. In any 
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case, the relevant claim is that the “landscape” constituted by rules functioning as second 
nature is not itself a manifestation of our conceptual capacities. 
Dreyfus discusses games as a way of distinguishing two kinds of rules: (1) the 
rules of playing the game; and (2) tactical rules for competitive play (OMM 53). With 
tactical rules, Dreyfus argues, an expert chess player is not capable of describing in 
sufficient detail the rules governing expert gameplay (OMM 54). If her “retroactive 
rationalizations” of her expert gameplay really expressed her expertise, Dreyfus contends, 
then following these rules could turn a mediocre chess player into an expert immediately. 
The inability to set down the rules of expert play means, according to Dreyfus, that expert 
players do not play according to rules at all, and he draws the conclusion that therefore 
conceptual capacities are not involved. 
McDowell’s basic response to Dreyfus’s arguments from rules underscores 
McDowell’s broader idea of our conceptual capacities. McDowell thinks that conceptual 
capacities can be involved in expert coping without making every aspect of that coping 
explicit and determinate. Just as implicitly following normative rules can manifest our 
rationality, so can navigating a territory first grasped conceptually manifest and deploy 
the same concepts even when the same territory becomes utterly familiar and navigating 
it becomes second nature. 
3.1.2 Awareness 
Dreyfus also appeals to the form of awareness we have in skilled coping to rule out 
conceptualism (again, on his narrow view of concepts). He argues that expert responses 
to changing conditions operate, at least in part, outside the awareness of the expert, which 
would mean that, on his view of concepts, concepts cannot be involved (OMM 57-8). In 
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other words, the expert responds to changing circumstances that never actually break into 
her explicit and discursive awareness of the situation to which she responds. She is aware 
of and attending to her situation, but she is not determinately aware of many or even most 
aspects of the situation that elicit her particular response.  
An expert at speed chess, Dreyfus claims, is differentially responsive to “perhaps 
hundreds of thousands” of different layouts on the board, and he points out that such 
positions cannot, in principle, be defined and enumerated and thereby grasped explicitly 
in conceptual terms that determinately identify each position according to a set of 
properties (OMM 58). Dreyfus uses that fact to re-establish the idea that speed chess 
experts are not following explicit rules; but the more interesting point that Dreyfus 
glosses over is that the players are responsive without being aware of what they are 
responding to. It does seem that if one is not aware of what one is responding to, one 
cannot be responding with conceptual capacities, because conceptual responsiveness is 
marked by awareness and it is part of the function of conceptual capacities that they yield 
awareness of what drew them into action—the lack of awareness suggests the absence of 
these capacities. 
McDowell effectively responds to this argument when he answers Dreyfus’s point 
about rules. For McDowell, there is no need to be aware of every aspect of the situation 
to which one is responding in order to count as responding rationally in one’s embodied, 
skillful activity. It is enough, for example, for the speed chess expert to be aware that she 
is responding to the situation she encounters on the board, without needing to articulate 
what the situation on the board is in a way that can distinguish it from one hundred 
thousand other situations. The point is that, while awareness seems important for 
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rationality in some sense, rational awareness does not mean exhaustive, discursive 
awareness. One can claim both that a subject is responsive to features of her surroundings 
of which she is not aware and that her activity under these conditions manifests her 
conceptual capacities in action. The thesis that conceptual capacities yield some kind of 
awareness when they are drawn into play can be true; but they need not bring every 
aspect of what one responds to into awareness. 
3.1.3 Ways of Being-in-the-World 
Another way Dreyfus endeavors to keep conceptual capacities, narrowly construed, out 
of embodied coping is by distinguishing between conceptual and merely intentional 
content that, he thinks, does belong to embodied coping. The problem is that in tracking 
Dreyfus’s arguments about various kinds of content forward through the debate, he seems 
to contradict himself. First, there is intentional content, shaped by our habits and practices 
of engaging with our surroundings. Dreyfus wields the idea of intentional content to 
disarm what might otherwise seem to be a forced choice between McDowell’s conceptual 
content and a bare or brute given (OMM 58). Later, intentional content gets the added 
designation of “motor” intentional content, to capture the idea that it is the content of 
motor intentionality, i.e., the kind of intentionality the body exhibits in activity that does 
not, in his view, draw our rationality into play (OMM 60). Dreyfus also equates 
intentional content with “affordances,” borrowing the term from Gibson (OMM 56). 
When McDowell simply appropriates Dreyfus’s talk of affordances to show that concepts 
do play a role in perception, Dreyfus unpacks affordances as solicitations, the idea being 
that we do not, in embodied coping, respond to affordances as affordances, rather, we 
respond to them as solicitations (RMM 357). Solicitations, in turn, are not the things we 
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encounter but the attractions and repulsions that draw our motor intentions into play 
without engaging our reflective awareness (RMM 357). Finally, Dreyfus claims that there 
is no content at all in our most absorbed form of coping, which corresponds to the 
absence of apperception in the form of an “I think” or even “I do” (MPM 28). The claim 
that there is no content at all is meant as a further clarification of the notions of attraction 
and repulsion (MPM 28). 
It is important to point out, however, that claiming an absence of content is not 
the same thing, for Dreyfus, as claiming that we are merely responsive to sub-personal 
environing stimuli that are nothing at all for us or to us. What the lack of content is 
supposed to reflect, for Dreyfus, is that the subject has no sense of herself as a self in her 
responsiveness; content requires some kind of awareness of intentions, albeit not 
necessarily full-blown self-consciousness. This is confusing, if not simply confused: what 
began as (motor) intentional content was better grasped as affordances, which are, insofar 
as they are relevant to the argument, solicitations, understood to be attractions and 
repulsions, which are not content at all. Putting things this way is wholly uncharitable but 
it illustrates the fact that Dreyfus needs a better tools to clarify what he means by content, 
or the lack thereof. 
One tool Dreyfus reaches for turns out to be Heidegger’s discussion of tool-being. 
How Dreyfus thinks of content reveals itself in the context of different ways of being-in-
the-world. Following Heidegger, Dreyfus claims there are three modes of a rational 
human’s being-in-the-world (two of which are forms of embodied coping) (MPM 32). 
We can be (1) absorbed in the flow of our activities; (2) coping with the unfamiliar; and 
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(3) engaged in subject-object intentionality (MPM 32). I’ll treat each of these modes in 
turn, from the lowest or most basic up to rational, discursive cognition. 
(1) “Absorption in flow” is a form of embodied coping under familiar circumstances 
that, Dreyfus thinks, involves no content at all, intentional or otherwise. Dreyfus 
sometimes calls this absorbed coping, referring to our absorption in the flow of our 
activities. Adopting Heidegger’s term, things we encounter in such absorbed coping have 
the form of being Zuhandenheit, which Dreyfus here calls “readiness-to-hand” and, in an 
earlier work, “availableness.”68 In this form, things are useful for us, but in making use of 
them there is no subject/object distinction as there is when we are explicitly aware of 
what we are doing. Things merely ready-to-hand do not appear as objects with properties, 
and in handling something in this way I am not returned to myself as a self. This is where 
Dreyfus wants to claim that there is no content involved, where having “content” means 
that we are attentively aware of or monitoring the thing we are handling. I can open a 
familiar door and walk through it in one fluid action without ever really attending to the 
doorknob that I grasped, turned precisely the right amount with the appropriate amount of 
force, and then released slowly so that it did not produce a loud noise by snapping back to 
its original position. If you ask me shortly thereafter whether I touched the doorknob 
when I came through the door, or if, instead, the door was slightly ajar (as it often is) and 
I opened it simply with my fingertips on the door panel (as I often do), I might not be 
able to tell you. In this sense, the doorknob that I operated was not, in that instance, the 
                                                
68 The earlier work is Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
Division 1. For Dreyfus’s terminological decision, see p. xi. In her translation of Sein und Zeit, Joan 
Stambaugh renders Zuhandenheit as “handiness” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 64 ff.). All references to 
Stambaugh’s translation give the marginal pagination, which refers to the German edition: Heidegger, Sein 
Und Zeit. For a useful overview of Heidegger’s notion of Zuhandenheit, see Overgaard, Husserl and 
Heidegger on Being in the World, 117 ff.  
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content of my awareness in any meaningful sense even though my interaction with it 
reflected a high degree of specificity and precision. I am an expert at walking through 
that door. 
These distinctions help unpack what Dreyfus is doing with affordances, 
solicitations, attractions, and repulsions. The important thing about affordances, for 
Dreyfus, is that they can, when we are wholly absorbed in the unimpeded flow of an 
activity, “withdraw” like the doorknob did, when we respond to them without necessarily 
being aware of them as affordances at all (OMM 56). When affordances do withdraw, 
there is just their “solicitation” left. The doorknob solicits my hand when I am absorbed 
in an activity, without soliciting my attention in any meaningful way, for example, to the 
properties of the doorknob as such. When we are absorbed in flow, the world is “the 
totality of interconnected solicitations that attract or repulse us” (RMM 357). Surrounded 
by familiar things and fully absorbed in a familiar activity, Dreyfus holds that there are 
only solicitations insofar as they actually attract or repulse familiar bodily movements 
(RMM 357-8). Reflecting on the nature of solicitations, Dreyfus claims they are orderly 
and systemic, albeit he does not mean that we encounter them as a system in our 
embodied coping (RMM 358). To grasp something as a system would surely involve 
conceptual content. Absorption in flow ends when something breaks into our attention to 
disrupt the flow of our activities, which leads us into a higher level of awareness that 
involves content, properly speaking. 
(2) “Coping with the unfamiliar” is a form of embodied coping that involves 
intentional content and, thus, some degree of awareness of one’s intentions. But this is 
not yet a subject-object relation, and engaging with intentional content does not involve 
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making judgments. What may have functioned as the solicitation of an affordance in our 
fully absorbed coping now stands out as an affordance for us in our awareness. That is, 
we are drawn out of absorption in flow and into “prereflective monitoring” of our 
movements when our absorbed coping is moderately disrupted, thus our actions cannot 
continue without involving some degree of awareness of our intentions. If I attempt to 
open the familiar door in a familiar way while absorbed in some larger activity and 
anticipate no resistance from the door, and then I find the handle to be unexpectedly 
stuck, requiring more than the usual force (perhaps it takes two hands to crank the 
handle), then, Dreyfus thinks, I am likely to encounter the affordances as more than just a 
solicitation, but as affordances as such. An affordance shows up for me, in a manner of 
speaking, as an un-affording affordance. It thereby becomes intentional content for me, 
my intention being to open the door, but I am not explicitly thinking and judging. Rather, 
I am just responding in the still-familiar surroundings with a kind of know-how. Opening 
the door has slowed me down but has not drawn my full attention. This mode Dreyfus 
associates with a second Heideggerian term: “Un-zuhandenheit” or un-readyness-to-
hand.”69 If the disturbance is only marginal, Dreyfus thinks we simply return to absorbed 
coping without the aid of explicit thought, but if it is great enough, we are drawn out of 
coping altogether and forced into confronting the world with thought, with subject/object 
intentionality. 
                                                
69 Dreyfus’s use of Heidegger’s terms in this table (Zuhandenheit, Unzuhandenheit, and Vorhandenheit) is 
not his attempt to represent Heidegger’s views so much as simplify the terms for his own use (MPM 32). 
For example, whereas Dreyfus treats each as distinct modes of entities and equates Vorhandenheit with 
objects grasped objectively through discursive, conceptual understanding, in Being and Time §15-6 the 
Unzuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit are modifications of useful (Zeug), Zuhandene things in which they do 
not necessarily lose their quality of being useful to become merely or only present at hand in an abstract, 
discursive, conceptual way. In other words, Vorhandenheit does not always involve the distinct opposition 
of a subject and an object (see Being and Time, 66–76). 
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The important thing for Dreyfus is that intentional content yields awareness of a 
thing and, to some degree, our intentions with respect to the thing, but without drawing us 
into a subject-object conceptual relation with it. Dreyfus unveils the distinction between 
intentional and conceptual content by approvingly quoting Brandom’s reading of Sellars: 
“grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word” (OMM 55). From this, he infers that 
because we do not have words for everything that figures as intentional content for us, 
concepts are not thereby involved. Note the similarity here to Dreyfus’s arguments from 
rules and from awareness. Intentional content is learned and shaped by experience and 
opens us onto a meaningful world to which we can respond in myriad ways (OMM 55). 
This responsiveness in no way requires that we master the use of words for all that 
figures for us as intentional content. Above all, for Dreyfus, intentional content is 
meaningful content: it manifests aspects of the world for us with respect to our aims and 
interests. It allows what we encounter in experience to matter to our lives, to what we are 
about in a given moment. 
In being snapped out of absorbed coping into this prereflective form of coping, 
what had merely been attracting and repulsing our familiar movements now comes into 
our intentional focus as affordances. Solicitations become for us the affordances they 
already were. Now Dreyfus needs to explain how affordances or intentional content 
becomes conceptual content as we move into subject-object intentionality. Here, Dreyfus 
suggests that we actively transform affordances or intentional content into conceptual 
content. Thinking is a kind of force that is separate from embodied coping entirely, and 
can act on it, stamping its shape onto coping habits to produce conceptually relevant, 
thinkable content. He writes: 
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Analytic attention brings about a radical transformation of the affordances 
given to absorbed coping. Only then can we have an experience of objects 
with properties about which we can form beliefs, make judgments, and 
justify inferences. At the same time, however, this transformation covers 
up the non-conceptual perception and coping that made our openness to 
the world possible in the first place. (OMM 61) 
Thus, Dreyfus supposes that transformation changes our whole orientation. We 
move from mere intentional content that motivates us to conceptual content fit for 
knowledge, from withdrawing affordances to objects with properties. Unfortunately, 
beyond these sparse comments, Dreyfus leaves the transformation of intentional into 
conceptual content largely unexplained, giving the impression that the very distinction 
between them serves more as a way of keeping rational understanding and embodied 
coping apart rather than explaining how they are related. More charitably, his comments 
are sparse because he simply doesn’t have an answer—the question of how intentional 
become conceptual content is closely related to the larger one about capacities that 
Dreyfus calls upon philosophers to answer, namely, to explain how rational, conceptual 
understanding arises from more basic capacities.  
 (3) Finally, “Subject-object intentionality” is the reflective, discursive, rational mode 
of being-in-the-world that involves conceptual content by which we make explicit 
judgments. In this mode, things formerly encountered merely as solicitations or 
intentional content now appear as objectively present-at-hand (here Dreyfus adopts 
Heidegger’s term, “Vorhandenheit”). In this mode, one is not merely aware of intentions 
but aware of oneself as having them. And things encountered as affording the opportunity 
to realize our interests become objects grasped through objective judgments of things 
bearing properties. Moreover, Dreyfus thinks, here we break into language-use, making 
  78 
things explicit to ourselves in a determinate form. A distinct subject appears opposite a 
distinct object and the object takes the form of a substance with knowable properties. 
Consider again my familiar door. This time it is not just that the handle is stiff, it 
won’t budge. The door is locked for the first time in recent memory. I have the key in my 
pocket but it is on a ring with several other keys, only one of which I use regularly. Now 
I have to inspect the keys and the lock on the handle to figure out which key is the right 
one. To avoid trying the same key twice, I flip it from one side of the ring to the other, 
speaking as I do, “not that one, not that one, not that one,” until I find the right key. This 
operation suddenly has my full attention. I am engaged in the activity of opening the 
door, fully cognizant of the central aspects of my activity: choosing and trying each key, 
ruling them out methodically one by one. When I succeed, I exclaim, “Yes, this is it!” 
This is subject-object intentionality. 
To Dreyfus, these three modes of being-in-the-world explain how we engage with 
our surroundings in a way that is supposed to show why conceptual content is only 
involved in the third and highest stage of subject-object intentionality. The problem is 
that it is not sufficient to show that concepts are not involved in embodied coping in the 
manner that McDowell supposes. On McDowell’s account, our conceptual capacities can 
be engaged when we are absorbed in the flow of a familiar activity or engaged in 
unreflective coping. Indeed, McDowell thinks that the passive engagement of conceptual 
capacities in our experience and action draws them into play without breaking us out of 
embodied coping and into subject-object intentionality and our explicit, discursive grasp 
of the world. What Dreyfus needs in order to repel conceptualism is an argument against 
endorsing a broader notion of concepts than the narrow one he adheres to. 
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3.2 Dreyfus Rejects a Broader Notions of Concepts 
Dreyfus’s argument against a broader notion of concepts only appears in Dreyfus’s final 
contribution to the debate, “Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental,” where he briefly 
makes the case for his view of concepts (one at odds with McDowell’s and which would 
exclude concepts from embodied coping) and attacks the competing views. He offers an 
argument against the pervasiveness of the mental, but it is more precisely an argument 
against the pervasiveness of conceptual capacities. Dreyfus acknowledges three theories 
of conceptuality: one is his view and the other two are, to him, variations of the myth of 
pervasive conceptuality.70 
Dreyfus’s own view I’ll call non-pervasive conceptuality (NonPC). NonPC is 
Dreyfus’s way of adhering to the Sellarsian idea that having a concept means mastering 
the use of a word. NonPC differs from McDowell’s view—yet remains remarkably 
similar to Brandom’s—insofar as it allots no role or function for concepts outside 
discursive judgments, be they inferential or non-inferential judgments. This means, for 
Dreyfus, that any use of a concept always involves breaking out of embodied coping and 
into subject-object intentionality whereby the mind takes up a position opposed to a 
world it grasps in explicit terms. Dreyfus implies that this is a ‘strong’ concept of 
conceptuality. It is strong, he seems to mean, in that conceptual capacities are strictly 
defined for a very specific function and have no other functions. The function of concepts 
lies in making explicit judgments. Concepts involve mental activity and rationality, 
breaking out of absorbed coping and taking up a distant relation to what one encounters. 
Conceptuality is bound up with language everywhere it has a role. 
                                                
70 The names of these views are mine, drawn out of Dreyfus’s discussion of pervasive conceptuality in 
“The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental,” 18–19. Henceforth, MPM followed by page number. 
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Then there are the two views Dreyfus attacks. The first of these I call Limited 
Pervasive Conceptuality (LPC), a relatively weaker notion of conceptuality (Dreyfus 
implies) that is the closest of the three to McDowell’s position. LPC shares with NonPC 
the notion that concepts are acquired through language use, i.e., through mastering the 
use of a word. It differs from NonPC, according to Dreyfus, insofar as it assigns a role to 
concepts outside explicit, discursive judgments. On this view, concepts come to play a 
role in perception and action after being printed onto our coping habits by explicit 
conceptual thought. The result is that we deploy concepts without “thinking” and thereby 
without breaking out of absorbed coping. Thus, for example, suppose I rely on concepts 
and explicit thought to familiarize myself with part of a city I’ve never visited before. 
Later, when that part of the city becomes familiar and I navigate it without thinking, I am 
still, nonetheless, incorporating and relying on the same concepts in my embodied coping 
as I formerly used in explicitly thinking about how to get around. 
The third view, and the second that Dreyfus attacks, I’ll call unlimited pervasive 
conceptuality (UPC).71 For Dreyfus, this is an even weaker notion of conceptuality than 
the previous one. As with LPC, concepts play a role in absorbed coping without breaking 
us out of it and into reflective thought. What makes UPC distinct from LPC and 
Dreyfus’s NonPC is that UPC is ambivalent about where concepts come from. UPC 
agrees with NonPC and LPC that we can acquire concepts through mastering the use of a 
word, and further agrees with LPC (contra NonPC) that these concepts, once acquired, 
can wind up playing a role in our embodied coping. But against both LPC and NonPC, 
UPC maintains that language is not the only means by which concepts can be acquired 
and put to use in embodied coping. Rather, UPC supposes that concepts result from 
                                                
71 This notion is closest to the one I begin developing in Chapter III. 
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habituation in perception and action without relying on language at all. I next consider 
Dreyfus’s arguments against LPC and UPC. 
3.2.1 Limited Pervasive Conceptuality 
Before dismissing limited pervasive conceptuality (LPC), Dreyfus briefly considers 
arguments for it, acknowledging, “we often have to use concepts to find our way about in 
an unfamiliar situation” (MPM 18). This seems to further imply that because we use 
concepts to become familiar, we continue to use concepts to engage with the familiar. 
Once concepts are in play for given situations, they stay in play for those situations, even 
though getting familiar involves actively thinking our way through the unfamiliar 
situations with distanced, reflective thought, whereas engaging with the familiar involves 
circumspection, responding to forces, absorbed coping, and no distance from the world. 
According to Dreyfus’s take on the LPC argument, concepts are pervasive insofar as they 
remain embedded in the coping habits that develop out of rational, conceptual 
deliberation. 
Dreyfus rejects LPC because it goes against his general idea that rationality is not 
retained in the habits that it forms: 
[O]ur situation gradually comes to make sense to us in a non-conceptual 
way as we learn our way around in it. Once our situation becomes 
familiar, our skilled dispositions respond directly to the solicitations of the 
relevant affordances. Indeed, once a skill is acquired, concepts used in 
learning the skill need play no further role. It is not even necessary that to 
learn a practice one needs to have been aware of the relevant concepts. 
Our ability to act normally is usually picked up by imitating authorities 
without concepts playing any conscious role. (MPM 18)  
Drawing out the claims of this statement yields two arguments against LPC; I’ll treat 
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each in turn. The first argument sets up the relationships between concepts and habits as 
being like that between an embosser and a piece of paper: conceptuality is the embosser 
we use in order to impart the shape of the place onto the paper of our absorbed coping, 
which grants us certain skilled dispositions. Just as the paper retains the shape of the 
embosser’s plates after the embosser is removed (i.e., the paper does not just revert to 
being flat), so we tend to retain our new concept-formed habits and disposition without 
involving the concepts that formed them. In other words, concepts help us form 
embodied skills and habits that empower us to better respond to our surroundings and 
organize the relevance of affordances we respond to, but no concepts are necessary once 
the forming and organizing are done. 
This argument against LPC sounds convincing when it claims that taking up a 
distanced, reflective, and discursive conceptual grasp is necessary for us to effectively 
navigate unfamiliar surroundings, and later not necessary when the same surroundings 
become familiar and we navigate them entirely in our absorbed coping. However, the 
same question arises that has been dogging Dreyfus all along, namely, that it is not clear 
why concepts must belong only to distanced reflection and not absorbed coping. Dreyfus 
is still working with the assumption that the only function concepts have involves 
breaking us out of our absorbed embodied coping. What is the argument against adopting 
a more expansive notion of concepts that allows them to be involved in embodied coping 
without disrupting it? An alternative view could claim that—to revise the embosser 
analogy—the embosser represents not concepts but active thought, and the concept is 
neither the embosser nor the plates but the shape the plates impart on the paper when the 
embosser is used. Just as embossing transfers the shape from metal plate to paper, so 
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thinking transfers the concepts onto our habits, our disposition, our second nature. The 
question becomes, what is the function of a concept that explains its involvement in 
embodied coping? Admittedly, that is not an easy question, and it is especially 
complicated by LPC’s commitment to the idea that all concepts are acquired through 
mastering the use of a word; it is complicated because LPC thereby follows McDowell 
and Brandom (and Dreyfus) in defining the essential function of concepts in terms of our 
discursive, linguistic practices. This view thus seems to need to append to concepts a 
further function that they fulfill in embodied coping that does not involve snapping us 
back into subject-object intentionality and an explicit, discursive form of awareness. If 
this question about the function of concepts is what Dreyfus is driving at, then he has a 
point; I do not think the prospects are good for LPC to append a second function for 
concepts in embodiment along with the first linguistic one it assigns to them. However, 
Dreyfus does not carefully consider the possibility of this option; his aim is to rule it out. 
Dreyfus’s second argument against LPC claims that while concepts may seem to 
play such a role in the formation of some dispositions and skills, other dispositions and 
skills clearly require no concepts whatsoever for their formation, because their formation 
does not require any discursive thought. So if some skills and dispositions work without 
concepts, why should we suppose other skills and dispositions need or involve concepts? 
Whatever the function of the concept is supposed to be in the case where it is involved, 
clearly concepts are not necessary for our skills and dispositions to work. This suggests 
that absorbed coping has no need of concepts at all. The example Dreyfus and McDowell 
discuss in their exchange is the practice of standing at an appropriate distance from other 
people, which (the assumption is) many of us learn by unconscious imitation, i.e., without 
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every really becoming reflectively aware that we are adjusting the space between the 
bodies we encounter according to social norms. Thus, if only some dispositions and skills 
require concepts for their acquisition, we should expect that none does.  
This second argument presents the same problem about the function of concepts, 
but does so more directly and forcefully than does the first argument. How can concepts 
have a function in embodied coping if embodied coping can happily proceed without 
concepts? To defend LPC, one could again define a function that concepts have in 
embodied coping, but one would also need to explain why that function does not need to 
be fulfilled in instances of embodied coping where no concepts are involved. 
One way for LPC to give concepts a secondary function in embodied coping 
(beyond their essential function in explicit judgments) is to suppose they function as a 
kind of cognitive tagging system that allows experiences to connect with judgments about 
them. This way, the function concepts have in embodied coping does not actually pertain 
to the ability to carry out our interests and activities, but rather, concepts function in 
embodied coping like intellectual bookmarks, allowing us to bring to mind aspects of our 
experience we are capable of thinking about. On such an account, LPC could answer 
Dreyfus in a way that is at least potentially consistent with McDowell’s idea that 
experiences we are equipped to judge have conceptual form. Nonetheless, this defense of 
LPC raises further questions about what it means for concepts to tag experiences. Dreyfus 
hasn’t wholly dismissed LPC but he has made the challenge to it somewhat clearer. 
3.2.2 Unlimited Pervasive Conceptuality 
What if concepts do not depend upon language for their acquisition, so that we can have a 
concept without having mastered the word that designates it? Dreyfus, to his credit, 
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anticipates this view and his next move addresses the idea that concepts might be 
involved in dispositions that required no explicit, discursive concepts for their formation. 
Thus, Dreyfus turns to the idea of unlimited pervasive conceptuality (UPC): 
One could, of course, introduce a still weaker understanding of 
conceptuality to justify the claim that concepts are pervasive. One could 
hold that any sort of absorbed coping, no matter how learned, would count 
as conceptual as long as it had become second nature; that is, as long as it 
was a natural propensity that has been taken over and shaped by a culture. 
That is, one could call everyday background coping practices conceptual 
even if no conceptual awareness were involved in acquiring and practicing 
them. (MPM 19) 
On this view, even distance standing—learned and performed without any thought or 
reflection, or even awareness that one has moved to stand at an appropriate distance—
would be a conceptually informed act. This is certainly not McDowell’s view, as 
McDowell relegates distance standing and other gestures we are not aware of performing 
outside of our agency and rationality and thereby outside the scope of his pervasive 
conceptuality.72 Indeed, Dreyfus’s argument against UPC actually anticipates reasons 
McDowell himself might dismiss it. Dreyfus writes, “since such practices normally are 
unthought, even if we choose to declare our trained normative background practices 
concepts, they clearly cannot play the role concepts normally play in grounding 
judgments and beliefs, i.e., in ‘adjusting thinking to experience’” (MPM, 19).73 In other 
                                                
72 McDowell, “The Myth of the Mind as Detached,” 50–51. I would argue, however, that McDowell should 
not concede to Dreyfus that distance standing is an example of a nonconceptual gesture. McDowell thinks 
that it suffices to count as a nonconceptual gesture provided my answer to the question, “why did you move 
there,” is “I didn’t know that I did that.” But it is impossible to imagine someone capable of that response 
not also being capable of responding, “I moved here because I didn’t want to stand too close to this other 
person.” By McDowell’s own arguments, an answer such as this ought to qualify the move as belonging to 
the agency and rationality of the subject, which requires, in turn, that it involve the subject’s conceptual 
capacities. 
73 Dreyfus is here quoting McDowell (MW 47).  
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words, if we “weaken” the notion of conceptuality so that it applies broadly to our 
capacities and practices that make up our second nature, even those that do not require 
conceptual thought for their formation, then concepts seem to have no function 
whatsoever. They are not functions of discursive judgments, nor could they even derive 
their function in embodied coping as a kind of tagging system for judgments. The 
question arises, what do concepts do? What are they for? 
Earlier, I presented Dreyfus’s distinction between intentional content and 
conceptual content. One way of stating the UPC thesis, and answering the question about 
the function of concepts, is that it treats everything Dreyfus calls intentional content as 
conceptual content. That way, one can claim, the function of concepts is to open us to a 
world of intentions. Some of these concepts will be acquired without language, in 
responding to the regularities we encounter in our embodied coping. Other concepts 
might first be acquired through language and only then come to articulate our intentions 
in embodied coping. Taking UPC in this direction raises further questions. Plenty of 
animals appear to have intentions, so if we do not want to assign concepts to all animals 
that appear to have intentions, there needs to be more stringent criteria for distinguishing 
conceptuality. Moreover, if embodied coping is replete with concepts, then what explains 
the difference between embodied coping and judging? And if not all intentional content is 
fit for judgment, yet all intentional content is conceptual content, then there is conceptual 
content that is not fit for judgment—which is absurd if, as Dreyfus points out, the whole 
point of conceptual content in embodied coping is to show how we can appeal to 
experience in justifying explicit, discursive judgments. Finally, UPC raises Dreyfus’s 
question anew: assuming UPC, how do we explain how rational, discursive thought arises 
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from the more basic give and take of conceptually articulated intentions in embodied 
coping? 
These are all important questions. Dreyfus’s argument against UPC, at least 
implicitly, comes down to (1) the claim that it assigns no coherent function to concepts; 
and (2) the assumption that UPC has no prospects for answering these questions 
satisfactorily. He is certainly not alone in thinking (1) and (2)—both McDowell and 
Brandom would likely agree. Nonetheless, I argue later that a coherent function can be 
ascribed to concepts in embodied coping that actually helps to dispel (2). 
Leaving these issues aside for now, I want to draw attention to what wading 
through Dreyfus’s position has brought to light. Dreyfus’s accounts of rules, awareness, 
and being-in-the-world all yielded the same problem, namely, that while Dreyfus 
consistently shows why explicit and discursive reflection have no place in embodied 
coping, he did not (as he seemed to think) show that concepts have no place in embodied 
coping, because he simply assumed that the involvement of concepts necessarily requires 
an explicit and discursive form of awareness that breaks us out of embodied coping. In 
making that assumption, he did not give us an argument as to why we have to take this to 
be true of concepts. When, in his final contribution to the debate, he stakes a claim for 
why we ought to take concepts to always involve explicit, discursive awareness, it turns 
out to depend on negative arguments that consider and then dismiss the alternatives (one 
very close to McDowell’s view, and one I develop later). These negative arguments raise 
important issues with the alternatives but do not show that, in principle, they cannot work 
and that the questions he raises cannot be answered. Dreyfus is right to insist, like 
Brandom, on there being a clearly defined function for concepts, but he seems blind to 
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the possibility that a UPC-type view of concepts might be able to provide that. Perhaps 
his blindness to the possibility stems from his adherence, along with both Brandom and 
McDowell, to the idea that concepts are exclusively acquired through language, i.e., 
through mastering the use of a word. More importantly, as I explain below, UPC-type 
views leave open the possibility of answering Dreyfus’s challenge, whereas (as I show 
next) Dreyfus’s Non-PC view makes answering his own challenge enormously difficult, 
if not impossible. 
3.3 Why Dreyfus Cannot Answer His Own Challenge 
The greatest problem with Dreyfus’s view is not that he fails to establish that concepts, 
understood more broadly than in their role in explicit, discursive judgment, cannot play a 
role in embodied coping. Rather, it is that his view of concepts as being dependent upon 
language and exclusively engaged in discursive judgment makes it virtually impossible to 
answer the challenge he himself raises, namely, the challenge of explaining how 
conceptual understanding arises out of more basic capacities. 
Dreyfus cannot answer the challenge in part because he has (not unlike Brandom) 
distinguished conceptuality exclusively as the realm of discursive and explicit rational 
understanding so thoroughly that it no longer bears any resemblance or connection to 
non-conceptual capacities. This works for Brandom, because Brandom has no pretensions 
to explain conceptual understanding in terms of the capacities that power our embodied 
coping, but for Dreyfus the restriction of conceptuality seems disastrous.74 As Brandom 
                                                
74 This is a highly qualified comparison to Brandom. While both treat conceptual understanding as wholly 
distinct from and uninvolved in experience and action, their respective characterizations of experience and 
action and their relation to conceptual understanding strongly diverge. To Dreyfus, embodied coping is full 
of meaning and forms a necessary backdrop to the discursive understanding of the world that comes with 
language, whereas Brandom denies outright that reliable differential responsive dispositions that make up, 
on his view, Dreyfus’s embodied coping, contribute anything to meaning or knowledge at all. 
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takes up his position with the explicit intent to make rationality distinct, he rightly 
acknowledges how this move makes it extremely difficult to see how rational capacities 
arise out of nonrational ones: 
Theories that assimilate conceptually structured activity to the 
nonconceptual activity out of which it arises (in evolutionary, historical, 
and individual-developmental terms) are in danger of failing to make 
enough of the difference. Theories that adopt the converse strategy, 
addressing themselves at the outset to what is distinctive of or exceptional 
about the conceptual, court the danger of not doing justice to generic 
similarities. The difference in emphasis and order of explanation can 
express substantive theoretical commitments.75 
I take Brandom to be absolutely right here, and I take these claims to be uncontroversial. 
What is odd about Dreyfus’s position, in light of Brandom’s remarks, then, is that 
Dreyfus appears to be divided against himself. To answer his challenge, he ought to opt 
for the former strategy of assimilating to conceptual to the non-conceptual and thereby 
courting the danger of failing to distinguish rationality. This approach, as critics of 
Dreyfus discussed above (Noë, Gardner, and Rouse) have pointed out, would be at least 
consistent with the existential phenomenology Dreyfus channels into his critique of 
McDowell. And yet, what Dreyfus actually does is the opposite, namely, he focuses on 
what is distinctive about the conceptual and thereby courts the danger of failing to grasp 
the similarities and connections between conceptual and non-conceptual capacities. In 
short, Dreyfus takes a top-down, rationalist approach to defining concepts while 
advocating a bottom-up explanation for their existence. In Brandom’s terms, Dreyfus 
appears to have made not just methodological but “substantive theoretical commitments” 
                                                
75 Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, 3. 
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to not answering his own challenge. It should be no surprise then that Dreyfus never 
offers anything close to a satisfactory way of explaining how rational, conceptual 
understanding arises. 
There is no argument (to my knowledge) that Dreyfus cannot in principle make 
his apparently conflicting commitments work, but I cannot imagine how Dreyfus can pull 
it off in practice. Philosophers who make language a necessary condition for having 
conceptual understanding (such as Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom) tend to arrive at 
their view having already committed to playing down the challenge Dreyfus raises as less 
important than the opposite challenge of making rationality distinct. If we make language 
necessary for concepts and rationality, then answering Dreyfus’s challenge means facing 
the perennial problem of establishing how one of two entirely dissimilar things gives rise 
to or even relates to the other. In Dreyfus’s defense, his account of the intentional content 
of embodied coping does bring it close to the conceptual content of subject-object 
intentionality. And Dreyfus does attempt to explain how intentional content transforms 
into conceptual content. Here, the problem is that he relies on what Rouse calls 
“magically invoking a ‘lingua ex machina’” to explain the connection and distinction at 
the same time.76 Claiming that we turn nonconceptual stuff into conceptual stuff with 
language is not a sufficient answer to Dreyfus’s challenge. To answer it, not only do we 
need to know how that transformation works, we also need an account of how the 
capacity for language arises in the first place. 
Here is just one way of putting the problem facing Dreyfus. Assume that 
intentional (but non-conceptual) content develops as part of second nature in intelligent 
                                                
76 Rouse, “What Is Conceptually Articulated Understanding?,” 260. 
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animals.77 It allows them to flexibly respond and adapt to their surroundings under 
changing conditions. Assume also that Dreyfus is right that having language is necessary 
for having concepts. Now the question is how exactly does conceptual understanding 
come on the scene? Because nothing will count as a concept if not expressed through 
language, language becomes the central means for explaining the appearance of 
conceptual understanding. Consider, then, a child of eleven months or so who is learning 
to use words. She makes word sounds correctly correlated to objects (airplane, tomato, 
dog, etc.), but she does not have conceptual understanding because she is still apt to 
misuse the words and cannot make the appropriate inferences or commitments regarding 
her discursive activity. Does this budding use of language constitute a use of concepts or 
should we explain the behavior of the child in terms of Dreyfus’s intentional concepts? If 
this use of words constitutes a use of concepts, then it becomes difficult to distinguish 
between a parrot saying “red” and such a small child saying “red.” On the other hand, if 
we deny that the small child’s use of words counts as a use of concepts, then we are 
forced to expand the notion of intentional content to explain word use in this basic sense. 
This move also comes with a threat to Dreyfus’s commitments: once we explain word use 
in terms of intentional content, it becomes difficult to see why we should not explain all 
word use (including giving and asking for reasons) in terms of intentional content, at 
which point intentional content is indistinguishable from conceptual content, ruining 
Dreyfus’s distinction. 
                                                
77 This is a contentious claim but a defensible one. Even Brandom acknowledges that intelligent animals 
have a proto-intentional form of erotic awareness (as discussed in Chapter I), which could itself serve as a 
starting point for the kind of account Dreyfus wants to give, albeit a ‘lower’ starting point than intentional 
content. 
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This categorial bleed that threatens Dreyfus’s account in both directions 
reinforces the criticism that Noë, Gardner, and Rouse level at him. Rather than attempt 
(and fail in one of the ways just described) to keep embodied coping and conceptual 
understanding wholly distinct and unlike one another and face the problem of relating 
them and explaining how the latter arises out of the former, answering Dreyfus’s 
challenge calls for a different picture altogether. On this different picture—one that draws 
more closely on the resources of existential phenomenology than does Dreyfus—we 
should understand embodied coping to go all the way up, animating our discursive, 
rational, linguistic practices, while at the same time endorsing the idea that concepts go 
down, if not all the way, then at least far enough to articulate all of the rational activities 
we perform in our embodied coping. 
To return to Brandom’s point in the quote above, if we start by assimilating, the 
challenge is to distinguish, and if we start by distinguishing the challenge is to assimilate. 
It is better for Dreyfus—at least insofar as he wants to answer the challenge he raises—to 
embrace the assimilation of conceptual understanding with lesser capacities we engage in 
our embodied coping. This way, Dreyfus makes the central challenge not explain how 
they come together but how they are distinct. Gardner, Noë, and Rouse all argue that, if 
anything, existential phenomenology opts to start with assimilation and face the problem 
of differentiation. If we assume that, true to his word, Dreyfus thinks the resources for 
answering his challenge lie in existential phenomenology, then his commitment to 
starting by differentiating the conceptual and facing the challenge of assimilation has not 
just blinded him to opportunities for answering the challenge; but rather, Dreyfus is 
facing the wrong challenge. 
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In the next section, I turn to McDowell and focus on the difficulty of answering 
Dreyfus’s question about how we develop the capacity for conceptual understanding out 
of more basic capacities. Just as Dreyfus’s difficulties with conceptualism stem from his 
commitment to the idea that language is necessary for having concepts, I show how 
McDowell’s problem with Dreyfus’s question is also tied to the same assumption, 
namely, the idea that we only acquire concepts by mastering the use of a word. 
 
4. From Embodied Coping to Rationality 
McDowell’s conceptualism involves a commitment to the idea that our “perceptual 
experience is permeated by rationality.” Concepts and rationality are, on this view, 
inseparable: one cannot be rational without the normative use of concepts, and one cannot 
have concepts if one is not a participant in the space of reasons, a rational actor. His 
move to let concepts and rationality permeate our perception is an attractive way of 
preserving a minimal form of empiricism while warding off the Myth of the Given, so in 
agreeing with McDowell on this point I endorse his motivation. I accept conceptualism, 
in some form, as a way to retain a minimal form of empiricism. 
What form that conceptualism needs to take—what theory of concepts we need to 
square a minimal form of empiricism with other commitments—will be my focus in 
Chapters III through V. There I reject McDowell’s idea that concepts and rationality are 
inseparable. By opposing the idea that concepts and rationality are inseparable I do not 
mean to claim that one can be rational without having concepts. I am suggesting that one 
can have concepts without being rational. In the present section, my aim is merely to test 
McDowell’s conceptualism to see if it offers any resources for explaining how the 
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capacity for conceptual understanding develops out of more basic capacities involved in 
our embodied coping. The question is, can McDowell’s conceptualism accommodate an 
answer to Dreyfus’s challenge without giving up his thesis that concepts and rationality 
are inseparable? To this end, I interrogate three aspects of McDowell’s view (from Mind 
and World through his debate with Dreyfus) that seem to offer resources for answering 
Dreyfus’s question. In each case I show that McDowell’s conceptualism is hobbled by his 
commitment to making language necessary for having concepts. The first case 
investigates McDowell’s discussion of animal environments for resources for 
understanding how a mere environment might morph into a world (§4.1); the second case 
investigates McDowell’s discussion of the system of animal affordances for resources as 
to how it may morph into a system of conceptual understanding (§4.2); and the third case 
investigates McDowell’s discussion of animal affordances generally for resources to 
explain how an affordance becomes (or comes to be taken as) a concept (§4.3). 
To be fair to McDowell, this investigation of his work is not an assessment of a 
failed attempt to answer Dreyfus’s challenge, for McDowell rejects the very idea that the 
question I am probing his work to answer is one that we are on the hook for answering in 
the first place. McDowell rejects Dreyfus’s challenge altogether. Rather, I am attempting 
to show, exhaustively, that if one is committed to answering Dreyfus’s questions—for 
reasons McDowell evidently does not recognize—and if one is nonetheless committed to 
McDowell’s idea that concepts play a role in our perceptual experience, then we need a 
different approach to what concepts are than the one McDowell provides. The point is, to 
answer Dreyfus’s challenge, conceptualism needs to be revised. 
  95 
4.1 Can an Umwelt Transform into a World? 
McDowell distinguishes the rational form of awareness enjoyed by humans from the 
nonrational form of awareness of other animals. One way he does this is by appealing to 
Gadamer’s use of the distinction between having a world versus having a mere 
environment or surrounding world (Umwelt). To have a world means engaging with what 
one encounters as rationally structured and bound up with human meaning and human 
possibilities. Only with language and rational, conceptual normativity can one encounter 
a world at all and, on McDowell’s view, we encounter such a world not just in explicit, 
discursive thought but also in our embodied coping. By contrast, on McDowell’s 
Gadamerian view, having a mere environment means encountering aspects of one’s 
surroundings only insofar as they are relevant to the biological necessities of animal 
survival. Rational humans have a world and no environment, whereas nonrational 
animals have an environment and no world. The distinction is a means to distinguish 
rational and nonrational animals. 
One can trace discussions of the distinction not just to Gadamer but to others, 
including Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Jakob von Uexküll, who stood out in his 
opposition to behaviorism for supposing animal lives to be suffused with meaning 
appropriate to the animal’s own form of life.78 Among these discussions, there is an 
alternative take on the Welt/Umwelt distinction that is worth considering, and that hews 
closer to Dreyfus’s outlook (even though Dreyfus barely mentions the distinction in his 
                                                
78 See Uexküll, A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, With a Theory of Meaning. Brett 
Buchanan writes, “What concerns Uexküll here, as well as elsewhere in his writings, is how we can 
glimpse natural environments as meaningful to the animals themselves. Rather than conceiving of the 
world according to the parameters of our own human understanding—which, historically, has been the 
more prevalent approach—Uexküll asks us to rethink how we view the reality of the world as well as what 
it means to be an animal” (Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments and Uexküll, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze, 2). 
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debate with McDowell). On this way of making the distinction, rational animals have 
both a world and an Umwelt. For example, Merleau-Ponty views the objective world as a 
modification of the embodied milieu we inhabit (where “milieu” is the French translation 
of “Umwelt”). Here the distinction is a means to distinguish modes of being-in-the-world, 
where rational animals have both an Umwelt and a world. The human Umwelt is prior in 
that it establishes the structures out of which the rational world is built. Different forms of 
life yield different Umwelten, which in turn yield different ways of producing a rationally 
structured world through our linguistic practices. In this section, I trace how McDowell 
deploys the Welt/Umwelt distinction as a way of distinguishing rational and nonrational 
animals, and consider the difficulty it poses for answering Dreyfus’s challenge. 
McDowell adopts the thesis in Mind and World that to have a world, as opposed 
to a mere environment, is for the world to be objective. Only a self-conscious subject can 
have an objective world. For McDowell, a self-conscious subject can ascribe experiences 
to herself, and it is only with this ability “that experiences can constitute awareness of the 
world” (MW 114). Where there is no self-conscious subject, there can be only an 
environment. Moreover, for McDowell, it is “the spontaneity of the understanding, the 
power of conceptual thinking” that brings about the awareness of one’s self as a self and 
awareness of the world as such (MW 114). Lacking the spontaneity of the understanding 
and the power of conceptual thought, nonrational animals have no access to self-
awareness or to an objective world. 
By making the contrast between rational and nonrational animals in these stark 
terms, McDowell invites the criticism that he has saddled himself with the “Cartesian 
idea that brutes are automata” so that they “are not genuinely sentient” (MW 114-5). On 
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the Cartesian picture, nonrational animals may be responsive to their surroundings, but 
their surroundings are nothing to them or for them. They are, in effect, machines. For 
animals to be more than machines, they need to be able to distinguish their own bodies 
from other bodies they encounter, and to be able grasp something as being significant for 
them, i.e., in the routines they develop to satisfy their biological needs. It is here that 
McDowell appeals to the Welt/Umwelt distinction to “acknowledge what is common 
between human beings and brutes, while preserving the difference that the Kantian thesis 
forces on us” (MW 115). All animal life is “structured exclusively by immediate 
biological imperatives,” according to McDowell, meaning that it is “shaped by goals 
whose control of the animal’s behaviour at a given moment is an immediate outcome of 
biological forces” (MW 115). What would it take for there to be any mediation involved, 
to entertain options irreducible to biological force? McDowell implies for there to be 
mediation requires that the animal “weigh reasons and decide what to do,” which is to 
say, have the spontaneity of conceptual understanding that yields an objective grasp of 
the world (MW 115).79 But an animal lacking a world does not entail that the animal 
lacks sentient awareness. Rather, following Gadamer, McDowell argues that the 
sentience of mere “brutes” yields an environment. An environment “can be no more than 
a succession of problems and opportunities, constituted as such by those biological 
imperatives” (MW 115). 
                                                
79 In effect, McDowell makes practical reasoning basic and subsumes theoretical reasoning under it. This 
commitment, which one can trace (at least, on certain interpretations) to Aristotle, German idealism, 
American pragmatism, and existential phenomenology, is also at the core of the view I develop later. 
However, as I discuss in Chapter III, evidence from contemporary ethology and comparative psychology 
suggests that some problem-solving animals have a capacity for instrumental reasoning, where this capacity 
is sufficient for attributing more than mere sentience to animals, yet something less than full, human 
sapience. 
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In other words, on McDowell’s account, a nonrational animal’s sentient 
awareness of the world is populated by entities and possibilities only insofar as they are 
shaped by the animal’s immediate biological needs, and all of its actions are directed 
toward satisfying those needs. McDowell’s use of the term “immediacy” can seem all too 
constraining if we take it to mean a lack of flexibility and revisability in the animal’s 
responsiveness to its surroundings. But McDowell’s view is not as restrictive as that. In 
inhabiting their environment, we can understand animals to “take something to be 
something” in a very basic sense of an affordance (to use Dreyfus’s preferred term) or a 
significance with respect to the animal’s erotic desire (to use Brandom’s terms). 
McDowell does not say so, but the form of awareness that animals have could be learned, 
revisable, and flexibly applied without threatening his thesis that animals are motivated 
by their biological imperatives. Put another way, animals can have everything short of 
self-awareness and rational choice or (as McDowell quotes Gadamer) “free, distanced 
orientation” (MW 117). The environment an animal inhabits impinges upon it, and while 
the animal can develop habitual capacities to improve its ability to satisfy its biological 
needs—a degree of second nature—the animal cannot “rise above” the pressure its 
environment exerts (MW 116).80 The animal can develop clever responses to these 
pressures, but it cannot gather enough distance from those pressures to understand them 
as pressures. It can respond to “problems and opportunities” by treating different aspects 
of its environment in ways that resolve those problems and exploit those opportunities, 
but it cannot respond to problems explicitly as problems or opportunities explicitly as 
opportunities. To do so requires distance, and McDowell thinks that distance requires 
                                                
80 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 441. 
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self-awareness of a kind that is only available to animals with spontaneous, conceptual 
understanding of the world. 
McDowell returns to the Welt/Umwelt distinction in his debate with Dreyfus in 
order to reinforce his thesis that the mind is pervasive in embodied coping. He again 
quotes Gadamer approvingly, that “man’s relation to the world is absolutely and 
fundamentally verbal in nature” (WM 346).”81 The point here is that once we acquire 
language and the rational norms that it enables, our conceptual grasp of the world is 
drawn into every aspect of our orientation to the world, regardless of whether or not we 
are explicitly thinking. As McDowell reads Gadamer, language gives us leverage against 
a mere environment that rational animals inhabit, lending us (to repeat the phrase) a “free, 
distanced orientation” to a world (WM 346). Again, a rational animal is a subject in the 
substantial sense of being self-conscious, and self-consciousness transforms the nature 
and scope of embodied coping even when we are not reflectively thinking about what we 
are doing. 
Part of Dreyfus’s complaint against McDowell’s conceptualism is that, from 
Dreyfus’s perspective, it seems to require that we have a determinate conceptual grasp of 
everything that enters our field of awareness in embodied coping. Moves like this are part 
of Dreyfus’s way of rejecting computational theories of mind. But McDowell argues that 
his pervasiveness thesis makes no such claims. The claim is not that every aspect of our 
experience is determinately grasped, but rather, it is that pervasive rationality imparts 
conceptual unity to experience. The point is not that the Kantian I-think actually attends 
every experience, but rather, that the I-think could attend every experience, because every 
experience is given the conceptual form it needs to make the attendance of the I-think 
                                                
81 See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 471. 
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possible. This unity of experience is a constitutive part of having a world (more than a 
mere environment), of being a self-conscious animal; it is part of what it is to gain the 
freedom of some distance from what we encounter. McDowell writes: 
We do not need to have words for all the content that is conceptually 
available to us … in the distinctive form that belongs with an experience’s 
being such as to disclose the world. The Gadamerian thought is that 
language enables us to have experience that is categorially unified, 
apperceptive, and world-disclosing, and hence has content that is 
conceptual in the sense I have introduced; not, absurdly, that we are ready 
in advance with words for every aspect of the content of our experience, 
nor that we could equip ourselves with words for every aspect of the 
content of our experience. No aspect is unnamable, but that does not 
require us to pretend to make sense of an ideal position in which we have 
a name for every aspect, let alone to be in such a position (WM 348). 
This is crucial for understanding the sense in which McDowell thinks the world that 
language affords us manifests itself in our experience. He thinks our conceptual 
capacities are drawn into play in embodied coping to give unity to the world we 
encounter, unity that reflects our generally rational orientation to the world. It does not 
follow, however, that one need the specific concept for every aspect of the world that 
enters into this awareness. Rather, those aspects fall under the general conceptual unity 
that shapes our awareness such that, should we wish to make our experience explicit, we 
could draw on other concepts to form a judgment. This is a form of conceptual unity that 
is only possible for self-consciousness. Nonrational animals, by contrast, do not have this 
kind of unity in their embodied coping and, lacking that unity, have no means for relating 
various aspects of its awareness. An environment may be populated with entities of 
interest but they are not conceptually related into a unified whole. It is in this sense that 
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having a mere environment means that the animal’s awareness lacks concepts; the 
content in the animal’s awareness must be non-conceptual, whereas, being unified, the 
content in a rational animal’s awareness must be conceptual. 
The distinction that McDowell draws here is quite useful for sketching the 
meaningful differences between a merely animal life and one that is full of human 
meaning. The problem, however, is that it makes it difficult to grasp how conceptual 
understanding might arise or, to put it in the terms just discussed, how a human Welt 
might develop out of a mere Umwelt. Presumably, all human infants inhabit a mere 
Umwelt on the way to inhabiting a world, so the question is how acquiring a language 
entails acquiring a world over and above a mere Umwelt, or, put another way, how an 
Umwelt becomes a Welt. Again, following Gadamer, McDowell claims that language is 
responsible for apperception, for the conceptual unity we are capable of bringing to all of 
what we encounter in experience. It is through the overarching conceptual unity that 
language provides that we bring the mere affordances of animal life into the world order. 
But this is still to assume the world-ordering capacity, whereas Dreyfus’s challenge is for 
us to explain the very appearance of that capacity in a way that does not appeal to it. 
McDowell’s talk of spontaneity is of no help here either, as it is just another term to 
account for our rational, conceptual capacities; he claims that we come by our 
spontaneity naturally, but is not interested in explaining how spontaneity is natural. To 
say that we gain a world by a process of Bildung, by learning language and becoming 
rational is not an answer to Dreyfus’s challenge; it just outlines a version of what Dreyfus 
challenges us to explain. Moreover, it is not at all clear that this take on the world/Umwelt 
distinction is the right one for answering Dreyfus’s challenge. It may well be that the 
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alternative—where rational animals enjoy both a world when we think and an Umwelt in 
our embodied coping that underpins the rational world offers better resources for 
answering Dreyfus’s challenge. Indeed, it does seem as though Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty, 
and perhaps Heidegger would prefer the alternative. 
4.2 Does the Discussion of Conceptual Form Explain How It Appears? 
Dreyfus’s challenge, again, is to explain rational, conceptual understanding from the 
bottom up. McDowell agrees with Dreyfus that there is a system of affordances to which 
both rational and nonrational animals respond—McDowell differs by insisting that the 
affordances of rational animals are conceptual. Perhaps the right approach, then, is to ask 
how it is that a system of affordances becomes a system of conceptual understanding. 
This is a second attempt to appeal to the resources of McDowell’s perspective as a means 
to answer Dreyfus’s challenge. 
One way to think through the question of how affordances become conceptual is 
through McDowell’s idea of “conceptual form,” the form under which we relate to 
affordances as rational animals and which makes everything we encounter at least 
potentially available for our explicit, conceptual grasp. Dreyfus discusses the affordances 
that nonrational animals have as forming an interrelated system according to the habits of 
the animal. The claim is not that the system is a system for the animal, but rather, all that 
is available to the animal is the succession of affordances. To grasp the system as a 
system would require conceptual understanding. McDowell nowhere objects to these 
claims. One of the ways McDowell unpacks the idea that concepts play a role in the 
perceptual experience of rational animals is by discussing that role in terms of the 
“conceptual form” by which we grasp the world. What McDowell means by “conceptual 
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form” is not entirely clear at first glance, and warrants a close reading because it is one of 
the ways that McDowell explains how aspects of our experience are taken up for discrete, 
discursive judgment. This discussion also leads into one of the ways McDowell thinks we 
can acquire new empirical concepts. One might think McDowell’s accounts of how 
aspects of our experience are discursively conceptualized and how we acquire new 
empirical concepts would offer clues to how the capacity for rational, conceptual 
understanding itself is acquired. Here I want to show that it does not. Rather, it reveals 
once again the same problem, namely, that McDowell assumes conceptual capacities in 
the process of explaining how they function in experience. 
In the debate with Dreyfus, McDowell discusses conceptual form to show how 
experiences can be conceptual without involving discursive, reflective judgments that 
break us out of embodied coping. To this end, McDowell characterizes all perceptual 
content as “present in a form in which it is suitable to constitute the content of a 
conceptual capacity” that brings its content into apperceptive unity (WM 346). What does 
it mean for all content to be present in a conceptual form? McDowell distinguishes (a) 
mere conceptual form, the form that all perceptual contents take for a linguistically 
endowed human with a world; from (b) articulated, conceptual content, carved out of 
experience and distinctly grasped (WM 347). McDowell’s claim is that for (a) to become 
(b), “All that would be needed for a bit of it to come to constitute the content of a 
conceptual capacity, if it is not already the content of a conceptual capacity, is for it to be 
focused on and made to be the meaning of a linguistic expression” (WM 348). The 
trouble is that it is still not clear what conceptual form actually is. Perhaps what 
McDowell is alluding to in his discussion of conceptual form is that, as rational animals, 
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all affordances we encounter are encountered as aspects of the world we gain by virtue of 
bringing them into a kind of rational unity. “Conceptual form,” then, captures the sense in 
which affordances no longer just afford a basic animal form of responsiveness we share 
with animals, they also afford normatively governed moves we can make in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons. Through rational form, we come to encounter things as 
bearing the potential for rational discourse, including discursive judgments about what is 
the case. 
Things may appear under conceptual form to rational animals, but, as I’ve already 
shown, McDowell doesn’t think our experience is entirely conceptualized. How does 
McDowell explain this partial measure of conceptuality? In his final contribution to the 
debate, McDowell addresses this issue by making three claims: First, any given 
experience is resplendent with knowable things, and in experiencing the world we do not 
actively make discursive judgments about every aspect of the experience; second, 
moreover, it is quite normal for a subject of experience to be incapable of judging every 
aspect of that experience; third, the condition for making such judgments is having the 
“means for making explicit” those implicit aspects of experience (MMD 43). 
The point is that even if what we experience is rich beyond our ability to grasp 
every element in explicit, conceptual terms, it does not follow that our experience is not 
wholly conceptual. McDowell writes, “experience discloses the way things are, whether 
or not its subject has the means to make those aspects of its content explicit in judgments 
or assertions” (MMD 43). That is, we do not experience the world non-conceptually in 
areas for which we lack the ability to make discursive judgments, and conceptually in 
areas for which we do not. Moreover, McDowell adds, “Making the content in question 
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explicit—even if the subject first has to acquire means to do that—does not make the 
content newly conceptual in any sense that is relevant to my claim, it was conceptual 
already” (MMD 43). Our rational orientation to the world means that whatever does show 
up for us in experience shows up through concepts, or as having conceptual form that 
makes it ripe for discursive judgments. 
In what way is our experience conceptual in those cases where we are not 
equipped with the concepts to make explicit judgments about it? McDowell uses the 
example of color to show how we move from experience with conceptual form without 
the ability to make particular aspects of that experience explicit, to the ability to make it 
explicit. Here the discussion of conceptual form turns into a discussion of demonstrative 
concepts such as “this” and “that.” As McDowell puts it,  
no subject is ready in advance with expressions for all the shades of color 
she might see. But while one is enjoying a visual experience in which 
something is presented as having a certain shade of color, determinate to 
the extent made possible by the acuity of one’s power to discriminate 
colors, one can exploit the visual presence to one of a sample of the shade 
in order to introduce an expression for the way the thing is presented as 
being, thus: “ … has that shade of color.” (MMD 43) 
Color is a nice example because, in principle, the entire visual spectrum of colors 
admits only of degrees. Anyone who has perused and pondered house paint chips can 
attest to lacking an explicit name for every shade of color. More generally, though, 
McDowell is saying that in those instances where we lack a complete spectrum of 
concepts to make the conceptual form of our experience explicit we can nonetheless get 
sufficiently explicit by recourse to demonstrative language. By saying “this” and “that” 
we thereby make our experience explicit, if only in the most basic way. The only 
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stipulation McDowell adds for such a demonstrative index to count as an explicit 
conceptual grasp is that we can continue to deploy these concepts to refer to the same 
aspect of our experience in the absence of the example that gave rise to it. The capacity 
for conceptual explication is thus the capacity to bring to mind or hold in mind something 
absent. 
The color example might seem to create a problem for McDowell. Having 
characterized the ability to pick out a specific color as a conceptual one, it now sounds as 
though he is denying other animals an ability that many obviously have. I don’t think this 
is a real problem. Animals might well be reliably, differentially responsive to colors in a 
variety of ways. For example, a relatively simple animal with a very basic nervous 
system could be highly adapted to respond reliably and differentially to a very specific 
range of environing stimuli that include colors. The animal need not have anything like 
the form of learned awareness of affordances that we seem to share with other intelligent 
animals, that is. Likewise, we might suppose that an animal with a highly developed 
brain that features the neural underpinnings of consciousness has the ability to learn to 
respond to a variety of different colors as aspects of a system of affordances that allow it 
to satisfy its biological needs. The point that McDowell is making is not that only a 
rational animal can make fine color discriminations; but rather, it is that in addition to 
being able to do this at the level of affordances, a rational animal can also make those 
discriminations explicit and draw them into the ambit of a conceptually unified world 
simply by referring to them with demonstrative concepts. 
Setting these issues aside, however, it is clear that McDowell’s discussion of the 
conceptual form that affordances have for rational animals will not aid in answering 
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Dreyfus’s challenge. McDowell simply assumes the rational capacity whose development 
Dreyfus challenges us to explain. His means for explaining how we draw new aspects of 
experience into our conceptual understanding works by appealing to conceptual 
understanding. This is not, to be clear, a critique of McDowell’s claims about conceptual 
form or demonstratives; to reiterate, McDowell rejects Dreyfus’s question. Nonetheless, 
the prospect of explaining how we acquire conceptual ability seems, if anything, worse. If 
not conceptual form, perhaps there are resources in how affordances come to be part of 
our conceptual grasp of the world. 
4.3 Can Affordances Transform into Concepts? 
In his “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental,” Dreyfus argues that McDowell establishes 
a break between the embodied coping of rational animals and that of nonrational animals 
by assigning concepts to the former and not to the latter. In its first iteration, Dreyfus’s 
argument is that (as McDowell puts it) “we share basic perceptual capacities and 
embodied coping skills with other animals”; yet other animals’ capacities are not rational; 
therefore, our capacities cannot be rational either (WM 343). McDowell attacks the first 
premise, writing, “The claim that the capacities and skills are shared comes to no more 
than this: there are descriptions of things we can do that apply also to things other 
animals can do” (WM 343). Animals perceive things and perform learned abilities, and 
so do we: this is all that the sharing in question amounts to. There is no reason to infer 
from the shared abilities that the abilities are the same abilities or that the content 
involved is of the same kind. Or, as McDowell puts it in Mind and World, “we can say 
that we have what mere animals have, perceptual sensitivity to features of our 
environment, but we have it in a special form” (MW 64). The form that our perceptual 
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sensitivity takes is conceptual and is due to the development of the spontaneity of 
conceptual understanding that we do not share with other animals. 
McDowell then entertains another claim from Dreyfus that he views as “just a 
sophisticated version of the quick argument above” (WM 343). He quotes Dreyfus’s 
APA address: 
 We directly perceive affordances and respond to them without beliefs and 
justifications being involved. Moreover, these affordances are interrelated 
and it is our familiarity with the whole context of affordances that gives us 
our ability to orient ourselves and find our way about.82 
Dreyfus’s claim here is that we engage in our embodied coping without the involvement 
of our rational, discursive capacities, aiming to show that there is no function for 
concepts in our embodied coping. It is not concepts but affordances that play a role 
here—content that, as discussed above, Dreyfus will later characterize as being 
intentional without being conceptual. On this view, there is no reason to think we don’t 
share this form of perceptual awareness with nonrational animals. So why does 
McDowell characterize this view as just a sophisticated version of the quick argument? 
Here he chides Dreyfus for mentioning but then dismissing the distinction between 
having a world versus having a mere environment.83 McDowell argues, in effect, that 
Dreyfus is right to claim that we, like other animals, are perceptually responsive to 
affordances in our embodied coping. As he puts it, “I do not dispute that perceptual 
responsiveness to affordances, necessarily bound up with embodied coping skills, is 
                                                
82 WM 343. McDowell cites OMM 59. 
83 Dreyfus does not deploy this distinction but he clearly reads it differently from McDowell. Heidegger 
thinks only rational animals have a world, whereas nonrational animals have a mere environment (Umwelt). 
However, as Dreyfus rightly reads Heidegger, when we are engaged in mere embodied coping, we fall back 
on having a mere Umwelt. In McDowell’s favor, the Umwelt of a rational animal is enriched with the shape 
things take on for a world-rich rational animal. 
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something we share with other animals” (WM 344). Moreover, he is also right that our 
familiarity with affordances serves as a background for the openness to the world we gain 
by virtue of our spontaneous capacity for understanding; then he writes, “What 
perception discloses to human beings is not restricted to affordances” (WM 344). Being 
open to a world, as opposed to a mere environment, “transforms the character of the 
disclosing that perception does for us, including the disclosing of affordances that, if we 
had not achieved openness to the world, would have belonged to a merely animal 
competence at inhabiting an environment” (WM 344). Once we are rational animals, 
endowed with the conceptual capacities that learning a language brings, affordances are 
no longer just affordances, but rather, they are taken up in the ambit of our conceptual 
capacities. Whereas nonrational animals are responsive to affordances, rational animals 
respond to conceptual affordances. They are conceptual insofar as we take them to be 
part of a world to which a rational response is a perpetual option. McDowell continues:  
 When familiarity with affordances comes to be a background to what 
there is, over and above openness to affordances, in being oriented 
towards the world, which is a distinctively human way of being, a human 
individual’s relation to affordances is no longer what it would have been if 
she had gone on living the life of a non-rational animal. Affordances are 
no longer merely input to a human animal’s natural motivational 
tendencies; now they are data for her rationality, not only her practical 
rationality but her theoretical rationality as well. (WM 344) 
Putting things this way, McDowell signals the view we saw him defend against Brandom 
in Chapter I, namely, the view that what we experience we experience as a reason for 
doing, thinking, or judging that something is the case. When our embodied coping skills 
and the affordances they make available to us become the “background for our openness 
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to the world,” that openness to the world—made possible by our spontaneous, conceptual 
grasp of what we encounter—establishes a conceptual frame and orientation that 
encompasses and absorbs everything we encounter, with nothing left outside it (WM 
345). It does not follow that everything within that frame is fully conceptualized. But 
McDowell does claim that there are no aspects of the experience of a rational animal that 
cannot in principle be conceptualized in one way or another. 
One might think that McDowell’s response to Dreyfus offers some clues as to 
how someone adopting McDowell’s position might answer Dreyfus’s challenge of 
explaining how conceptual understanding arises from lesser abilities. Upon inspection, 
however, it reveals only an unsolved puzzle about how it is that affordances become 
concepts. Ostensibly, McDowell wants to claim perceptual experience is permeated by 
concepts and rationality. He also needs to ensure that rationality and spontaneity are 
wholly distinct from mere animal affordances, otherwise the way we respond to our 
surroundings will not be sufficiently different from the way animals respond to their 
surroundings. The perennial problem is to explain how we get clear and distinct rational, 
conceptual understanding if all we start with, as infants, is affordances. 
If McDowell agreed with Dreyfus that embodied coping, absent rationality, were 
informed by affordances that shaped an animal mode of navigating what they 
encountered in satisfying their needs, and if, prior to becoming rational, human infants 
also responded to affordances, then presumably McDowell would need to claim that 
becoming rational definitively transforms affordances into concepts. In the language of 
his revised view, affordances must become conceptual intuitions. In the quote above, 
however, McDowell seems to be claiming something different. McDowell recognizes 
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that rational humans have affordances but claims that, qua rational, we stand in a 
different relation to them than do nonrational animals. It is not that affordances are 
transformed into concepts, it is rather that our relation to affordances changes, and by 
virtue of that change, the affordances count as conceptual. Absent rationality, the relation 
to affordances concerns merely what they afford in terms of animals realizing their 
biological needs, but with the presence of rationality, affordances afford much more, i.e., 
they afford data for empirical judgments according to the norms of one’s community. 
Does this make sense? The comparison between how nonrational animals relate to 
affordances (nonconceptually) and how rational humans relate to affordances 
(conceptually) is suspect. Animals cannot not “relate to affordances” in the same sense 
that rational humans relate to “affordances.” A nonrational animal’s “relation to an 
affordance” is just a relation to a thing it takes to afford something. It relates to a thing as 
an affordance, where the affordance constitutes the entirety of the thing. A rational 
human’s relation to an affordance must be a second order relation: a rational animal 
relates to an affordance “as data for rationality.” In other words, the rational animal does 
not just relate to a thing as an affordance, it also relates to the affordance as a thing, 
namely a thing that serves as data for rationality. But the whole question is how 
affordances become conceptual. McDowell’s answer that we come to relate to them 
conceptually does not actually explain anything. Rather, it assumes the thing that needs to 
be explained, namely, how it is that we come to transcend a mere environment full of 
affordances to a world where we can grasp an affordance conceptually as affording 
rational thought. 
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To be charitable to McDowell, I ought to be clear about how I am exploiting his 
exchange with Dreyfus. I am exploiting the transcendental shape of McDowell’s defense 
of minimal empiricism. For McDowell is in the epistemological business of explaining 
the necessary conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge, and his answer is, in 
part, that our perceptual experience must be permeated by concepts and rationality. The 
point is that McDowell’s argument is in no way designed to answer the question I am 
raising. And yet, Dreyfus is right to ask anew the old question of how to explain the 
development of rational, conceptual understanding out of lesser capacities we share with 
other animals and children. And it is moreover crucial to any account of how we justify 
empirical judgments (as Brandom superbly makes clear) that it is able to show what is 
distinctive about the rational capacity for conceptual understanding. The view that 
McDowell offers falls apart as soon as we attempt to mobilize it to answer the emergence 
question. What I am after, again, is a view that makes compatible the disparate 
commitments to (1) minimal empiricism through some kind of conceptualism and (2) a 
functional account of concepts that helps us to explain what makes rationality distinct, 
while answering Dreyfus’s challenge. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of my dissertation, again, is to answer a longstanding philosophical challenge to 
explain how our capacity for conceptual understanding arises from more basic capacities 
we share with other animals. My criteria for answering the challenge is to square three 
attractive but apparently incompatible commitments: Brandom’s rationalist commitment 
to clearly differentiating rational from nonrational capacities; McDowell’s commitment 
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to a minimal form of empiricism that places concepts in experience; and Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological commitment to explaining our rational capacities in terms of those 
involved in our embodied coping. To reconcile these commitments in Chapter V, I reject 
their shared commitment to the idea that having language is necessary for having 
concepts, and propose instead a relaxed form of conceptual holism. 
I began the present chapter by (§2.1) giving an overview of what are, for my 
purposes, the most important features of the debate between McDowell and Dreyfus, and 
(§2.2) discussing three critical responses to the debate that help to frame how I later 
respond to it. Next (§3), I interrogated Dreyfus’s rejection of the idea that concepts can 
play a role in embodied coping, first (§3.1) considering a narrow notion of concepts that 
McDowell does not share, and then (§3.2) considering two broader notions of concepts, 
one that is close to McDowell’s view and another that comes close to the view I develop 
later. I showed that Dreyfus’s rejection of the idea that concepts play a role in embodied 
coping is not exhaustive: it is not the case that concepts cannot play a role in embodied 
coping, but rather, Dreyfus only demands that the function of concepts be clarified if they 
are to play a role in embodied coping. That is a reasonable objection, and one I intend to 
meet. I then showed how Dreyfus’s own notion of concepts creates difficulties for 
answering his own challenge of explaining how it is that we acquire the conceptual 
capacity for rational understanding. I take this difficulty to recommend a different notion 
of concepts altogether. 
I then (§4) turned to McDowell’s contribution to the debate and considered what, 
if any, resources there might be in McDowell’s conceptualism for answering Dreyfus’s 
challenge (noting that McDowell himself rejects the idea that we should feel compelled 
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to answer such a challenge). I focused only on what appeared to be the most promising 
aspects of his view. After considering (§4.1) McDowell’s discussion of the difference 
between having an environment and having a world, (§4.2) his discussion of conceptual 
form, and (§4.3) his discussion of affordances, I concluded that McDowell’s 
conceptualism offers little to no help for answering Dreyfus’s challenge. 
Summing up, here are three key points I have established about how McDowell, 
Brandom, and Dreyfus all make attractive but apparently incompatible commitments: (1) 
Brandom rejects McDowell’s minimal, empiricist conceptualism and warns against 
attempting to answer Dreyfus’s challenge because doing so would undermine his 
commitment to making rationality distinct. (2) McDowell rejects Brandom’s approach to 
making rationality distinct because it forces us to give up minimal empiricism, and he 
thinks we should not even be tempted to answer Dreyfus’s challenge. And (3) Dreyfus 
rejects Brandom’s idea that experience contributes nothing to knowledge and rejects 
McDowell’s idea that concepts can play a role in embodied coping. 
Looking ahead, I establish that the one commitment all three thinkers share 
produces the appearance of incompatibility among their respective commitments. The 
shared commitment, again, is the idea that language is necessary for having concepts, that 
having a concept means mastering the use of a word. Once we abandon this one 
commitment, we can begin to see how it is that the other three attractive commitments 
can be made to cohere with each other. My method for establishing this will be simply to 
abandon the one, shared commitment. In place of a notion of language-dependent 
concepts, I consider and endorse a much broader notion of concepts. The notion I have in 
mind is one developed recently by Elisabeth Camp. 
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CHAPTER III: CONCEPTS WITHOUT INTELLECTUALISM 
 
1. Beyond Intellectualism 
In the previous two chapters, my aim was to challenge the intellectualist idea—held by 
Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus, among others—that language is necessary for having 
concepts at all, and to motivate consideration of a broader notion of concepts. The most 
important criterion for a broader definition of concepts, for my purposes, is that it should 
help reconcile the respective commitments these three philosophers make. That is, in 
addition to being compelling in its own right, it ought to (1) help answer Dreyfus’s 
challenge of explaining how rational understanding develops out of cognitive abilities we 
share with prelinguistic humans and nonhuman animals; (2) clarify how normatively 
governed concepts play a role in human experience, to retain McDowell’s minimal form 
of empiricism; and (3) be useful for explaining exactly what makes rationality distinct, to 
uphold Brandom’s commitment. 
Here, I turn to the work of Elisabeth Camp to present and assess her theory of 
concepts for my purposes. On Camp’s view, as I explain in detail below, concepts are 
revisable, systematically recombinable representations that can be deployed 
independently of environing stimuli; so defined, they are the key cognitive capacities of a 
range of animals capable of intelligent problem solving, likely including elephants, 
corvids, cetaceans, and all great apes (including humans). One advantage of Camp’s 
definition of concepts is that it builds in a kind of conceptual holism. Unlike the 
astringent holism of McDowell and Brandom, which makes the inferential role of 
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concepts in language necessary for having concepts, Camp’s relaxed holism merely holds 
that to have any concepts means to have many concepts, because to have concepts is to 
be able to spontaneously and systematically recombine them with other concepts. 
In Camp’s view, Dreyfus, McDowell, and Brandom (along with Sellars, Donald 
Davidson, John Haugeland, and others) are all beholden to an unwarranted 
intellectualism about concepts, i.e., the restriction of all concept use to rational 
understanding, a cognitive capacity exclusive to humans. She is motivated by the idea 
that human cognition cannot be as different from nonhuman animal cognition as the 
intellectualists purport it to be. 
In searching for a theory of concepts befitting both human and nonhuman animal 
cognition, she focuses on the function of conceptual thoughts in the lives of animals, 
emphasizing the advantages of having conceptual thought in the evolution of species that 
have it. While there are other philosophers who have recently argued on similar grounds 
that animals have concepts, what makes Camp’s theory unique (and uniquely valuable for 
my purposes) is that hers is an attempt to reconcile theories of animal concepts with 
intellectualist theories of concepts like those held by Brandom, Dreyfus, and McDowell. 
She attempts to improve a definition of concepts that attribute them to a wide variety of 
nonhuman animals (even including invertebrates) by narrowing and tempering it with a 
compelling insight about concepts she finds in intellectualists from Davidson to 
McDowell. 
My aim here is to explain and evaluate Camp’s theory of concepts. What I take 
from her theory is a way of understanding what rational cognition shares with the 
cognition of prelinguistic children and nonhuman, problem-solving animals. By 
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attributing concepts to other intelligent animals, Camp shifts the burden of explaining 
what makes rationality distinct into other terms: rather than take the intellectualist route 
and define concepts in order to distinguish rational capacities, the idea is to show how (1) 
all intelligent problem-solving animals share a kind of conceptual grasp of things they 
encounter, and then (2) explain how that basic, animal, conceptual grasp of things and 
opportunities is shaped into a rational grasp of the world through socio-linguistic 
practices. The present Chapter III is devoted to (1). The following Chapter IV integrates 
Camp’s theory of concepts with John Haugeland’s theory of objectivity to lay the 
groundwork to deliver on (2) in Chapter V. 
In the present chapter, I first spell out Camp’s theory of concepts in detail (§2), 
then show how Camp’s theory of concepts (which I call instrumentalism) functions as an 
attack on the intellectualism about concepts endorsed by Brandom, McDowell, Dreyfus, 
and others (§3). Finally (§4), I consider how Camp’s instrumentalism falls short by 
intellectualist lights by failing to offer a sufficient response to the epistemological 
motivation of intellectualism, and consider how Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus might 
each respond to Camp’s view. 
 
2. Camp’s Theory of Concepts 
Elisabeth Camp defines concepts as representations that are revisable, systematically 
recombinable, and stimulus-independent.84 I sketch the basic shape of Camp’s position 
                                                
84 Camp, “Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence” henceforth, 
PTW followed by page number. “Representation” has been a contentious word among philosophers who 
attack the Myth of the Given—“intellectualists” in Camp’s parlance. For example, Rorty attacks 
“privileged representations,” i.e., representations alleged to serve as a foundation for empirical knowledge, 
as a common enemy of both Sellars and Quine (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 165–92). This 
critique of representation does not, however, apply to Camp’s theory of concepts because, for Camp, the 
primary function of representational abilities is not to underwrite rational, objective knowledge but to 
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briefly here before going into more detail and defining Camp’s terms in the following 
subsections.85 Concepts are a function of cognition exclusive to animals that can actively 
recombine their representations, as opposed to being dependent upon environing stimuli 
to, in effect, dictate what they can represent in any given circumstance. One form of 
behavior that evinces such conceptual abilities—which I explore in greater detail 
below—she calls “instrumental reason,” i.e., the animal ability to spontaneously bring 
about specific, subsidiary states of affairs in order to achieve their goals.86 
Camp presents her view as a middle way between two extremes: minimalism and 
intellectualism. Minimalism takes a “neo-behaviorist” approach to cognition and 
attributes concepts to explain the cognitive capacities of a wide range of animals.87 This 
is the “scientific tradition” that approaches concepts as thought-enabling mechanisms that 
facilitate an animal’s systematic responsiveness to environmental features. Minimalism 
                                                                                                                                            
facilitate an animal’s ability to navigate and take advantage of its environment. That is, Camp sets forward 
“representations” as means to explain the behavior of animals, as part of an ethological discourse that is 
advancing comparative psychology, and her approach to representations lacks any of the epistemological 
pretensions that Rorty critiques. Her use of the term “representation” finds a full definition in the work of 
Josef Perner, whose ideas Camp cites and draws upon. (See Perner, Understanding the Representational 
Mind.) I describe and make use of Perner’s theory of representation in Chapter V. The intellectualist 
challenge to Camp’s view is not that she depends upon a bankrupt idea of representation that reinstates the 
Myth of the Given—she doesn’t. Rather, the challenge to Camp’s view, as I show at the conclusion of this 
chapter, is that if nonhuman and human animals alike have concepts, she seems to undermine the means to 
explain what makes rational, objective knowledge distinct. 
85 I spell out systematic recombinability and stimulus independence below, but let me begin here with 
“revisable.” Revisable representations are not innate but acquired, and can change “in light of experience” 
(PTW 282). Camp does not elaborate on what it means for a representation to be revisable, but recall 
Brandom’s similar idea in his discussion of “significances.” Animals driven by desire take objects to have 
significance as a means to satisfy that desire. This, on Brandom’s view, opens up the possibility of a 
“distinction between appearance and reality,” when an animal takes something to have the significance of 
satisfying a desire and it does not satisfy that desire (SDR 134). It will discover that significance it took the 
thing to have is not the significance it actually has. Any representation (or significance) R is revisable in the 
sense that, if appearance and reality come apart, what counts as R can change (SDR 134). 
86 Camp’s “instrumental reasoning” is distinct from and should not be confused with other uses of that term 
or, for example, with the “instrumental rationality” discussed in critical theory. I would not rule out the idea 
that it is worth exploring a connection between Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts and the critique of 
instrumental rationality, but it is not my aim to do so here. 
87 I borrow the term, “neo-behaviorist,” from Haugeland, “The Intentionality All-Stars,” 1990. Camp’s own 
view, by Haugeland’s standards, is a form of neo-behaviorism. In Chapter IV, I explore the compatibilities 
and incompatibilities of Camp’s and Haugeland’s views in detail. 
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attributes concepts to a wide range of animals, including, for example, dogs and bees. 
What makes minimalism attractive is that it “puts thoughts to work” (to quote the title of 
Camp’s essay), i.e., it defines concept use in terms of a cognitive ability that affords 
animals an evolutionary advantage by allowing them, as individuals or in groups, to 
better exploit their ecological niche. The downside to minimalism, Camp argues, is that it 
fails to appreciate the importance of an animal’s ability to actively recombine 
representations, independently of environing stimuli. Not only does this failure miss 
something crucial about thought that intellectualism gets right, it leads minimalism to 
attribute concepts and thoughts to animals, such as bees, that have highly rigid cognitive 
abilities compared to animals typically understood to be intelligent, such as corvids, 
cetaceans, elephants, and primates. 
Intellectualism defines concepts exclusively as a function in the cognition of 
rational, human animals capable of metacognition and grasping cognitive errors. This is 
the “philosophical tradition” that focuses on what rational thinkers can do with concepts 
and makes having language necessary for using concepts. Intellectualism only recognizes 
concept-use in rational animals with a developed capacity for natural language. What 
makes intellectualism attractive is that it grasps the important insight, mentioned above, 
that a cognitive ability should only count as thought or concept-use if it can be freely 
deployed, rather than relying on environing stimuli. The problem with intellectualism, 
Camp argues, is that it sets the bar too high for concepts and misses the opportunity to 
link human rationality to the complex forms of cognition that we can observe in our 
closest primate relatives and other intelligent species. 
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In the course of her essay, Camp refines the minimalist approach to concepts by 
accommodating what she takes to be the important insight from the intellectualist 
approach, namely, that concept-use requires an active ability to recombine 
representations independently of stimuli. Thus she finds a middle way between the 
permissive criteria for concept use that minimalism provides and the all too restrictive 
criteria that intellectualism provides. Her goal is in part to naturalize concepts, or as she 
puts it, to “understand why and how [conceptual thought] might emerge in nature,” and 
she thinks the key is to consider the practical advantages for an animal that develops 
conceptual thought (PTW 276). 
To spell out Camp’s theory of concepts I first present the minimalist approach to 
concepts whose criteria Camp considers necessary but not sufficient (§2.1); I then 
explore the additional criteria Camp appends to minimalism to present her instrumentalist 
approach to concepts (§2.2). 
2.1 Minimalism 
Minimalism, as Camp understands it, takes concepts to be revisable, systematically 
recombinable representations that facilitate an animal’s ability to adapt to and make use 
of its surroundings.88 On a minimalist view of concepts, conceptual cognition is a 
function of an animal’s ability to adapt to its surroundings and adapt its surroundings to 
its needs. Thus, concepts are “states and abilities [that] have the function of indicating or 
representing aspects of the world, and are capable of interacting with a range of other 
such states and abilities to produce action aimed at achieving the creature’s goals” (PTW 
                                                
88 A good example of a minimalist approach to concepts can be found in Peter Carruthers’ work, especially 
Carruthers, “Invertebrate Concepts Confront the Generality Constraint (and Win).” 
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279).89 Concepts are revisable in the sense that they are learned—acquired from and 
responsive to regular patterns of activity and environing stimuli, enabling the animal to 
take better advantage of its present circumstances. As Camp puts it, these conceptual 
abilities are “applicable on the basis of, and revisable as a result of, a range of different 
experiences” (PTW 279). 
What does it mean for concepts to be systematically recombinable? For one thing, 
it means combinations of a limited set of concepts form distinct conceptual structures that 
represent different states of affairs, giving the animal a more nuanced grip on its 
environment and a greater capacity to take advantage of opportunities and avoid threats. 
Camp writes, “one of the few widely shared intuitions about concepts [is] … that 
conceptual thought is essentially structured” (PTW 277). On this account, concepts are by 
definition (1) relational, in that a concept has no function if it is not standing in some 
relation to another concept; and (2) representational, in that a set of relating concepts has 
no function if it is not representing a state of affairs. 
To further clarify what it is for concepts to be systematically recombinable, Camp 
draws on the work of Gareth Evans and in particular his notion that generality is the key 
to conceptuality. Camp is not interested in the distinction between conceptual and 
nonconceptual content that motivates Evans, and it is not clear that the minimalist’s use 
of Evans’ generality constraint accurately reflects Evans’ view of it. However, here I only 
focus on explaining Camp’s appropriation of the idea. 
On Camp’s reading, the main idea of the generality constraint begins with the 
thought, introduced above, that “conceptual thought is essentially structured” (PTW 
                                                
89 What Camp means by “representation” shares some features with what Brandom means by 
“significance.” I discuss Brandom’s “significances” in Chapter I, §4.1.1. 
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277).90 That is, concepts are representations that can be flexibly recombined with a wide 
variety of other representations. General recombinability means that different thoughts 
bear a structural similarity to one another; Camp cites Evans’ examples: “John is happy” 
bears a structural resemblance to both “Harry is happy” and “John is sad” (PTW 277).91 
The similarity between conceptual thoughts “can’t just be a descriptive similarity at the 
level of referential content,” because then the similarity would only incidentally belong to 
the representations (PTW 277). Rather, the similarity belongs to how those 
representations are essentially structured. The generality constraint is about a similarity of 
means of representation, not similarity of practical results. As Camp points out, a thinker 
who can think that both John and Harry are happy can do so because she can represent a 
variety of things as “being happy,” so that every representation of something being happy 
bears a similar structure; and the reason a thinker who can think that John is happy at one 
time and sad at another is that she can represent John in a variety of ways (PTW 277-8). 
This variety is what makes the representational ability “general” in the relevant sense. 
Camp concludes, “conceptual thoughts are structured, then, at least in the sense that the 
ability to think them results from the exercise of distinct, systematically interacting 
representational abilities” (PTW 277-8). In her examples, the ability to represent John, 
Harry, being sad, and being happy systematically interact. In Evans’ formulation of the 
generality constraint, “If a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F then he 
must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every 
                                                
90 See also Camp, “The Generality Constraint and Categorial Restrictions.” 
91 Camp refers to Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 100. Peter Carruthers arrives at his minimalism 
through a similarly loose interpretation of Gareth Evans’ generality constraint, which he characterizes as 
follows: “If a creature possesses the concepts F and a (and is capable of thinking Fa), then for some other 
concepts G and b that the creature could possess, it is metaphysically possible for the creature to think Ga, 
and in the same sense possible for it to think Fb” (Carruthers, “Invertebrate Concepts Confront the 
Generality Constraint [and Win],” 97). 
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property of being G of which he has a conception” (PTW 278).92 Thus for someone to 
count as having the ability to think John and Harry are happy, she must in principle be 
able to think that George is happy too. 
An additional criterion of the generality constraint concerns the extent of 
generalizability: only when the animal is capable of entertaining all possible 
combinations of its representations can those representations count as concepts. Camp 
deflates the importance of this criterion by arguing (1) it is not clear that even language 
affords the ability to entertain all possible combinations of our representations, strictly 
speaking, and (2) Evans himself takes a relaxed view of this criterion, setting it up as an 
ideal for conceptual abilities to approach rather than a criterion to be satisfied for an 
ability to count as conceptual (PTW 305). 
Note that minimalism about concepts entails a kind of conceptual holism: to use a 
concept is to structurally relate a set of concepts. The ability to recombine concepts 
means having a plurality of concepts that can be recombined. One cannot count as having 
any concepts if one does not have multiple concepts. To be clear, however, this is not the 
conceptual holism that interests Brandom in his intellectualist approach to concepts, not 
least because minimalism about concepts does not require there to be normatively 
governed inferential relations among concepts. Nonetheless, it is worth flagging that 
conceptual minimalism involves a kind of holism. Although Camp requires additional 
criteria beyond minimalism for a cognitive ability to count as conceptual, Camp’s own 
theory of concepts retains this holism built into minimalism. 
Camp considers the minimalist criteria for concepts too basic, and incomplete. 
The problem with minimalism about concepts, Camp argues, is that it attributes thoughts 
                                                
92 Camp refers to Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 104. 
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to animals that don’t seem to have any control over their supposed ability to think (PTW 
287ff). Rather, their ability to systematically recombine representations remains entirely 
dependent upon environing stimuli. Camp argues that, in addition to the minimalist 
criteria for having concepts, we should add another criterion, namely, stimulus-
independence. When an animal can deploy its ability to represent things independently of 
environing stimuli, it gains a genuine advantage that turns revisable, systematically 
recombinable representations into instruments for animal problem-solving. 
2.2 Instrumentalism 
In order to count as conceptual, on Camp’s view, it is necessary but not sufficient for 
representations to be revisable and systematically recombinable. In addition, the animal 
must be able to actively, systematically recombine its cognitive states as a means to an 
end. With minimalism, environing stimuli select and cause the systematic recombination 
of representations in a way that facilitates the animal’s goal-directed activity. With 
instrumentalism, the animal expands its control of its limbs to include its own cognition, 
and can take over and incorporate the selection and recombination of representations into 
its goal-directed activity. 
2.2.1 Stimulus Independence 
Camp’s discussion of stimulus independence is part of her search for a “capacity for 
active, self-generated cognition” (PTW 291). The thinking animal must be capable of 
actively and spontaneously recombining its representations itself, as part of its goal 
directed activity, to represent states of affairs that do not presently obtain (PTW 287-8). 
But what is stimulus independence? Camp distinguishes between two sorts of stimulus-
independence that representational abilities can have (PTW 289-90). There is a non-
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demanding sense of stimulus-independence that minimalism can already account for and 
a demanding sense that Camp argues is necessary for representational abilities to count as 
conceptual. 
The non-demanding sense of stimulus-independence captures how animals 
represent states of affairs that are physically absent, i.e., in the absence of the environing 
stimuli that initially gave rise to the representation of the state of affairs. As Camp points 
out, honeybees can represent absent food sources with their waggle dances. Hungry rats 
that have learned to find food at the end of a maze presumably represent food as being in 
the maze as they seek it—attributing this representational ability to the rat helps explain 
the rat’s behavior. Animals with revisable, systematically recombinable representations 
(but lacking concepts, by Camp’s lights) can represent absent things in this sense and so, 
in a limited way, their representational abilities can function independently of environing 
stimuli. 
While Camp recognizes this non-demanding stimulus independence affords the 
animal certain advantages, it is not sufficient, on Camp’s view, to count as conceptual 
thought. The reason it is not sufficient is that, even though the animal can represent 
absent states of affairs, it can do so only insofar as environing stimuli prompt it to do so 
(PTW 291). How and which of its representations are recombined remains causally 
dependent upon environing stimuli, even though what it represents is not present. 
Animals with such abilities do have minds, as Camp says, but they are very narrow-
minded (PTW 290). 
The more demanding, relevant sense of stimulus-independence that Camp does 
think amounts to concept use involves the ability to (at least occasionally) control how 
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and which representations are recombined regardless of the environing stimuli (PTW 
290). With stimulus independence in the more demanding sense, an animal is capable of 
representing a state of affairs that does not obtain, without relying on environing stimuli 
to do so. This ability affords the animal genuine advantages, by empowering it with a 
greater ability to take advantage of its environment. 
 It is worth dwelling on Camp’s use of the notion of “distance” to articulate the 
importance of stimulus independence in Camp’s demanding sense. As she puts it, “many 
theorists have felt that active, genuinely rational thinking, as opposed to mere passive 
reaction, requires some sort of ‘distance’ or ‘separation’ between the thinker and what it 
thinks about” (PTW 287).93 Recall that, in Mind and World, McDowell inherits from 
Gadamer the idea that having “distance” from our environment (Umwelt) is an attribute 
of human rationality that sets us apart from the other animals. As McDowell noted, 
language helps to establish this distance and it is that distance that makes possible having 
a world. On McDowell’s view, this distance is filled by social and linguistic norms, 
allowing us to rise above biological pressures to freely, actively, and spontaneously 
respond to our conditions. By contrast, the distance Camp is talking about does not 
attribute a world (in Gadamer’s sense) to the animals Camp takes to have concepts. 
Rather, Camp’s distance establishes two qualitatively different ways of having an 
environment: having no distance from one’s environment in the sense of being dependent 
on environing stimuli, and having, over and above this, a modest distance with the ability 
to actively and spontaneously represent conditions or states of affairs that do not 
                                                
93 Among the philosophers she cites as demanding that genuine thought involves distance or separation are 
Cussins, “Content, Embodiment and Objectivity: The Theory of Cognitive Trails,” 659–60; Bermúdez, 
Thinking Without Words, 39; Dummett, Origins of Analytic Philosophy, 123; and McDowell, Mind and 
World: With a New Introduction, 57. 
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presently obtain, and further, an ability to suppose counterfactual states of affairs as a 
means to realize a goal. This slim distance does not accommodate rational norms but 
does allow the animal to “think” in Camp’s sense of the word. That Camp’s theory of 
concepts can give intelligent animals a degree of distance from their environments is 
genuinely interesting, because it challenges intellectualism on a basic point: that only 
humans have any kind of distance from the environment. 
2.2.2 Instrumental Reasoning 
Instrumental reasoning is the paradigmatic animal ability that Camp takes to exemplify 
stimulus independence in the demanding sense that she is after (PTW 291-2). To be clear, 
instrumental reasoning in Camp’s sense should not be confused with other senses, or with 
“instrumental rationality” as discussed, for example, in critical theory. Rather, Camp’s 
instrumental reasoning builds on the notion of “Einsicht” (intelligence or insight) 
developed a century ago by Wolfgang Köhler in The Mentality of Apes.94 There, Köhler 
characterized “insight” as follows: 
As experience shows, we do not speak of behaviour as being intelligent 
[einsichtigem Verhalten], when human beings or animals attain their 
objective by a direct unquestionable route which without doubt arises 
naturally out of their organization. But what seems to us “intelligence” 
[Einsicht] tends to be called into play when circumstances block a course 
which seems obvious to us, leaving open a roundabout path which the 
human being or animal takes, so meeting the situation.95 
                                                
94 See Wolfgang Köhler, The Mentality of Apes. In this translation, Köhler’s term, “Einsicht,” and its 
cognates, are translated variously as “insight” or “intelligence,” and their cognates. The discussion of 
“insight” begins in his introduction and is further refined in his first chapter. 
95 Wolfgang Köhler, The Mentality of Apes, 3–4. 
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Köhler’s notion of insight as a form of intelligence shared by both humans and some 
other species was largely criticized as unscientific and anthropomorphic.96 A few 
psychologists picked up the idea but used the notion inconsistently, which led to scrutiny 
and skepticism even by those who might be inclined to accept the idea, and a particularly 
damning critique by Jonathan Bennett.97 However, Camp’s revision of “insight” as 
instrumental rationality goes beyond the views that Bennett criticized by defining it more 
rigorously and showing how it is useful for explaining distinctive forms of behavior. Her 
definition is worth quoting at length: 
When a creature reasons instrumentally, it recognizes a way to achieve a 
goal that it cannot achieve directly, by bringing about a subsidiary state of 
affairs. In order to do this, it must represent that subsidiary state while 
realizing both that this state does not actually obtain and that its obtaining 
would help to achieve the primary goal. To count as a case of genuine 
reasoning, the creature’s recognition of the connection between the two 
states must be established through spontaneous “insight”: that is, it must 
be neither directly “afforded” by its environment nor established through 
trial-and-error or operant conditioning. If a creature does meet all of these 
requirements, then its representation of the intermediate state of affairs is 
genuinely instrumental. (PTW 292) 
The ability to represent a state of affairs that does not presently obtain in its connection 
with a state of affairs that does presently obtain establishes the independence from 
environing stimuli that Camp is after. This capacity for instrumental reason, Camp thinks, 
endows animals with an attitude of “supposing” what it represents, where the supposed 
                                                
96 Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?, 66. 
97 See Bennett, Rationality, 101–19. The question that animates Bennett is whether “insight” is really 
different in kind from other forms of animal learning, such as trial and error. Bennett contends that 
arguments for a difference in kind fail, leaving differences of degree only in the intelligence of nonhuman 
animals and a difference of kind between human and nonhuman intelligence. 
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conditions do not obtain (PTW 292).98 This supposition is a functional part of the 
animal’s ability to solve problems it encounters: it supposes a state of affairs that does not 
presently obtain, but that the animal could bring about, and if it did bring that state of 
affairs about, it would then be able to achieve its goal. Köhler’s famous examples of this 
include an ape building a long stick by attaching short sticks together, in order to retrieve 
food, and apes stacking boxes on top of each other, again in order to reach food 
suspended out of reach. Thus instrumental reasoning introduces a capacity for 
means/ends thinking. Whereas animals lacking instrumental reasoning engage in goal-
directed activity and can represent their goals as the ends of their activity, animals with 
instrumental reasoning can also represent situations as means to those ends, and then treat 
the realization of the means as a means to those ends. To put what I take to be the core of 
Camp’s idea in these terms, the genuine advantage afforded by stimulus independence in 
                                                
98 Compare Camp’s instrumental reason to the notion developed by Okrent in the fifth chapter of his 
Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality, 104–33. As with Camp, Okrent’s discussion of 
“instrumental rationality” should not be confused with the critique of instrumental rationality in critical 
theory. Although Camp and Okrent proceed differently, their accounts have important details in common. 
Like Camp, Okrent thinks that to have instrumental reason is (1) to be able to form proximate goals on the 
way to achieving a main goal; and (2) to model the mental states of others—in Okrent’s case a plover 
models the mental state of a potential predator and uses that model to deceive the predator with its “broken 
wing display” and lead it away from the plover’s nest (Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of 
Intentionality, 119). (For Okrent’s discussion of proximate goals, see ibid. 32-33, 83-84). Ultimately, 
Okrent writes, “[t]he supreme test of instrumental rationality is the ability to learn to respond effectively to 
a range of situations by engaging in novel, but goal- and situation-appropriate, activity” (Okrent, Rational 
Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality, 121). In these respects, then, Camp’s and Okrent’s 
respective accounts of instrumental reasoning in nonhuman animals appear complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. However, they are importantly different. For one thing, Okrent’s discussion of proximate goals 
pursued in light of an end goal does not require that pursuing the proximate goal takes the animal 
temporarily away from its end goal. Nor does it require that the animal must represent its proximate goal as 
a means to the end of achieving its end goal. This is, in part, because Okrent, unlike Camp, makes the 
intentionality of behavior fundamental and derives the intentionality of representational abilities from 
behavior (ibid. 26-27). Another crucial point of difference is that Camp singles out instrumental reasoning 
as a clear indication of conceptual thought, whereas Okrent appeals to it to distinguish a special form of 
goal-directed activity. If it is fair to claim, as Okrent does, that the plover is “estimating” the predator’s 
“intentional psychological state” (ibid. 119), then his notion of “instrumental rationality” aligns nicely with 
Josef Perner’s notion of secondary representations, i.e., the ability to entertain multiple models, including 
counterfactual models, of how things are (Perner, Understanding the Representational Mind, 7). As I argue 
in Chapter V, the use of secondary representations underwrites and is necessary for Camp’s instrumental 
reasoning but does not qualify as instrumentally rational by itself for reasons similar to why Okrent’s 
version does not qualify as instrumentally rational on Camp’s view (see Chapter V). 
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the demanding sense is the capacity to represent not just ends but ends that are also 
means to other ends. 
Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts benefits—as she recognizes in her 
paper—from Josef Perner’s work on representation in Understanding the 
Representational Mind.99 I return to Perner’s work in detail in Chapter V, but here it is 
enough to mention his tripartite approach to representation. The most basic ability, 
primary representation, is revisable, could even be systematically recombinable, and 
allows animals to refine their behavior based on their success or failure at realizing their 
goals. But primary representations are only causally elicited by environing stimuli. 
Secondary representations, which humans acquire around age two, are stimulus-
independent and allow children to entertain multiple models of a given state of affairs, 
engage pretense, and attribute their own mental models to others as a way of anticipating 
their behavior. Camp’s distinction of stimulus independence goes further than Perner’s 
does, however, which suggest’s that secondary representational abilities are not, by 
definition, conceptual on Camp’s definition. However, conceptual problem-solving 
abilities—per Camp’s definition—do count as secondary representations by Perner’s 
definition. Although Perner himself does not consider nonhuman animals, the idea that 
other species have secondary representations (and sufficient stimulus-independence to 
count as having concepts) is supported by Suddendorf and Whiten, who analyze results in 
comparative psychology and ethology and argue that Great Apes and other species are 
best understood as having secondary representational abilities.100 The third stage in 
Perner’s theory is metacognition—the ability to represent representations as 
                                                
99 Perner, Understanding the Representational Mind. Henceforth, URM followed by page number. 
100 Suddendorf and Whiten, “Mental Evolution and Development: Evidence for Secondary Representation 
in Children, Great Apes, and Other Animals.” 
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representations—and the development in human children, around age four, of a 
representational theory of mind. It is odd that Camp does not take advantage of the 
resources Perner’s metacognition afford for making human rationality distinct, but 
perhaps this just underscores Camp’s lack of interest in this intellectualist question in her 
essay. 
For an example that highlights the advantage of instrumental reason, consider a 
small dog that habitually and energetically follows a large dog around the neighborhood 
each day. The two dogs are regular companions, often observed to play with each other. 
For the past few weeks, during a regular game that involves the small dog chasing the 
large one, they have been leaping over a fence, but, because it is small, the small dog 
must first leap on top of a sturdy, overturned cardboard box that has been left next to the 
fence in order to leap over it. One day, the small dog plays with the box, and, while 
chewing on its flaps, drags the box several meters away from the fence, making it useless 
as a launch pad for leaping the fence. At this point, the large dog shows up and one of 
their regular games of chase erupts, leading them around the neighborhood. When they 
return to the fence moments later, the large dog bounds the fence as usual and the small 
dog stops short, erupting in barking and whining; it cannot clear the fence without the 
box. The small dog’s goal is to stay with the large dog, but it lacks the cognitive 
resources to “suppose” that it could leap the fence if it first dragged the box back to 
where it has been for weeks—a solution to the small dog’s problem that is obvious to an 
intelligent onlooker. Note that the small dog has already moved the box and is therefore 
both strong enough to replace it and also has experience moving it. Despite its eagerness 
to catch up with the large dog, the small dog cannot represent a subsidiary state of affairs, 
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cannot give itself a subsidiary goal of replacing the box in its previous position, a goal 
that would require broadening its representation of its ends to include also representations 
of means to those ends. In short, the small dog lacks instrumental reason. By treating the 
box as a tool to achieve its goal of following the big dog, the small dog would, on 
Camp’s account, represent relocating the box as a subsidiary goal on the way to 
achieving that end. As Camp observes, representing and pursuing a subsidiary goal takes 
the animal temporarily farther from its main goal (PTW 296); in my example, this would 
mean backing away from the fence to grab the box, and thereby moving away from the 
retreating big dog despite being desperate to catch up with it. This small dog lacks 
instrumental reason. 
If we imagine instead that the small dog responds to its situation by moving the 
box and jumping the fence then, on Camp’s account, we would be in a position to 
attribute instrumental reasoning to the dog: by moving the box, it has supposed a state of 
affairs that does not presently obtain, which establishes that its grasp of the situation is 
stimulus independent, and it has represented a subsidiary goal on the way to achieving its 
main goal. It has thus spontaneously recombined its representations of the box and the 
fence (and perhaps other surroundings). 
It is important to point out that training an animal to perform a subsidiary task to 
achieve a goal it already has would not amount to giving it instrumental reason. Rather, 
the training gives the animal a new end goal, and it performs that end goal prior to 
performing another end goal that it can now achieve for having achieved the first goal. 
This does not require that the animal represent the first goal as a means to achieve the 
second. It is not “supposing” anything and still lacks any ability to take something to be a 
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means to an end. On the other hand, just because an animal fails to grasp an opportunity 
to solve a problem by representing and achieving a subsidiary goal in a given instance 
does not mean the animal lacks instrumental reason. Humans fail in exactly this way all 
the time; it is indeed such a classic human failure that exploiting it is a central motif in 
physical comedy. In humans, this failure suggests that while we are able in most 
circumstances we encounter to effectively deploy instrumental reasoning, we can fail to 
do so. In animals, the failure to achieve an end when the means are available may evince 
a limitation on the range of objects and situations in which the animals can engage in 
such behavior, not to mention the relatively narrow set of goals that even intelligent 
animals (corvids, chimpanzees, etc.) seem to have. What is at stake here is whether an 
animal can engage in instrumental reasoning under any circumstances, not whether or not 
it always does. 
Two kinds of animal behavior that Camp takes to indicate instrumental reasoning 
are tool use and instrumental social interaction (PTW 293). Essentially, tool use involves 
using objects as a means to an end, and the social interaction Camp has in mind involves 
engaging other members of a social group as means to an end.101 Again, Camp does not 
think that having a capacity to use instrumental reason is in principle necessary to count 
as having concepts (PTW 292n12), nor does she claim that only these two kinds of 
behavior should count as instrumental reason in nonhuman animals. Rather, she is 
reaching for the clearest demonstrations of instrumental reason in nonhuman animals, and 
tool use and instrumental social interaction turn out to be the easiest to observe for that 
purpose. 
                                                
101 To discuss members of a community using each other as means to an end has the ring of selfish 
behavior, but it can be equally altruistic if the instrument-member or community at large benefits from the 
behavior.  
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To illustrate an example of tool use, suppose we change my example of the small 
dog and the cardboard box in the following way: rather than stopping, barking, and 
whining as the large dog retreats over the fence, the small dog looks for the cardboard 
box and then moves it back to its former position in order to jump the fence and chase the 
large dog. Moving the box under these conditions, for this purpose, would count as an 
example of tool use, which, for Camp, “requires manipulating one object to achieve a 
goal with respect to some other one” (PTW 293). Here, the small dog’s “supposing” 
could be expressed linguistically as “if the box were under the fence, then the fence could 
be jumped.” In terms of recombining and relating representations, the small dog would 
have to be able to represent how things are (with the box far from the fence) and how 
things were and could be (with the box close enough to the fence to enable jumping the 
fence) and be able to relate those two representations in a way that shows up the box as a 
means to the end of jumping the fence and catching up with the large dog. 
According to Camp, research on tool use in nature (i.e., absent human 
interference) shows that “a wide variety of species, including primates, elephants, polar 
bears, sea otters, and corvids (crows and ravens), can do this with at least some objects” 
(TPW 293). On Camp’s account, all such animals will have some capacity for 
instrumental reasoning and therefore some capacity for conceptual cognition. Examples 
of animal tool use (both with and without human intervention) that Camp cites include 
crow communities forming various tools to retrieve food in various circumstances; New 
Caledonian crows selecting and creating “novel, appropriate tools” (in one case creating a 
hook with a piece of wire, which was to this crow a novel piece of material with novel 
properties); chimpanzees using sticks and boxes to obtain bananas and, in the wild, 
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selecting materials to modify into tools to retrieve food “in situations where the goal is 
not perceptible” (293-4).102 
Examples of instrumental social action include “tactical deception,” a form of 
social behavior observed in chimpanzees, corvids, and other species (PTW 294). Another 
form of instrumental social interaction Camp cites concerns problem-solving behavior in 
chimpanzees, albeit under human contrived conditions. The human intervention opens the 
door to skepticism (and I’ll turn to Camp’s answer to skeptics next), but it is a striking 
example nonetheless. The example involves one chimpanzee recognizing that 
coordinating with a member of its group will facilitate achieving a goal. It is again worth 
quoting Camp at length here: 
Chimpanzees were first introduced to a wooden key which they could use 
to unlock a sliding door to a room where another chimpanzee was held. 
Next, they were introduced to a feeding platform, which was located out 
of direct reach but accessible by means of a rope threaded through two 
metal loops in the platform. The chimpanzees very quickly discerned 
(often through observation alone) that pulling one end of the rope 
unthreaded it, leaving the food inaccessible, while pulling both ends 
brought the platform within reach. When the platform’s loops were 
positioned close enough together for one chimpanzee to reach both rope 
ends at once, the subject pulled in the platform by himself. When the loops 
were too far apart, however, most of the chimpanzees—and a majority on 
the first trial—unlocked the door and released the other chimpanzee, who 
then often collaborated to pull in the platform. When, in a second session, 
the subjects were introduced to two new collaborators, only one of whom 
was reliably cooperative, they reliably discerned who was cooperative and 
                                                
102 This last point about nonperceptible goals answers an objection from Dummett, who denied that 
chimpanzees used instrumental reason in cases where their goals—the food they wished to obtain—was 
present. By contrast, chimpanzees preparing tools prior to arriving at the destination of their intended use 
defeats the objection. 
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chose to unlock his door. Thus, most of the chimpanzees quickly figured 
out when they needed (and could use) help, how to get it, and who could 
best provide it. (294-5) 
This is, if nothing else, an ingenious experiment and one that undeniably shows how 
intelligent chimpanzees really are, but how to characterize that intelligence is another 
question. Camp infers from the experiment (reasonably, I think) that the chimpanzee who 
opts to unlock a door so that another, like-minded chimpanzee can pull the other end of a 
rope and aid in retrieving food is an example of instrumental reason. It seems fairly clear 
that the chimpanzee can represent its fellow as a means to the end of retrieving the food, 
just as it can represent pulling both sides of the rope at the same time as a means to 
retrieving the food. Camp isolates what she thinks is crucial about the experiment as an 
example of instrumental social interaction. For Camp, what counts is 
 that “chimpanzees can quickly adapt a recently learned skill (removing 
the key) for a novel purpose (initiating a collaborative activity),” in a 
situation where the connection between implementing the skill and 
achieving the goal is indirect and not visually perceptible (Melis et al 
2006, 1300). The finding is especially surprising given that chimpanzees 
generally perform better in competitive than cooperative contexts (e.g. 
Tomasello et al 2003). (PTW 295) 
Part of what is striking here is the degree to which the solution to the problem takes the 
chimpanzee away from the goal of achieving the food. Unlocking a gate with a wooden 
key is a whole other activity that itself involves a separate episode of tool use, i.e., 
representing a wooden object as a means to open an enclosure to release another chimp. 
This example of instrumental reason is itself enlisted in order to realize a different goal, 
of retrieving food, instrumentalizing an activity that is already an instance of instrumental 
reasoning. Whether or not all animals capable of instrumental reason will be capable of 
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this degree of flexibility or if this identifies two different degrees of instrumental 
reasoning is an interesting question, one that Camp does not consider. 
2.2.3 Differences by Degree 
It is part of Camp’s view—albeit a part she does not discuss directly—that there are 
differences of kind and degree in play between different forms of cognition. For example, 
Camp consistently refers to “degrees” of stimulus independence that cognitive capacities 
can have, from the nondemanding sense that enables the ability to represent absent states 
of affairs to the demanding sense required for instrumental reasoning.103 Presumably, 
metacognition involves a still greater degree of stimulus independence. Camp also views 
all conceptual capacities in terms of differences of degree, from the conceptual capacities 
of intelligent animals capable of instrumental reasoning to those of fully rational humans 
(PTW 305). However, given Camp’s great interest in distinguishing conceptual forms of 
cognition from nonconceptual forms, it stands to reason that conceptual cognition is 
different in kind from more basic representational abilities. Thus, one can put Camp’s 
view this way: With respect to stimulus independence, all forms of cognition are different 
in degree only. With respect to cognition, we can understand there to be two kinds of 
representational ability: conceptual and nonconceptual. And with respect to conceptual 
cognition, from chimpanzees up to rational humans, there are only degrees of difference. 
This, at least, is what we can most straightforwardly infer from what she writes. 
On this view, both in terms of stimulus independence and conceptual capacities, 
human cognition can only be different in degree, not in kind, from the cognition of (for 
example) chimpanzees. This sets up an interesting contrast with intellectualism that helps 
to show what is distinctive about Camp’s approach to concepts. Camp thinks the 
                                                
103 For reference to “degrees” of stimulus independence, see PTW 292, 295, 302. 
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conceptual, instrumental rationality we find in other intelligent animals is different in 
kind from more basic forms of animal cognition and yet different only in degree from 
rational human thought. This is the reverse of intellectualism, which holds there to be a 
difference in kind between rational human thought and all nonrational animal cognition, 
and only differences of degree among manifestations of nonrational animal cognition.104 
Since Camp does not thematize difference of degree vs. difference of kind talk, 
she never spells out what she takes the distinction to be. Jonathan Bennett offers a useful 
rule of thumb in cases where it is not clear if there is a difference of kind or degree 
between two things, in the introduction to his essay, “Rationality.”105 Suppose there is 
such an ambiguous difference between x and y. If it is inconceivable for anything that 
seems to fall between x and y to be other than an x or a y, then the difference is a 
difference in kind. By contrast, if it is conceivable for something falling between them to 
be neither an x nor a y, then the difference is a difference in degree. 
To show this distinction between intellectualism and Camp’s view in concrete 
detail, consider the opposition between her position and Brandom’s position: Camp 
believes there is (1) a difference in kind between two representational abilities that 
animals may have: (a) recombinable representations whose recombination is wholly 
dependent upon environing stimuli; and (b) recombinable representations whose 
recombination is (at least sometimes) under the active control of the animal (as 
exemplified in sophisticated forms of tool-use). That is, the capacity to think conceptually 
articulated thoughts is different in kind from lesser forms of animal responsiveness. And 
                                                
104 Intellectualists have different stories to tell, however. Brandom and Dreyfus both locate the crucial 
difference of kind between discursive and nondiscursive practices, and find only differences of degree 
among nondiscursive practices of humans and nonhumans alike. McDowell, by contrast, locates the crucial 
difference of degree as between rational humans and nonrational animals. 
105 Bennett, Rationality, 4. 
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Camp believes (2) there is only a difference of degree between (b) and (c) the rational, 
human ability to deploy concepts in language, in giving and asking for reasons.106 This 
latter notion may be shocking to intellectualists, but consider that each one of us became 
rational only slowly, through a process of development or Bildung that admits of 
degrees.107 
The distinction between differences of degree and of kind is useful here but I do 
not mean to put it forward as being more than a heuristic. The intellectualist critique of 
Camp’s view, as I discuss in §4 below, is that her means of differentiating rational human 
capacities from the instrumental reasoning of nonhuman animals is insufficient. In light 
of that critique, one could argue that there is in fact a difference of kind between full 
human rationality and nonhuman instrumental rationality, by appealing to species, as 
McDowell does: only humans have the potential to actualize fully rational capacities, and 
only for humans is this natural, in a relaxed sense of “nature.” Contrast this way of 
thinking with Camp’s species-blind appeal to abilities in her claim that there is only a 
difference of degree. What this contrast shows is that, at least in this case, the question of 
whether there is a difference of degree or a difference of kind is decided in advance by 
the criteria one appeals to in making the claim. 
2.2.4 Summing Up Camp’s Instrumentalism 
Minimalists understand conceptual thought to require revisable, systematically 
recombinable representations. Camp agrees with minimalists that these are necessary 
                                                
106 As Camp puts it, “we should view conceptuality as a matter of degree” (PTW 305). 
107 Brandom’s first response would be to absolutely reject (2). As for (1), Brandom’s demarcation of 
rationality does not necessarily commit him to rejecting it. Endorsing (1) would not cost him anything in 
principle, though he would have to reject the language Camp uses to characterize (b) as “conceptual” and 
“instrumentally rational.” However, Brandom does seem to also reject (1). He seems to reject (1) because 
he thinks there’s only a difference of degree between iron rusting, parrots saying red, and apes stacking 
boxes to reach bananas. 
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conditions for a representational ability to count as conceptual, but not sufficient. Add a 
robust form of stimulus independence to the minimalist criteria and, together, they 
constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for a cognitive ability to count as 
conceptual. Again, many species of animals can represent absent states of affairs, and this 
is a degree of stimulus independence, but this is not the relevant, demanding sense of 
stimulus independence because representing absent states of affairs can occur under the 
control of environing stimuli. Rather, the demanding sense of stimulus independence is 
that an animal has control over which representations are combined and when they are 
combined. What this robust stimulus independence amounts to is a capacity for 
instrumental reasoning, an ability that allows animals to represent not just ends as ends, 
but also means to ends as means to ends. One can find examples of this capacity for 
instrumental reasoning in sophisticated forms of animal tool use and instrumental social 
interaction. This revisable, systematically recombinable, stimulus-independent 
representational ability that powers instrumental reasoning constitutes conceptual 
thought. This is a genuinely distinct cognitive ability that empowers animals in 
possession of it to take advantage of opportunities to which they would not otherwise 
have access. Finally, while conceptual cognition is a distinct kind of cognition, Camp 
considers the instrumental rationality of intelligent animals to be different only in degree 
from the fully rational cognition that humans generally enjoy. 
 
3. Instrumentalism Contra Intellectualism 
“Instrumentalism,” again, is my term for Camp’s theory of concepts, outlined above. In 
this section, I briefly describe the intellectualist approach to concepts (already familiar 
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from my discussion of Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus in previous chapters) before 
spelling out the debate between instrumentalism and intellectualism. 
3.1 Defining Intellectualism 
Theories that fall under “intellectualism” as Camp defines it are those that treat concepts 
as essentially or exclusively a function of rational judgment. Brandom, McDowell, and 
Dreyfus are intellectualists by this standard, as are Donald Davidson, Wilfred Sellars, and 
John Haugeland. Camp’s critique is that intellectualism demands a superfluous criterion 
for concept use, above and beyond the criteria required by her own instrumentalism. The 
superfluous intellectualist criterion for concept use is objectivity: to have concepts, one 
must have an objective grasp of the world. Objectivity involves metacognition—the 
ability to think reflectively about thoughts as thought—and the ability to understand that 
one’s beliefs may be true or false.  
Camp acknowledges one of the motivating insights of intellectualism, that there is 
a meaningful difference between the fully rational cognition of humans and the cognition 
of other animals. She uses cognates of “thought” more liberally than do intellectualists, 
leading her to put the intellectualist insight this way: “the sort of thinking that dogs and 
rats do is obviously quite different from the sort of thinking we do” (PTW 283, emphasis 
mine). As she points out, even with “extensive training,” other intelligent animals seem 
incapable of the wide variety of counterfactual thoughts that rational humans consider as 
we freely explore our world (PTW 283). This is Camp’s way of agreeing with 
intellectualists that we need to be able to say something about what makes rational, 
human cognition different in some way. However, as I show below, her suggestion as to 
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how to account for that difference is not sufficient to an intellectualist. To be fair to 
Camp, explaining that difference is not her goal. 
To state the intellectualist position in its most basic form, Camp turns to 
Davidson’s version, which has been highly influential.108 According to Camp, 
Davidson’s intellectualism states that: 
(1) in order to have a belief, one must understand the possibility of being 
mistaken; 
(2) in order to understand the possibility of being mistaken, one must have 
a concept of belief; 
(3) in order to acquire the concept of belief, one must interpret another’s 
linguistic utterances.  
Therefore, belief requires language. (PTW 284) 
Belief and thought are not synonymous in Davidson, but they go together (to lack either 
one is to lack both). The upshot of Davidson’s argument is that metacognition (reflecting 
on or thinking about thoughts and beliefs) and error recognition are necessary for having 
thoughts and beliefs at all, and because concepts are essentially the components of 
thoughts (as Camp herself agrees, albeit under a different definition), they are also 
necessary for having beliefs. 
Davidson’s argument resonates strongly with the Sellarsian line—which 
Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus all endorse—that having a concept means mastering 
the use of a word. To master the use of a word is to be capable of deploying it in the game 
of giving and asking for reasons, and, to do so, one must be capable of recognizing errors 
                                                
108 As a mark of Davidson’s influence, Brandom conceives the inferential semantics he develops in Making 
It Explicit as, in part, an extended development of Davidson’s insight. Davidson is also the chief target of 
McDowell’s revised intellectualism, wherein McDowell (pace Davidson) finds an additional role for 
concepts in experience.  
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in one’s use of the word. It also requires the capacity to grasp concepts as concepts, so as 
to be reflectively aware of and responsive to the appropriate conditions for using them. 
Another the motivation for the intellectualist position is to avoid the Myth of the 
Given, i.e., the notion that a concept, belief, thought, or mental representation can be both 
semantically efficacious and yet independent of all other concepts, beliefs, thoughts, or 
mental representations.109 In order to avoid the myth, intellectualists typically make 
language use necessary for concepts, thoughts, and beliefs. Rather than derive the 
meaning of concepts atomically from their relation to fundamental, mind-independent 
sensations, intellectualists derive the meaning of concepts holistically from their use in 
the discursive norms of a community.110 It follows from this thought that if one does not 
belong to and participate in a rational, linguistic community, one does not have beliefs, 
thoughts, or concepts. 
Typically, intellectualists think only the rational use of language can make 
thoughts and beliefs possible. Some intellectualists appeal directly to language-use as 
definitive of concept-use and even, as Brandom, Dreyfus and Sellars do, restrict all 
concept-use to language-use.111 However, other varieties of intellectualism seek other 
means to account for the ability to have an objective grasp of the world, and de-
emphasize the importance of language for capacities like metacognition, error recognition 
and objectivity. As I showed in Chapter I, McDowell de-emphasizes language to the 
extent that he thinks concepts give rational form to human experience, such that our 
conceptual capacities are in use even when we are not making explicit, discursive 
judgments. This is in contrast to Brandom’s and Dreyfus’s views, where concepts only 
                                                
109 Discussed in detail in Chapter I. 
110 Maher, The Pittsburg School of Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom, 21ff. 
111 Dreyfus and Sellars also endorse this view. 
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have a role to play in explicit, discursive judgments; however, McDowell agrees with 
them insofar as he endorses the Sellarsian idea, mentioned above, that mastering 
language use is necessary for having concepts. Haugeland’s “Truth and Rule-Following” 
is another example, where language-use may be necessary for having an objective grasp 
of the world, but it is not the principle means of explaining how that grasp is achieved.112 
A view like Haugeland’s is nonetheless subject to Camp’s critique, which is not 
ultimately an attack on making language necessary for having concepts but, more 
generally, an attack on the idea that having an objective grasp of the world is necessary 
for having concepts. For Camp, unlike Haugeland or any other intellectualist, the 
function of concepts lies in facilitating a practically useful, instrumentally rational grip on 
the world that is, in principle, independent of the normative government of concepts that 
comes with shared, rational language because it is a capacity shared with nonrational, 
nonlinguistic animals. 
3.2 Critique of the All-or-Nothing View 
It is part of the intellectualist view that rational cognition is an all-or-nothing affair. To 
have concepts is to have thoughts and beliefs, metacognition, error-recognition, 
objectivity, rationality and a natural language. Falling short on any of these fronts means 
lacking concepts and thoughts entirely.  
Against this all-or-nothing approach, Camp thinks that this difference between 
human and nonhuman animal abilities can be explained in terms of “a suite of unrelated 
abilities”—“unrelated” not in the sense that they do not interact but rather that they 
                                                
112 Haugeland is unique among the philosophers named above for holding this view. I return to Haugeland 
later, as his way of thinking about what underwrites objective understanding of the world is extremely 
effective in showing up what is lacking in Camp’s view of concepts. Moreover, I argue, unlike his 
intellectualist compatriots—Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus—Haugeland’s view can accommodate 
Camp’s theory of concepts. 
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evolve piecemeal as opposed to necessarily coming in an all-or-nothing package. Camp 
contends that the intellectualist error belies a kind of anthropocentrism about thought. 
She thinks, “only anthropocentric prejudice leads us to assume that if there were some 
crucial difference between us and other animals, it would reflect something important 
about thought itself” (PTW 283). Camp aims to trace out an alternative: conceptual 
thought is an ability we share with multiple clades of other animals that serve as a 
genuine evolutionary advantage by enabling a more sophisticated and adaptive—i.e., 
instrumentally rational—grasp of things we encounter. Language may well serve as the 
ability that makes up the difference between human and nonhuman animal cognition, but 
not, she suggests, because it gives us an objective grasp of a world. To Camp, the 
important human difference—for which language may well be responsible—is rather the 
massive number and range of concepts we have and our ability to socially co-ordinate our 
use of them (PTW 286-87). In short, the all-or-nothing view unnecessarily obscures what 
we share with other animals. Camp’s contention is that we can show the difference of 
human cognition without it. This contention can be true even if it turns out that Camp’s 
own way of explaining the human difference fails to satisfy the intellectualists’ concerns. 
The position I defend below agrees with Camp that the all-or-nothing view is 
unmotivated but answering intellectualists requires a more robust and detailed account of 
what makes human rationality distinct. 
3.3 Critique of Intellectualism’s Basic Argument 
Davidson’s form of intellectualism, again, has been highly influential. While Camp’s 
critique focuses on the form that Davidson’s argument takes, it applies more broadly to 
the forms of intellectualism on which I am focused: those of Brandom, McDowell, and 
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Dreyfus. Here again is the basic form of the argument that Camp considers to animate 
intellectualism: 
(1) in order to have a belief, one must understand the possibility of being 
mistaken; 
(2) in order to understand the possibility of being mistaken, one must have 
a concept of belief; 
(3) in order to acquire the concept of belief, one must interpret another’s 
linguistic utterances.  
Therefore, belief requires language. (PTW 284) 
Camp accepts (2) but rejects (3) as implausible, in part on empirical grounds that suggest 
early humans developed a theory of mind (involving, I suppose, belief attribution at least 
on Camp’s broad definition of belief) prior to linguistic communication (PTW 284). Yet 
because Camp is more concerned with what a belief is than with how the concept of 
belief can be acquired, she focuses her attention on (1) (PTW 285). There is room for an 
intellectualist to reply to Camp’s quick dismissal of (3) precisely because it seems to 
require substituting Camp’s definition of belief for the intellectualist’s definition. 
However, Camp’s dismissal of (3) depends upon her critique of (1), making her attack on 
(1) the essence of her critique of intellectualism generally.  
On Camp’s reading, (1) is committed to the following two claims: “first, in order 
to think conceptual thoughts, one must be able to think higher-order (specifically, modal) 
thoughts about thoughts and their truth-values; and second, one must realize that beliefs 
‘aim at’ truth (PTW 285). It is by pressing on these claims that Camp derives what she 
takes to be the important insight of intellectualism: metarepresentational abilities, as 
higher-order conceptual thoughts (about thoughts), are stimulus-independent. Again, 
Camp argues that we should take stimulus-independence to be necessary for concept use, 
  147 
but refuse the idea that metacognition and objectivity are necessary for stimulus-
independence. 
3.4 The Argument from Children 
To show what is wrong with the intellectualist’s claim that concept-use is necessarily tied 
to the abilities to have thoughts about thoughts and to think objectively (i.e., grasp that 
thoughts aim at the truth), Camp appeals to the cognitive abilities of three-year-olds.113 
Appealing to children is, perhaps, an obvious move for countering an all-or-nothing view 
because it seems absurd to suppose that children have no thoughts or concepts until 
suddenly they have a fully rational understanding of the world. According to 
intellectualism, typical three-year-olds do not have concepts or thoughts because they 
have not yet developed a capacity for metacognition and objective thought. According to 
Camp, by contrast, typical three-year-olds evidently do spontaneously recombine their 
concepts in much the same way fully rational adults do. The argument really turns, 
therefore, on which approach to concepts and thought is more reasonable. I turn to the 
“more reasonable” argument in the following section. Here, I spell out how Camp 
appeals to children and how an intellectualist might respond. 
“Intuitively,” Camp writes, “three-year-old children appear to possess many 
concepts, which they apply repeatedly and confidently in various combinations, in order 
to think and say things about the world. . . . But they have not yet developed an 
understanding of false belief, let alone an ability to reflect upon the epistemic credentials 
                                                
113 Pressing intellectualists to account for the abilities of children is a common move when questioning their 
notion of a concept. For a critique of McDowell’s conceptualism, for example, see Crary, Inside Ethics: On 
the Demands of Moral Thought, 108ff. Dreyfus—who himself counts as an intellectualist by Camp’s lights, 
yet accuses McDowell and others of intellectualism for allegedly reducing perception to an epistemological 
function—also appeals to “prelinguistic infants” to motivate his challenge to explain the development of 
upper floors of rational cognition out of the ground floor we share with children and other animals (OMM 
47).  
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of their own beliefs” (PTW 286). That is, young, semi-linguistic children with abilities of 
typical three-year-olds (i.e., committed yet unreliable speakers and listeners), throughout 
the early stages of learning a language, really do seem to have concepts when they make 
correct observation reports of present states of affairs and express desires for absent 
things. Young, semi-linguistic children manifest this behavior all the time (often 
relentlessly). It is impossible to conclude that they are not spontaneously recombining 
their representational capacities in order to represent how things are or how they wish 
things were. More simply, they really do seem like concept users. 
Camp’s premises attributing concepts to children in their early stages of language 
acquisition could be put this way. Picture a three-year-old, H,114 who is an utterly reliable 
user of the word “juice” in the following way: every time she sees juice, she makes the 
sound “juice.” So far, she is no different from Brandom’s parrot, who says “red” reliably 
when confronted with red things. But unlike the parrot, H regularly (far too often, really) 
makes the sound, “juice,” in the absence of any juice at all (often, it seems, when it is 
impossible to obtain juice). Moreover, H repeats the sound, “juice,” at ever-greater 
volume, with increasing intensity and exhibiting the hallmarks of human desperation until 
juice arrives or some other sufficiently desirable object is introduced. And if juice does 
arrive, she stops saying “juice” and drinks the juice, exhibiting the hallmarks of human 
satisfaction. According to Camp’s instrumentalism, H’s behavior suffices for her to count 
has having concepts and thoughts. 
One key detail suggesting that H has the concept of juice is her clear ability to use 
the concept in the absence of juice, as a way of expressing her desire for it and a means to 
                                                
114 I am elaborating on Camp’s example of “Bobby,” albeit to the same argumentative effect. See PTW 
286. 
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get it. This suggests the kind of instrumental reasoning that Camp takes to be the 
hallmark of concept use. Rather than directly raid the fridge, pull the juice container out, 
spill the juice and lick it up off the floor (as a clever dog might solve the juice problem if, 
indeed, there are juice-desiring dogs), H engages in activity that instrumentalizes an adult 
as a means to get the juice, satisfying her juice desires not by pursuing the end directly 
but through indirect means. 
Now, consider how an intellectualist would deny that H meets the appropriate 
criteria for having concepts and thoughts. We can even allow that H can also use “juice” 
in basic sentences. Assume H’s sentences are not always grammatically correct, for 
example, “Mommy drinking juice, H wants juice. Mommy give H juice” (PTW 286). 
Despite this budding linguistic ability, there are many things important to intellectualism 
that H cannot do. She cannot give and ask for juice-related reasons (or at least, even if 
she can ask “why” in some sense she cannot accept juice-related reasons, or any reasons 
for anything that runs against her desires, for that matter). Nor can she reflect on her 
credentials for saying “juice” in the presence of juice, not least because she lacks most of 
the words required for articulating the attributes of juice and juice-related practices, and 
the conditions under which it is appropriate to take something to be juice. Nor can she 
think about her thoughts about juice (if we are willing to call these thoughts at all). 
Finally, H is not sufficiently engaged in the criteria for using the word “juice” to judge 
the use of the word as objectively correct or incorrect. For example, if another child says 
“juice” in the presence of milk, H doesn’t balk at this misuse. All of this is to say, by 
intellectualist criteria, H cannot count as having the concept “juice,” even if, by those 
criteria, we can say that she is on her way to having the concept. H lacks the concept of 
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juice essentially because she is not capable of the rational use of the word, “juice,” an 
ability she lacks essentially because she does not yet exhibit rationality at all, by 
intellectualist credentials. 
Hypothetically, an intellectualist could accept Camp’s arguments that H has 
stimulus-independence, instrumental reasoning, and recombines her representations in a 
general way, and yet still deny that H is using concepts. That is, an intellectualist could 
argue that because H is not a reliable user of concepts—her propositional claims are not 
reliably true, often logically unsound, and she is generally unreasonable—she doesn’t 
count as having any concepts. In order to actually confront intellectualism, Camp must 
make the further claim that her instrumentalism about concepts is more reasonable than 
intellectualism about concepts. 
3.5 The Argument from More Reasonable Premises 
Camp’s ultimate claim against intellectualists is not that their view is false for empirical 
reasons or suffers from internal logical inconsistency. Rather, it comes down to the claim 
that the intellectualist view is less reasonable than her instrumentalism about concepts:  
Arguments to the effect that children and early humans are not really 
deploying concepts to represent the world because they aren’t capable of 
meta-representation will be persuasive only if those arguments rely on 
premises that are at least as intuitively compelling as the claim that such 
people are conceptual thinkers. I don’t know of any argument that does 
this. (PTW 286.) 
In short, intellectualist premises that deny concepts to semi-linguistic, semi-rational 
children are less believable than the instrumentalist premises that attribute concepts to 
them. What makes it more reasonable to suggest that H’s abilities are conceptual than 
that they are not is that (1) what H is doing is easily recognizable as something fully 
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rational humans do, and (2) what we need is a notion of concepts and thought amenable 
to explaining human cognition in evolutionary terms. Despite the intellectualist 
credentials H lacks, it seems much more reasonable to suggest that H uses words to 
express thoughts and that the components of those thoughts are recombinable concepts, 
as Camp defines them. Camp’s view leaves us to claim that what separates H from full 
rationality is not an absolute lack of concepts, as the intellectualist would have it, but 
rather her relatively small repertoire of concepts and her lack of accountability and 
refinement in her use of them. 
If Camp is right that her instrumentalism about concepts is more reasonable than 
intellectualism, then it is a rejection of the general intellectualist contention that the only 
or essential function of concepts lies in discursively structuring objective knowledge. To 
Camp, the function of concepts is to facilitate a cognitive capacity that affords animals 
that have them the ability to take advantage of opportunities afforded by their 
environment that would otherwise remain out of reach—from stacking boxes to reach 
bananas, to spitting water in a tube to bring a floating peanut into reach, to carrying a 
heavy rock on one’s back for a kilometer in order to use it to crack nuts on another, larger 
flat rock (where suitable rocks cannot be found), to vocalizing recombinable sounds that 
will prompt a family member to give you juice, to filing a tax return in the hope of 
receiving the child tax benefit and contributing to a more egalitarian society. 
Again, the premise Camp singles out as a driving force behind intellectualism’s 
argument is Davidson’s claim that, “in order to have a belief, one must understand the 
possibility of being mistaken” (PTW 284). As I have shown, Camp rejects this premise as 
far less intuitively compelling than the claim that beliefs are possible without 
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understanding the possibility of being mistaken, which allows us to recognize what we 
share cognitively with not-yet-rational children and intelligent nonhuman animals, and 
defines concepts and thoughts broadly, in a way that shows how they empower animals 
to take greater advantage of their environing conditions. Camp’s thought is that the 
minimalist’s contention that we can identify some nonhuman animals as having specific 
beliefs on the basis of their behavior is right, provided we also make stimulus-
independence and the active recombination of concepts (the important insight buried in 
intellectualism) necessary for concept-use. 
3.6 The Argument from What Explains the Human Difference 
Camp’s leading, general question is, “What is necessary for distinctively conceptual 
thought?” (PTW 275; see also PTW 302). To an intellectualist, to ask this question is also 
to ask what it is that makes rational, human cognition distinct. Camp, by contrast, does 
not think that what makes conceptual thought distinctive is what makes human thought 
distinctive (and in Chapter V I show how I agree with her). To explain the human 
difference, Camp appeals to an “explosive increase in our own cognitive abilities over 
basic cognition” (PTW 286). She writes,  
The really significant difference between creatures with mere basic 
cognition and us lies in the exponentially greater range of applications we 
find for our beliefs, rather than in the carefulness with which we form and 
revise them or in the mere fact that we exchange them with others. (PTW 
287) 
The careful formation, revision, and exchange of beliefs refer to metacognitive capacities 
such as error recognition. Camp’s point is that having these metacognitive capacities is 
much less important, practically speaking, than having a large cache of generally 
recombinable concepts. The great power of human cognition, in Camp’s view, comes 
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from having many, many concepts, not from the ability to recognize errors in their use. 
Thus, Camp contends, “a thinker can only apply epistemic reflection to those first-order 
thoughts that it already thinks” (PTW 287). To illustrate the point, Camp invites us to 
imagine a thinker with the ability to think second-order thoughts but with only a very 
narrow repertoire of first-order thoughts about which to think. This would be far less 
useful and evolutionarily advantageous than having a broad range of generally 
recombinable first-order concepts and little to no capacity for second-order thoughts, 
metacognition, error recognition, and the like. 
One might object that, in fact, acquiring the vast range and number of concepts 
we do have depends upon the capacities for metacognition and error recognition. 
Curiously, despite drawing on Josef Perner’s theory of representation, Camp overlooks 
the fact that, on his view, metarepresentation and the development of a representational 
theory of mind are necessary for the explosive increase in conceptual abilities that Camp 
has in mind, but also constitutively include a capacity to reflect on and assess the use of 
representations.115 And by embracing this aspect of Perner’s theory in Chapter V, my 
answer to Dreyfus’s challenge includes this idea. 
3.7 Summing Up the Instrumentalist Critique of Intellectualism 
Defining intellectualism as the thought that metacognitive capacities are necessary for 
conceptual thought, Camp then critiques it on the following grounds: Intellectualism’s 
all-or-nothing grasp of human cognition is anthropocentric and unmotivated, and its basic 
argument depends upon the tendentious premise that error recognition is necessary for 
having beliefs, thoughts, and concepts. It is counterintuitive to claim, as intellectualism 
                                                
115 See Chapter V, §2.3.1. For Perner’s introduction of his notion of metarepresentation, see URM 7; and 
for his introduction to representational theory of mind, see URM 11.  
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does, that typical three-year-old, semi-linguistic children lack any conceptual capacities, 
and far more intuitively appealing to suppose that they have thoughts articulated by 
concepts. Thus, ultimately, the premises of the instrumentalist argument and definition of 
concepts are more reasonable and intuitively appealing than those of intellectualism. 
Finally, if our definition of concepts is to help answer that question of what explains the 
explosive increase in cognitive abilities that humans have over a more basic form of 
cognition—and it should help—then the intellectualist definition of concepts is far less 
useful than Camp’s instrumentalist definition. 
 
4. Between Instrumentalism and Intellectualism 
Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts aims to find a middle ground between 
minimalism and intellectualism about concepts. However, as I discuss below, I do not 
think Camp’s theory is sufficient for answering the concerns that motivate intellectualists 
to adopt an all-or-nothing view. My aim for the rest of this dissertation, beginning in 
Chapter IV, is to split the difference once again, this time to find a middle ground 
between Camp’s instrumentalism and intellectualism. First, I argue that Camp’s view 
won’t satisfy intellectualist concerns, and motivate the need to find a middle ground 
between instrumentalism with intellectualism (4.1). Then I return to the commitments 
made by Brandom, McDowell and Dreyfus to show how reconciling them and finding a 
middle ground between instrumentalism and intellectualism about concepts is one and the 
same task (4.2). 
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4.1 Motivating a Reconciliation of Instrumentalism and Intellectualism 
Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts raises a number of questions. For one thing, it is 
not clear that her (and the minimalist’s) appeal to Evans’ generality constraint to attribute 
revisable, systematically recombinable representations to a broad number of species of 
animals is a convincing use of Evans’ ideas. After all, Evans was after a distinction 
between conceptual and nonconceptual content, not a distinction between basic, animal 
cognition and mere differential responsiveness. However, Camp’s use of the generality 
constraint does seem like a profitable and useful appropriation, and therefore an 
admissible part of Camp’s own view. 
Another worry about Camp’s instrumentalism is ambiguity. Her account leaves 
the reader with many questions. Do animals with instrumental reasoning have 
nonconceptual representations in addition to conceptual ones? If so, can nonconceptual 
representations be recombined with concepts? At what point does a nonconceptual 
representation count as a concept? Or is it better to say that representations only count as 
concepts when the animal is engaged in actively recombining its representations in the 
process of instrumental reasoning, and the rest of the time—when the representations are 
recombined passively, by environing stimuli—they do not count as concepts at all? Later, 
I endorse specific ways of answering these questions, but here I only raise them to 
suggest that Camp’s instrumentalism so far leaves us wanting. However, that Camp’s 
theory leaves one wanting more detail is not a serious shortcoming. Not only does she 
provide sufficient detail for the argument of “Putting Thoughts to Work” to be 
acceptable, it is reasonable to think that the questions I raise can all be satisfactorily 
answered. 
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The central issue, for my purposes, is whether Camp is successful in dispatching 
the intellectualist approach to concepts and thought. And here, I think she misses her 
mark. Camp’s critique of intellectualism falls short because it does not engage with 
intellectualism’s basic, epistemological motivation. 
To show how Camp’s instrumentalism falls short in its critique of intellectualism, 
let me first articulate the basic point I take her account to get absolutely right: 
(A) If the goal is to give an empirically useful account of concepts that 
helps to explain the explosion of cognitive capacities as an evolutionary 
advantage, then instrumentalism about concepts is superior—because 
more reasonable and intuitively appealing—to intellectualism about 
concepts. 
Setting that aside, consider what motivates the intellectualist. The form of intellectualism 
that Camp critiques is, in large part, a reaction to the failure of traditional empiricism 
mired in the Myth of the Given (as I discuss in Chapter I). If traditional empiricism fails 
because it depends upon an untenable, foundationalist epistemology, then how is 
objective, empirical knowledge possible? What intellectualism quite rightly demands is 
an answer to that question, i.e., an account of what constitutes rational thought, of what 
makes objective knowledge possible. And it is precisely in providing such an answer that 
anti-foundationalists, from Sellars and Davidson to Brandom and McDowell, take 
positions on concepts, thoughts, and beliefs that commit them to the intellectualism that 
Camp critiques. Here, then, is the intellectualist riposte to (A) above that is equally right 
and compelling: 
(B) If the goal is to give an epistemologically useful account of concepts 
that helps to explain how rational, objective knowledge is possible at all, 
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then intellectualism about concepts is superior to instrumentalism about 
concepts. 
Thus, both (A) and (B) approaches to concepts have distinct advantages given their 
particular sets of concerns. But if both sets of concerns are more or less equally valid—
and it strikes me that they are—then they need to be reconciled. What we need is an 
account of concepts and thought that achieves the goals of both instrumentalism about 
concepts and intellectualism about concepts. 
Among intellectualists, Brandom is the most insistent that such reconciliation is 
not advisable or even possible. As I showed in Chapter I, Brandom argues that one 
cannot give an account of this kind—one that plays up the continuity of rational and 
nonrational forms of cognition—without failing to sufficiently differentiate our rational, 
discursive abilities. Brandom explicitly opts to differentiate our rational, discursive 
capacities rather than assimilate them to other abilities, as Camp aims to do.116 McDowell 
takes a similar line of thought, imposing a gap between human and nonhuman animal 
cognition. 
By Camp’s standards, Dreyfus counts as an intellectualist, because (for example) 
he endorses the Sellarsian idea that having a concept means mastering the use of a word. 
However, unlike Brandom and McDowell, Dreyfus is interested in a developmental story 
about how rational conceptual understanding arises from more basic capacities. 
Answering the challenge to tell such a story is the motivation of this dissertation, which 
                                                
116 See Chapter I, §4.1.2. According to Brandom, “Theories that assimilate conceptually structured activity 
to the nonconceptual activity out of which it arises (in evolutionary, historical, and individual-
developmental terms) are in danger of failing to make enough of the difference” (Articulating Reasons: An 
Introduction to Inferentialism, 3). Moreover, he more recently claims, one cannot do the work of 
assimilating without failing to “demarcate” rationality (Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, 
Recent, and Contemporary, 26–29). 
  158 
led me to Camp’s theory of concepts. It is ironic that answering Dreyfus’s challenge to 
explain the appearance of concepts leads me to reject his theory of concepts. 
The point to carry forward is that one can endorse Camp’s theory of concepts—as 
I intend to do—and still hold out for an answer to the epistemological concerns that 
motivate intellectualism. Contra Brandom, I am claiming that both the instrumentalist 
and intellectualist goals can be satisfied under a single theory of concepts through careful 
work of reconciliation. The challenge is to show how Camp’s theory of concepts can be 
integrated into an anti-foundationalist theory of knowledge of the kind that motivates the 
intellectualist view.  
4.2 Instrumentalism in Light of the Intellectualists’ Commitments 
Recall the commitments from Chapters I and II that I aim to reconcile: Brandom’s 
commitment is to explain how the human form of rationality is distinct from whatever it 
is that nonhuman animals have. McDowell’s commitment is to give concepts a role in 
structuring a rational form of human experience, to retain his minimalist empiricism. And 
Dreyfus’s challenge is to explain how our rational, conceptual understanding develops 
out of more basic capacities we share with nonhuman animals. 
The interest of reconciling these intellectualist commitments led me to reject one 
commitment all three share, namely, the commitment to making language necessary for 
having concepts. Camp, as I have shown, gives an empirically useful account of concepts 
that does not assume language is necessary for concepts, and rather explains concepts and 
thoughts as offering a distinct evolutionary advantage. How does Camp’s 
instrumentalism look in light of the respective commitments of Brandom, McDowell, and 
Dreyfus? 
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4.2.1 Brandom 
Brandom’s commitment is to define concepts in a way that helps make rationality 
distinct. Camp shows little interest in making human rationality wholly distinct from 
forms of nonhuman animal cognition. According to Camp, the difference between human 
and nonhuman conceptual cognition comes down to the number of concepts—revisable, 
systematically recombinable, stimulus-independent representations—one has. In other 
words, human and nonhuman cognition are not qualitatively different but quantitatively 
different on Camp’s theory of concepts. For one thing, epistemic reflection and other 
second-order thoughts are only applicable to first-order thoughts we already have (PTW 
286-7). The capacity for epistemic reflection does not, itself, do much “to increase the 
range of such thoughts, or the range of uses to which the thinker can put them” (PTW 
287). What marks the difference between human and nonhuman animals, according to 
Camp, comes down to how broadly our cognitive capacities range over things and 
situations we encounter. She writes, “The really significant difference between creatures 
with mere basic cognition and us lies in the exponentially greater range of applications 
we find for our beliefs, rather than in the carefulness with which we form and revise them 
or in the mere fact that we exchange them with others” (PTW 287). In other words, in 
Camp’s view, it is the vast number of things we can think and the flexibility with which 
we can think them that marks our cognition as different and distinct, not the fact that we 
can critically reflect on and assess the accuracy of our thoughts. 
These criteria for distinction fall short for my purposes because they won’t serve 
as a reasonable accommodation of Brandom’s commitment to making rationality distinct. 
What Brandom is after, in making rationality distinct, is an account that explains how it is 
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that we can have an objective grasp of the world, one for which we can be held 
accountable. And an important aspect of making rationality distinct involves explaining 
just how it is that we can justify our claims to objective knowledge. It is true that, from 
practical point of view, a massive range of widely applicable, flexible representations is 
enormously useful, but useful for what? Brandom wants to know how it is that we know 
anything at all. While I have already critiqued Brandom for overemphasizing his 
epistemological concern, here Camp underestimates its importance. In light of Brandom’s 
commitment, what Camp’s view is missing is an account of what it is about human 
cognitive practices that secures objective knowledge, and how an objective grasp of the 
world is different from an intelligent animal’s conceptual grasp of things it encounters. 
Put another way, by spelling out what we share cognitively with some intelligent, 
nonhuman animals, Camp quite strongly assimilates human rationality to animal 
problem-solving. She thus buys into human/nonhuman animal continuity to the point 
where she appears to prove Brandom’s point: if you reach for assimilation, you rob 
yourself of the means to make human rationality distinct. To accommodate Brandom’s 
commitment, I need to show how Camp’s theory of concepts is amenable to a theory of 
objectivity that markedly distinguishes our rational, human grasp of the world. 
4.2.2 McDowell 
McDowell’s commitment, again, is to retain a role for concepts in our experience. 
Specifically, however, this means that the same concepts we think rational thoughts with 
are involved in experience. Having seen how Camp recognizes the cognition of tool-
using, problem-solving animals as conceptual, we might ask if Camp thinks that concepts 
(in her sense) are involved when animals are not thinking (in her sense). That is, how 
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should we understand the role of concepts in the lives of problem-solving animals when 
they specifically are not actively solving problems? Are concepts only involved in 
episodes of active instrumental reasoning, leaving animals reliant on merely 
nonconceptual representations when they are not instrumentally reasoning? Or, rather, 
should we take Camp’s theory to suggest that once an animal has acquired a stimulus-
independent conceptual grasp of p, then every representation of a state of affairs that 
involves p is conceptual, in the sense of being part of an animal’s ongoing and 
overarching conceptual grasp of its situation? In other words, what opens up here is a 
space for the entire Dreyfus/McDowell debate to play out again on Camp’s more basic 
level of conceptually articulated instrumental reasoning and noninstrumentally rational 
embodied coping. It is conceptualism vs. nonconceptualism all over again, except this 
time there is no epistemological dimension to the debate because the instrumental 
reasoning of other animals is not subject to the social norms that underpin objectivity. 
Camp’s theory, as presented, is entirely neutral on this point, and could be taken 
either way. Considering, however, that my aim is to accommodate McDowell’s 
commitment to giving a role to concepts in the embodied coping of rational animals, 
Camp’s neutrality presents an opportunity to lay the groundwork for the view I am after. 
Camp’s instrumentalism can help accommodate McDowell’s minimal empiricism by 
explaining the perception and action of rational humans as a matter of recombining 
concepts (in her sense). However, to satisfy McDowell’s concern that experience and 
action have a rational shape, that, for example, I experience something as a justification 
of an explicit thought, the concepts deployed in experience and action must be 
normatively governed. Thus, Camp’s theory of concepts can be reconciled with 
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McDowell’s commitment to giving a role for normatively governed concepts in 
experience and action only if one can explain how it is that concepts and thoughts (on 
Camp’s definition) come to be normatively governed and shaped. This is a central task of 
Chapter IV, where I show how the norms of a linguistic community can come to govern 
concepts, as Camp defines them. 
4.2.3 Dreyfus 
The commitment Dreyfus makes is to explain step-by-step the development of rational, 
conceptual understanding. To this end, Camp’s theory promises to be useful, not despite 
but because it takes a completely different approach to concepts than does Dreyfus. As I 
argued in Chapter II, Dreyfus’s notion of concepts makes it extremely difficult to see 
how we could explain the development of rational, conceptual understanding. 
What makes Camp’s theory of concepts useful is that it establishes a ground level 
for concepts in their most basic form, by defining concepts clearly as a function of a 
practical grasp of the world that we share with other animals. Camp’s definition of 
concepts can be rolled into and used by a theory that actually explains how rational, 
conceptual understanding develops. Put another way, Camp’s theory of concepts is 
promising for answering Dreyfus’s challenge because it gives us a kind of conceptual 
“matter” that can then be shown to take on rational “form” through socio-normative and 
linguistic development. On this account, becoming rational is partially a matter of 
acquiring the concepts that enable rationality, but also involves developing and shaping 
the concepts that show up in instrumental reasoning, refining them according to the social 
and linguistic norms of our communities. 
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5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain and evaluate Camp’s theory of concepts, 
for my purposes. I’ve argued that Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts offers a way of 
understanding what rational, human cognition shares with the cognition of prerational 
humans and nonhuman, problem-solving animals. Unlike intellectualists who define 
concepts narrowly and thereby exclude nonhuman animals, Camp defines them more 
broadly—albeit, by giving them a clear function in cognition—and attributes concepts to 
other intelligent animals. This move shifts the burden of explaining what makes 
rationality distinct. Rather than define concepts in order to distinguish rational capacities, 
Camp gives concepts a definition that is “empirically useful” for explaining animal 
problem-solving behavior. Her empirically useful notion of concepts upholds a relaxed 
form of holism about concepts because to have concepts at all entails an ability to 
spontaneously recombine them with other concepts. Camp appeals—albeit briefly—to 
sociolinguistic capacities to explain how conceptual cognition becomes rational, human 
cognition. This is where Camp’s theory falls short by intellectualist standards: she fails to 
sufficiently explain what makes human rationality distinct. 
After spelling out Camp’s instrumentalist theory of concepts, I showed how it 
functions as a critique of the intellectualist approach to concepts embraced by Brandom, 
McDowell, and Dreyfus. I then considered how her view nonetheless falls short in light 
of commitments these intellectualists make (and that I think are worth making). By 
spelling out just how Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts falls short, I laid the 
groundwork for Chapter IV, where I appeal to the work of John Haugeland to integrate 
instrumentalism and intellectualism. 
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Camp’s theory of concepts gives me a starting point or, as I put it above, the 
conceptual material for my account. What my account needs to do is explain just how 
that material gains its rational form and is thereby drawn into the structure of conceptual 
understanding that humans have. To give such an explanation is to propose an answer to 
Dreyfus’s challenge. In doing so, I also have to explain how it is that rational, 
normatively governed concepts with which we think are also drawn into our experience, 
giving our experience its rational shape, thereby satisfying McDowell’s commitment. 
And finally, I need to explain what makes our rational capacity for conceptual 
understanding distinct, in order to satisfy Brandom’s commitment. 
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CHAPTER IV: CONFORMISM, NORMATIVITY, AND CONSTITUTION 
 
1. Beyond Instrumentalism 
In Chapter III, I introduced Camp’s theory of concepts: revisable, stimulus-independent, 
systematically recombinable representations. The quintessential example of behavior that 
indicates conceptual cognition, in Camp’s sense, is instrumental reasoning: pursuing 
subsidiary goals that temporarily take the animal away from its motivating goal, which 
involves the ability to treat things and situations as means to an end. Several animal 
species show signs of this kind of ability, including corvids and great apes. On Camp’s 
theory, concepts have the same function in human cognition as they do in nonhuman 
animal cognition. The difference, Camp thinks, is that language allows humans to 
massively expand the number of concepts we have and coordinate our use of them. 
Language leads to metacognition, the ability not just to have a thought but to grasp that it 
can be true or false and to consider how the thought might be justified or not. While I am 
inclined to agree with the fairly uncontroversial claim that language leads to 
metacognition, I think Camp’s treatment of the difference between the nonhuman animal 
and human use of concepts is insufficient to account for our objective form of thought, 
and more generally, for what is distinctive about human understanding. 
For my purposes, Camp’s theory of concepts offers building blocks for realizing 
the aim of my dissertation: to propose an answer to Dreyfus’s challenge of explaining 
how a rational, conceptual grasp of the world develops out of lesser abilities that we share 
with children and nonhuman animals, while reconciling that answer with McDowell’s 
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empiricist commitment to a rational form of experience and Brandom’s commitment to 
making rationality distinct. Camp’s theory plausibly establishes a way to understand what 
human cognition shares with that of other intelligent animals. What remains to be 
shown—on the way to accommodating Dreyfus, Brandom, and McDowell—is how the 
animal use of concepts in problem-solving is built into the objective use of concepts in 
human experience and understanding. Philosophers who argue that there is something 
distinctive about human rationality typically think that acquiring an objective grasp of the 
world introduces new elements proper to human cognition or transforms elements of 
merely animal cognition into the elements proper to human cognition. Thus, there ought 
to be some story about how the merely animal representations, affordances, or 
significances are transformed into concepts. As I showed in Chapter II, Dreyfus thinks 
the transformation happens each time we shift from embodied coping into explicitly 
thinking, while McDowell thinks this transformation happens as human infants pick up 
social norms and learn language. Brandom might agree there is some kind of 
transformation story to be told, but, as I showed in Chapter I, he insists that it is a sub-
personal story: whatever is transformed belongs beneath the level of semantic awareness. 
I agree with these philosophers that there is something distinctive about human 
rationality; however, I don’t think stories about the transformation of the elements of 
cognition give a suitable answer to Dreyfus’s challenge, for reasons I made clear in 
Chapter II: accounts of this transformation of elements of cognition wind up making the 
rational, conceptual elements so different from the nonrational elements that they arose 
from that the transformation is incredible. That is, transformation accounts tend to impose 
too much distance and difference between the rational and nonrational.117 The task of 
                                                
117 Matthew Boyle also argues for a “transformative framework” for understanding how humans become 
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answering Dreyfus’s challenge, as I take it, is to be able to explain the rational elements 
in terms of the nonrational elements. My way of doing that—which I explain in Chapter 
V—is by appealing to reflexivity: the “transformation” does not transform the elements 
of cognition, but rather, it allows us to grasp the elements of cognition as such. To put it 
back in the terms Camp introduces, rational human cognition consists, in part, in the 
ability to grasp concepts (as she defines them) in terms of other concepts. 
The first step, which I take in the present chapter, is to show how one can 
profitably integrate Camp’s theory of concepts with Haugeland’s theory of objectivity. 
The second step, which I take in Chapter V, is to make use of that integrated view to 
propose an answer to Dreyfus’s challenge while accommodating Brandom’s and 
McDowell’s respective commitments. 
To integrate Camp’s concepts with Haugeland’s objectivity, I selectively use 
ideas that Haugeland developed throughout his career, particularly his ideas about the 
conformism guiding the behavior of social animals, how conformism makes social norms 
possible, and how constitution leverages social norms into an objective grasp of the 
world. My aim is to show how Camp’s theory of concepts fits into each of these notions 
that Haugeland develops to explain objectivity. 
Haugeland’s and Camp’s views are not obviously compatible. From Camp’s 
perspective, Haugeland appears to be another intellectualist, because he thinks of concept 
use as having an objective grasp of the world. From Haugeland’s perspective, Camp’s 
brief suggestions about how the cognition of intelligent animals turns into objective 
                                                                                                                                            
rational, and critiques what he calls “additive” approaches to rationality, which add rational human 
capacities on top of shared animal capacities for perception (Boyle, “Additive Theories of Rationality: A 
Critique”). The account I develop in Chapter V is not subject to Boyle’s critiques of additive theories, but 
answering Boyle would take me beyond the scope of my dissertation. 
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understanding are woefully brief and insufficient. However, unlike other intellectualists, 
such as Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus, Haugeland does not depend upon the 
definition of concepts to make our rational objective understanding distinct. For this 
reason, as I show below, Haugeland’s view is amenable to a broader definition of 
concepts, such as Camp’s, and yet still able to robustly distinguish our objective 
understanding of the world from the forms of intelligence possessed by other intelligent, 
problem-solving animals. 
In §2, I put Camp and Haugeland in conversation by considering the implicit 
critique each has of the other’s view. While they have differing concerns, their respective 
ways of thinking about human and nonhuman animal cognition are complementary, at 
least when taken as contributions to the kind of view I aim to develop here. Following 
that, in §3, I turn to Haugeland’s notion of conformism to show how it lays a natural 
ground for socially instituted normativity. I argue that Camp’s theory of concepts 
integrates well with Haugeland’s notion of conformism and that, in fact, both Camp’s and 
Haugeland’s views are strengthened by accommodating aspects of the other. Next, in §4, 
I show how, in his early work, Haugeland moves to leverage the normativity that 
conformism establishes into socially instituted intentionality. Here, the integration of 
Camp’s view with Haugeland’s creates a problem for Haugeland by undermining what 
Haugeland takes to be distinctive about the rational form of intentionality that we enjoy. 
In §5, I shift focus to the discussion of constitution in Haugeland’s late essay, “Truth and 
Rule-Following,” where Haugeland develops his theory of objectivity. In §6, I show how 
the constitutive structure of objectivity can accommodate Camp’s theory of concepts 
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while nonetheless clearly establishing the difference between socially instituted animal 
norms and having an objective grasp of the world. 
 
2. Camp and Haugeland in Conversation 
Before I integrate their views for my own purposes, I want to acknowledge the distance 
between their two approaches to concepts by setting out the implicit critique each has for 
the other’s work. In “Intentionality All-Stars,” Haugeland distinguishes three main 
approaches to intentionality, each whimsically assigned a base in a baseball diamond.118 
All three approaches look to explain how intentionality originates in systematic patterns 
in arrangements of matter, i.e., all three are against the idea that intentionality can be 
explained in terms of an immaterial substance like a soul. 
At first base, there is neo-Cartesianism, a view that is fairly widespread among 
cognitive scientists and philosophical psychologists (IAS 132-38). On the neo-Cartesian 
view, artificial intelligence can (at least in principle) be a source of original intentionality. 
The operative principle for determining whether or not something has intentionality is the 
principle of interpretation: neo-Cartesians hold that the right criteria for establishing 
intentionality is that we can interpret a system as having internal states that produce 
semantically meaningful behavior or expressions. Presumably, chess-playing software 
has intentionality on the neo-Cartesian view. We are justified as interpreting it as 
intending to win the game of chess. Proponents include Jerry Fodor, Zenon Pylyshyn, 
Hartry Field, and, Haugeland suggests, perhaps also Ned Block, Rob Cummins, Gilbert 
                                                
118 Haugeland, “The Intentionality All-Stars,” 1998. I cite the 1998 version IAS followed by page number; 
the essay was first published as “The Intentionality All-Stars,” 1990. By the time the essay was republished 
in 1998, Haugeland cautiously suggested that his own view no longer fits neatly at the third base of neo-
pragmatism, but he does not suggest which position he comes to play nor whether indeed he has left the 
stadium (see his “Introduction: Toward a New Existentialism,” 4). 
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Harman, and Bill Lycan. Haugeland’s point is that neo-Cartesianism is a viable view with 
advantages and drawbacks, although it is not the view he endorses. 
Neo-Cartesians get short shrift in Camp’s essay, where she disqualifies the ability 
of an abacus—and by extension, other machines—to represent a state of affairs because it 
does not systematically change its own internal states. Camp does not thematize 
intentionality as such, but if we assume there is widespread agreement that intentionality 
and representational abilities go hand in hand, by denying machines representations, she 
also denies that they can have intentionality. This is not a substantial engagement with 
neo-Cartesianism, not least because neo-Cartesians would agree that an abacus lacks 
intentionality. Thus, it is not that Camp presents an argument against neo-Cartesianism, 
but rather, she does not engage with it. That Camp is clearly not a neo-Cartesian, nor a 
neo-pragmatist helps to illuminate what position she plays on Haugeland’s Intentionality 
All-Star team: as will become clear, Camp plays at the neo-behaviorist second base 
(perhaps with a slight tendency to inch toward shortstop). 
At second base, neo-behaviorism locates intentionality not in the internal states of 
a system, but rather, in how that system interacts with its environment (IAS 138-47). One 
can imagine nonanimal forms of intentionality fitting this criteria, but neo-behaviorism 
motivates (and perhaps is motivated by) a move to ascribe intentionality to nonhuman 
animals. The operative principle in neo-behaviorism Haugeland calls the Principle of 
Ascription: we can ascribe intentionality to a system (such as the kind of organic system 
that an individual animal is) provided that system exhibits sufficient skill in how it adapts 
and responds to its environment. Proponents include W. V. O. Quine, Daniel Dennett, 
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Robert Stalnaker and, Haugeland suggests, perhaps also J. L. Austin, Jonathan Bennett, 
and Paul Grice. 
Camp is, crucially, a neo-behaviorist by Haugeland’s definition, because, again, 
she treats intentionality as tightly corresponding to representational capacities while 
restricting representation to the goal-directed abilities of animals. Camp’s minimalism 
about concepts is neo-behaviorist about intentionality because it locates intentionality 
prior to or beneath objective, rational capacities. From Camp’s perspective, there is no 
problem with assigning intentionality to animals with only basic cognition (i.e., revisable, 
systematically recombinable representations that depend on environing stimuli for their 
use), and therefore who lack concepts on her account. Reading Camp in light of 
Haugeland’s categories, it is interesting to see her drive a distinction Haugeland 
overlooks: the distinction between (1) intentional action facilitated by the systematic 
recombination of representations that is tightly coupled to and merely triggered by 
environing stimuli, and (2) intentional action facilitated by the systematic recombination 
of representations where which representations are recombined is independent of 
environing stimuli. Unlike (1), (2) enables the kind of problem-solving Camp takes to 
indicate concept use. With (2), the domain of animal activity has expanded from bodily 
action; the animal has gained active control of its representational ability, free of 
environing stimuli. This is what allows animals to represent counterfactual opportunities, 
drive toward subordinate goals on the way to realizing primary goals, and treat things as 
means to an end. 
Finally, at third base, there is neo-pragmatism (IAS 147-56). Neo-pragmatists 
locate intentionality in the social norms, language-use, and various practices to which we 
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conform. By Haugeland’s count, proponents include Sellars, and maybe also John Dewey 
and Michael Dummett.119 Most importantly for me, this club also includes Brandom, 
McDowell, and Dreyfus.120 From Camp’s perspective, neo-pragmatists are all 
intellectualists because they limit all concept use to rational human capacities. I’ve shown 
how this is true of Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus, but it is true of Haugeland too. 
Haugeland defines concepts as what we have when we have an objective grasp of the 
world. Camp, as I showed in Chapter III, thinks this delimitation of concept use is not 
credible because she demands that we define concepts in a way that makes them 
empirically useful for discriminating an evolutionarily useful cognitive ability (rather 
than define concepts as essentially bound up with rational understanding, as neo-
pragmatists tend to do). Camp’s demand leads her to attribute concept use to children 
who are verbal but do not yet qualify as rational and intelligent, and also to intelligent, 
problem-solving animals who can clearly cognize not just goals but also distinct tasks as 
means to an end goal. 
How might Haugeland respond to finding himself in the cross-hairs of Camp’s 
critique of intellectualism? The first thing Haugeland can claim is that, unlike Dreyfus, 
McDowell, and Brandom, he is not hung up on what counts as a concept—this will 
become clear in the following section. Moreover, Haugeland could say, the task that 
                                                
119 Haugeland also included Heidegger and himself as neo-pragmatists when he wrote the essay in 1988, 
but by 1998, as I indicated above, his view had changed. 
120 Again, in 1988, at the time he wrote this essay, Haugeland’s thought hewed closely to Brandom’s. In his 
late view, Haugeland eschews the label of neo-pragmatism, because he identifies neo-pragmatism with 
Rorty and Brandom, for whom social institution is sufficient to explain objectivity, whereas Haugeland 
comes to insist that first-personal experience and existential, constitutive commitments are vital aspects of 
any coherent account of objectivity. If we can wrest the term “neo-pragmatism” away from Brandom and 
Rorty, however, and think of it as a productive recuperation of the deep insights of classical pragmatism, it 
would still usefully capture Haugeland’s philosophy. It is also worth noting that his approach to 
intentionality remains within the ambit of neo-pragmatism he defines in IAS: it is neither neo-behaviorism 
nor neo-Cartesianism, nor does it warrant a new category or shift Haugeland to the outfield he ridiculed in 
IAS. I thank Zed Adams for his comments on how Haugeland’s view changed. 
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Camp sees intellectualists engaged in is not (as Camp seems to think) just to give a 
reasonable definition of what a concept is, but also to explain what exactly our fully 
rational capacities to grasp the world objectively consist in. It is to that express purpose 
of making rationality distinct that “intellectualist” neo-pragmatists define concepts. 
Moreover, defining concepts expressly for the purpose of making rationality distinct is 
not a particularly surprising move, given the reasonable assumption that concepts are—
quite uncontroversially—functions of rational judgment. Haugeland also might add that 
Camp’s definition of concepts threatens to rob the “intellectualist” of the means to 
explain how rational capacities really are distinct without offering an alternate way to do 
so, and that is a serious oversight. Most importantly, however, for my purposes, 
Haugeland could also reply that there is no reason he could not accommodate Camp’s 
definition of concepts into his explanation of fully rational, objective thought. 
A final thought from Haugeland bears on Camp’s own ideas about how the 
animal use of concepts becomes the rational use of concepts. As I showed above, Camp 
thinks epistemological reflection, error recognition, metacognition, objectivity and the 
like are all much less important than the massive explosion of stimulus-independent 
representations that comes with human language. That explosion, she thinks, is where the 
real advantage comes because it massively increases the ways we can take advantage of 
our environing conditions. Camp plays down metacognition as insignificant compared to 
the explosion of useful concepts without considering the possibility that metacognition is 
necessary for that explosion of useful concepts. 
It seems to me that this is false. For one thing, if human life and culture were 
possible without a metacognitive grasp of errors in the face of socially instituted norms, 
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one would expect to find record of it in our anthropological and historical records. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to imagine how a human culture could sustain itself without 
the ability for the group to explicitly articulate deviation from norms. Perhaps what Camp 
has in mind is something much more basic than anything we would call human culture—
an explosion of concepts that gave us massive advantages and set us apart from other 
animals, yet still without any capacity for metacognition. But Camp accepts the idea that 
language is necessary for the explosion of concepts, and the idea of having language 
without culture is a contradiction in terms. 
If we accept that metacognition is necessary for the explosion of concepts that 
Camp thinks makes up the human difference, then we should ask how it is necessary. To 
that end, let me put things in the following terms: consider that conceptual cognition as 
instrumental reasoning is “knowing how,” and metacognition is “knowing that.” A 
crucial idea absent from Camp’s view yet built into Haugeland’s view is that “knowing 
how” and “knowing that” are mutually reinforcing aspects of human cognition, such that 
“knowing that” is a constitutive part of the expansion of concepts.121 That is, the idea 
Camp misses and Haugeland gets is that “knowing how” to do A is necessary for 
“knowing that” B, which is in turn necessary for “knowing how” to do C, which is 
necessary for “knowing that” D, and so forth, and this structure of mutual reinforcement 
between two kinds of knowing is necessary for the expansion of concepts that humans 
enjoy. In other words, contra Camp, metacognition is necessary for the proliferation of 
human conceptual know-how and for countless material advantages that give humans 
clear, empirical, evolutionary advantages. 
                                                
121 As Sellars puts it (on the way to making a different point), “knowing how to do something at the level of 
characteristically human activity presupposes a great deal of knowledge that” (“Philosophy and the 
Scientific Image of Man,” 1–2). 
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To Haugeland, a human form of life is one that involves a biological propensity 
for conformism, is socially instituted, and (crucially) is constituted by an individual’s 
constitutive commitment to a shared way of life.122 To put the point about the importance 
of metacognition in Haugeland’s terms, in this human form of life, how we use our vast 
array of concepts is governed by social norms (both in terms of knowing how and 
knowing that). In order for that to happen, in order for social practices to be coordinated 
in the way that they are, there needs to be some kind of agreement on how to use the 
concepts and a shared, constitutive commitment to the norms governing our concepts. 
That constitutive commitment requires, in part, that we reflect on our use of many of 
these concepts. For Haugeland, metacognition is not just a quasi-superfluous ability 
idolized by intellectualists, as Camp seems to suggest. Rather, metacognition is a 
fundamental structure necessary for the coordination of human society because it is a 
condition for the possibility of socially aligning our constitutive commitments, the basic 
life skills of navigating the world we inhabit, and cognitive skills of getting things right 
according to the normative rules to which we commit. The practice of cognitive reflection 
and capacity for metacognition that Camp plays down are part of a government of 
concepts without which we could never come together to form the complex societies we 
have, without which we would have no use for so many of the concepts that proliferate in 
a human society. To do justice to the centrality of metacognition in Haugeland’s work—
to unpack it further—would take me away from my aim in this chapter, but as I explore 
his thought, below, I aim to highlight the crucial importance of metacognition for his late 
view. 
                                                
122 These are all details I unpack below. 
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In her quick account of the difference of human cognition as the mere 
proliferation of concepts, Camp more or less waves off Dreyfus’s challenge to explain 
how our fully rational abilities emerge, not to mention Brandom’s commitment about 
what makes them distinct. The advantage of turning to Haugeland is that, unlike Dreyfus, 
Brandom, or McDowell, Haugeland offers an account of rationality that is useful for 
proposing an answer to Dreyfus’s challenge. 
Haugeland’s intellectualism is different from the strains I have already discussed 
in McDowell, Brandom, and Dreyfus. Unlike other intellectualists, Haugeland does not 
appeal primarily to language and concepts in order to distinguish our human, objective 
grasp of the world. Rather, Haugeland offers what is in my view a more coherent and 
powerful explanation of objective perception and thought by appealing to skills and to 
our constitutive commitment to a certain way of life and the norms that give it its distinct 
shape. Language is, admittedly, a crucial and necessary part of our own particular form of 
rational understanding, on Haugeland’s view, but the point is that directly appealing to 
language is not the best way to unpack and explain our capacity for objectivity. 
Haugeland’s shift in emphasis opens up the account of intellectual capacities enough to 
make it amenable to a bottom-up explanation of rational, human cognition that begins 
with Camp’s definition of concepts. 
By creating a hybrid of Camp’s neo-behaviorism and Haugeland’s neo-
pragmatism, the view I develop here occupies the position Haugeland identified as 
shortstop.123 For Haugeland to accept my proposal, he would have to give up two things. 
                                                
123 In his IAS, Haugeland glibly suggests that Wittgenstein plays shortstop, i.e., a distinct position between 
neo-behaviorism and neo-pragmatism. Other players who have recently signed onto this position (or at least 
attempted to combine the best insights of neo-pragmatism and neo-behaviorism) include Sachs, 
Intentionality and Myths of the Given: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology; Rouse, Articulating the 
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The first is merely terminological: Haugeland would have to give the standard, neo-
pragmatist line of thought that equates having a conceptual grasp of the world with 
having an objective grasp. But this is easy, as Haugeland has no stake in the definition of 
concepts; reconciling his view with Camp’s does not distort anything I take to be 
essential to Haugeland’s understanding of rational objectivity any more than it does 
Camp’s theory of concepts. The second thing Haugeland would have to give up is more 
substantial: in both his early and late views, Haugeland toes the neo-pragmatist line of 
thought that drives a gap between humans and other animals and emphasizes the 
discontinuity between us.  
The great advantage of Haugeland’s theory of objectivity, for my purposes, is that 
it lends itself to an explanation of how it is acquired. Brandom rejects the idea that one 
can assimilate a rational, objective, conceptual grasp of the world to lesser capacities that 
nonrational animals have. Dreyfus calls for an account of its acquisition but does nothing 
to provide one. McDowell appeals to concepts like second nature and Bildung, but does 
not develop these ideas. Haugeland, by contrast, more or less traces out a way to explain 
the acquisition of an objective grasp of the world. He begins with conformism—a 
biological predisposition of social animals to develop cohesive behavioral dispositions—
and shows how this natural ability yields socially instituted norms and is ultimately 
cultivated into a set of interdependent skills that constitute a socially instituted, objective 
grasp of the world. In the following sections on conformism, normativity, and 
constitution, I selectively draw on those aspects of Haugeland’s theory of objectivity that 
are useful for my purposes, to integrate them with Camp’s theory of concepts. 
                                                                                                                                            
World: Conceptual Understanding and the Scientific Image; and Okrent, Rational Animals: The 
Teleological Roots of Intentionality. All three books offer resources for thinking about Dreyfus’s challenge, 
but none takes it on explicitly. 
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3. Conformism 
One of the basic ways I integrate Haugeland’s view of objectivity and rationality with 
Camp’s theory of concepts is the conformism that Haugeland attributes to humans and 
other intelligent, social animals as well. Conformism is an innate or naturally selected 
proclivity to conform to social, behavioral norms. The result is that individual members 
of a species will behave according to the norms of the group. Most (if not all) species that 
count as having instrumental reason, and therefore concepts, on Camp’s definition, also 
exhibit Haugeland’s conformism because they are highly social species, such as corvids, 
great apes, elephants, and cetaceans. All of these species are conformist in Haugeland’s 
sense and also have concepts by Camp’s definition. The only animal that may be 
nonsocial and nonconformist and yet count as having concepts by Camp’s definition is 
the octopus.124 
3.1 On Conformism 
Conformism is one of Haugeland’s ways of talking about what, in the history of 
philosophy, has been discussed in terms of habituation and second nature. It serves, for 
him, as a basis for grounding norms: Haugeland takes conformism to be a condition for 
normativity, yet he takes conformism to be a widespread animal capacity and treats 
normativity as essentially human. 
                                                
124 The cleverness of the octopus is legendary. For an interesting investigation into the mind of the octopus, 
see Godfrey-Smith, Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness. While 
some species of octopus can famously solve puzzles, like opening a child-proof bottle, it is not clear that 
they do pass Camp’s test for instrumental reasoning, where the animal’s behavior must clearly indicate that 
it pursues subsidiary goals to a main goal in a way that temporarily takes it away from its main goal. If they 
do pass this test, then they may be a rare example of nonsocial animal with conceptual thought (by Camp’s 
lights). 
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Animals can form habits through repetition of a wide variety of activities, but 
conformism specifically concerns habituation of behavior that is reinforced socially. It is 
useful to keep in mind that conformism is a specific instance of habituation, because it 
shows how Haugeland’s view is part of a tradition of appealing to habit to give rational 
norms a natural ground, a tradition whose threads appear in German idealism, American 
pragmatism, and existential phenomenology, and can be traced back (as McDowell hints) 
to Aristotle’s notion of second nature. Habits are crucial for precisely the reason 
Haugeland points out: they are the hinge between mere biological functioning and social 
normativity. They ground rational norms in nature in a way that preserves the existence 
of rational norms. As I discuss below, the social dimension of conformist habituation is 
crucial for Haugeland’s ideas about normativity and objectivity. 
In “The Intentionality All-Stars,” conformism is an important part of what 
Haugeland identifies as the neo-pragmatist approach to intentionality. Given that Camp 
is, by Haugeland’s standards, a neo-behaviorist, the view I am developing here is in part 
an effort to integrate their neo-pragmatism and neo-behaviorism. Haugeland considers 
the possibility of integrating neo-behaviorist and neo-pragmatist accounts of 
intentionality, and claims that with regard to the fundamental “pattern upon which 
original intentionality depends, they are not compatible at all, but mutually exclusive 
(IAS 160).”125 He leaves open the option, however, that one could devise an account with 
two kinds of original intentionality—neo-behaviorist and neo-pragmatist (IAS 161). My 
aim here is to show that, in some sense, neo-pragmatist intentionality emerges as a 
distinct pattern from neo-behaviorist intentionality, whereas neo-behaviorist 
                                                
125 The fundamental pattern of neo-behaviorist intentionality consists in the perceptions and responsive 
actions of animals in their respective environments (IAS 138-9). The fundamental pattern of neo-pragmatist 
intentionality is, by contrast, a culture or a way of life (IAS 147). 
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intentionality emerges as distinct from a pattern of animal behavioral interactions with its 
environment. I don’t want to claim that rational, discursive intentionality is merely 
“derivative” of animal intentionality, but I do want to claim that it is a distinct 
development of animal, behavioral intentionality in something like the following sense: 
rational intentionality is a human social practice, a longstanding tradition of refining, 
shaping, and using our animal, behavioral intentionality.126 
To distinguish neo-pragmatism, Haugeland appeals to conformism to show both 
how discursive intentionality is ultimately biologically grounded, and to lay the 
groundwork for its development. What Haugeland aims to show is how conformism leads 
to the normative, social institutions that yield an objective grasp of the world. To this end, 
Haugeland defines conformism as a combination of “imitativeness,” or the inclination to 
copy the behavior of other members of a social group, and “censoriousness,” or “a 
positive tendency to see that one’s neighbors do likewise, and to suppress variation (IAS 
147). Censoriousness thus has both positive and negative expressions (IAS 148). 
Conformism “presupposes” two abilities that it makes use of: the ability to respond 
differentially to different stimuli, and the ability “to learn, as in conditioning or habit 
formation” (IAS 147). He calls the capacity to conform a “complex second-order 
disposition” because it is a disposition that bears on the formation of other dispositions, 
yet it is nonetheless natural or “‘wired in’” (IAS 147). What conformism leaves open are 
                                                
126 In this respect, my dissertation fundamentally differs from Carl Sachs’s Intentionality and Myths of the 
Given: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology. In that book, Sachs takes Haugeland’s suggestion of 
advancing an account that includes both neo-behaviorist and neo-pragmatist forms of intentionality, which 
he limns as “bifurcated intentionality.” He builds his bifurcated approach by combining Merleau-Ponty’s 
bodily intentionality with Brandom’s discursive intentionality, making the two distinct and co-original. For 
a critique of Sachs’ approach, see my “Review of Carl B. Sachs, Intentionality and the Myths of the Given: 
Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology.” In light of the perspective I develop in this dissertation, 
Sachs’s position endorses the intellectualism I’ve identified in Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus, and does 
not (in my view) take seriously enough Dreyfus’s challenge. 
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the actual forms of behavior and dispositions that become reinforced and also the 
performances that count as reinforcement or rejection of the actions of other members of 
the social group. Presumably, this is a great advantage for animals that have evolved the 
capacities for conformism: social habits and dispositions can change to make the most of 
social and environmental changes. 
Haugeland writes, “The net effect of conformism is a systematic peer pressure 
within the community, which can be conceived as a kind of mutual attraction among the 
behavioral dispositions of the different community members” (IAS 148). In other words, 
conformism results in members of a social group forming dispositions to act in similar 
ways in similar circumstances. Moreover (although Haugeland does not make this 
explicit), it seems as though the resulting dispositions must be cohesive, at least in the 
sense that the result is a more or less stable set of behaviors that perpetuate the group as a 
group, for the simple reason that if they did not, no such social group would last long 
enough to form dispositions that are alike. 
Haugeland takes up conformism again in his late essay, “Truth and Rule-
Following,” emphasizing that a conformist tendency is both biologically based and also a 
metadisposition to form and reinforce dispositions according to social pressure (TRF 
311). Again, the idea is that we (and many other species) are predisposed to forming 
dispositions that conform to social norms we encounter, including dispositions to 
promote and reinforce these norms within our spheres of social influence. To socially 
conform is to monitor, follow, and uphold rules that govern behavior. Haugeland puts it 
like this: 
The central idea is that community members effectively promote 
similarities in how they and their fellows are disposed to behave relative to 
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circumstances. This presupposes that they can tell who behaved how in 
what circumstances, and how that compares with what others would have 
done; it also presupposes that they can modify their own and each other’s 
dispositions in the direction of conformity. (TRF 311) 
Note how complex these capacities are. They require, among other things, the ability to 
recognize others as institutors of norms, that is, to take others’ actions to establish how 
one ought to act.127 Haugeland also adds, if these socially instituted norms become 
coherent, stable, and mutually reinforcing (as opposed to conflicting, mutually 
destructive, and undermining), they can institute a community “with a common set of 
social customs and mores.” The result is a form of life that will perpetuate itself as long 
as it is adequately stable and yet also sufficiently responsive to its changing conditions, 
including those changes caused by the very activities that perpetuate that form of life. 
3.2 Integrating Camp’s Concepts with Haugeland’s Conformism 
How does Haugeland’s conformism sit with Camp’s theory of concepts? Perhaps the best 
way to think about integrating them is the appeal to the kinds of behaviors that Camp 
thinks best exemplify the use of concepts: instances of instrumental reasoning like tool 
use. A group of animals with an ability to treat an object as a tool—a means to an end, for 
example, of acquiring food—has revisable, systematically recombinable, sense-
independent representations of the implements and goals of tool use. Combining 
conformism with animal tool use is helpful to explain how some groups of animals pass 
along their tool-using practices to one another, through imitation and censure. A useful 
example here is the community of tool-using chimpanzees that Camp refers to (PTW 
                                                
127 This kind of social recognition forms the basis of the structure of self-consciousness in Brandom’s 
reconstruction of Hegel’s theory of recognition (see SDR). Haugeland implicitly recognizes the social 
institution requires some degree of self-consciousness when he argues that members of a community must 
recognize each other as agents, that is, as responsible for their own actions (TRF 312). 
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294). The animals seek out particular kinds of materials in one location, prepare the 
material into a tool, and then bring it with them to a second location where they are able 
to use the tool to acquire food. Not only does the community’s behavior suggest that 
individual members have an instrumental—thus conceptual—grasp of the implements 
and goals of their practice, they also evidently pass this practice along to one another 
precisely through the kind of conformism that Haugeland discusses. 
One point to make here is that it is genuinely useful to combine Haugeland’s ideas 
about conformism with Camp’s ideas about instrumental reason to explain some animal 
practices and behaviors. A more general point, for my purposes, is that conformism and 
conceptual, instrumental reasoning appear to be independent abilities that can be 
profitably combined (the animals benefit from combining them). Thus, animals gain an 
advantage from conformism absent any capacity for instrumental reasoning; likewise, it 
is conceivable that other animals may be capable of instrumental reasoning yet have little 
to no conformist tendencies (perhaps they’re only minimally social). But when both 
conformism and instrumental reasoning capacities are present they interact. In particular, 
conformism helps to establish dispositions to solve certain problems in certain ways, 
saving instrumentally reasoning animals from having to “reinvent the wheel.” Indeed, it 
is easy to imagine Haugeland taking instrumental reasoning on board for his purposes 
and Camp taking conformism on board for her own purposes. I don’t think Haugeland’s 
theories of normativity and objectivity are flawed because he does not see how 
instrumental reasoning might play a role in their development—he seems to do fine 
without it. But I do think instrumental reasoning (and the stimulus-independent, 
conceptual grasp of things that it comes with) positively augments Haugeland’s theory. 
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The important point is to claim that, in the case of humans, conformism involves 
shaping dispositions including conceptual, problem-solving dispositions. The idea here is 
that absent any kind of conformist pressure (if humans could survive without it), humans 
would develop conceptual, problem-solving practices, but in the presence of conformist 
pressure, we come to solve problems according to social norms. The next part of 
Haugeland’s argument is to clarify how conformism yields normativity in a really basic 
sense that is shared by a wide range of animals, and also in a more integral sense wherein 
normativity deeply penetrates a wide range of social practices and is thereby sufficient to 
institute what Haugeland calls “a way of life.” 
 
4. Normativity 
In both “Intentionality All-Stars” and “Truth and Rule-Following,” Haugeland’s 
discussion of conformism sets up a discussion of normativity. I focus on the discussion of 
normativity in “The Intentionality All-stars” in this section, and turn to the later essay to 
discuss constitution in the following section. I argue that integrating Camp’s theory of 
concepts with Haugeland’s earlier view of normativity undermines his old way of 
distinguishing normativity. In the following section, I show how the discussion of 
constitution in Haugeland’s later view resolves that problem.  
4.1 On Normativity 
Comparing Brandom and Haugeland on normativity is useful for clarifying Haugeland’s 
notion. To Haugeland, the upshot of animal conformism is norms, not in Brandom’s 
sense of involving rational, discursive understanding, but rather in the sense of a stable 
set of socially sanctioned dispositions governing the behavior of members of a group 
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under certain circumstances (IAS 148). Brandom defines normativity narrowly as 
involving the ability to give and ask for reasons. While he does not make all normativity 
a matter of explicitly following explicit rules, he does make the capacity to grasp explicit 
rules in general a condition for normativity in his sense. To Haugeland, by contrast, 
“norms are a kind of ‘emergent’ entity, with an identity and life of their own, over and 
above that of their constituents,” that are resilient and passed along from one member to 
another and from one generation to the next (IAS 149). Against Brandom (and others), 
Haugeland aims to explain explicit rule-following precisely in terms of norms in his more 
basic sense (IAS 149-50). To this end, he defines norms as “community-wide classes of 
similar dispositions that coalesce under the force of conformism” (IAS 149). What 
qualifies them as norms rather than a mere collection of habits is the fact that “they 
themselves set the standard for that very censoriousness by which they are generated and 
maintained” (IAS 149). Whereas habitual behaviors may form and become entrenched or 
weakened and eliminated without any bearing or influence from a social group, norms 
have normative force by virtue of the censoriousness that attends to them. 
Again, Haugeland argues that the ability to conform to the norms of the group in 
no way depends upon the ability to follow explicit rules, which would require a rational 
discursive understanding (IAS 149). All it takes to form the normative dispositions is 
imitation and reinforcement via the positive and negative censorious reactions of other 
members of the group. Rather, the point of Haugeland’s approach is to explain the 
capacity for explicit rule-following in terms of the social norms of a group (IAS 150).  
Like Brandom, Haugeland distinguishes between normativity and causality, 
insisting that the former cannot be properly explained in terms of the latter. The 
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difference here between Brandom and Haugeland is that Haugeland extends a form of 
normativity to nonrational animals. To explain how the normative behavior of animals is 
not merely causal (even though there are underlying causal mechanisms at work), 
Haugeland distinguishes between causal regularity that is merely exhibited and normative 
regularity that actually governs behavior, such that animals, in practice, hold each other 
accountable to those norms (IAS 150).128  
Haugeland firmly distinguishes between conformism and the kind of normativity 
that rational animals have, while taking conformism to be a condition of all normativity. 
Thus, it is implicit in Haugeland’s theory, I think, that all normativity involves 
conforming in a general sense (when we take on a social norm, we conform to it), and all 
conformism yields norms in a general sense, but not all conformism yields normativity in 
a specific, robust sense of establishing what he calls “a way of life” (IAS 151).129 In other 
words, a group of social animals can, through conformism, generate a set of norms, but 
those norms and the imitation and censure that attends their maintenance may not be 
particularly dominant in the lives of the animals. There may be many circumstances in 
which there are simply no normatively governed dispositions that the animal can put into 
play. By contrast, for the norms of the group to constitute a way of life, they should cover 
a wide—if not the entire—range of behaviors. Haugeland writes, “a way of life is highly 
integrated and structured, in that the norms which make it up are intricately 
interdependent” (IAS 151). I take “highly integrated and structured” to mean that 
normative governed dispositions draw together almost all of the possible activities the 
animal can find itself in. Haugeland makes this distinction of a normatively governed, 
                                                
128 Haugeland does not use the terms “exhibited” and “governing” here, but does so later in “Truth and 
Rule-Following” (see TRF 305ff). 
129 The italics are Haugeland’s. 
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integrated way of life in order to set up human normativity that governs not just 
behavioral dispositions but also serves to constitute the things we encounter and use in 
our practices. 
This Haugeland develops into a discussion of tools, which he then uses to 
distinguish natural language (IAS 152-3). Anticipating arguments he will develop in 
much greater detail in “Objective Perception” and “Truth and Rule-Following” (and 
which I consider below), Haugeland explores how social practices institute connections 
between normative actions and things those actions involve, and thereby practically 
categorize them (IAS 151). This classification is practical, rather than discursive, in the 
sense that it does not involve explicitly grasping objects in terms of properties, but rather 
treating a variety of things as being a certain kind, where the kind in question is 
determined by the role such things play in a socially instituted practice. Anticipating 
arguments he will develop in “Objective Perception,” Haugeland talks about chess pieces 
in this way: a chess player who learned the game through imitation and censure—rather 
than an explicit grasp of the rules—would develop the ability to treat a variety of 
differently shaped things as “rooks” or “pawns” by virtue of the social convention of 
treating them as such (IAS 151). More generally, the same claim can be made about 
tools. What constitutes something as a tool of a certain kind are the social practices that 
institute that thing as such. For any given tool, there are appropriate and inappropriate 
things to do with it (IAS 152). In short, “tools are defined by their instituted roles” (IAS 
152). Typically, such tool use will also involve other kinds of things with which the tools 
are properly used, according to social norms. Thus, tools are furthermore defined “by 
their (instituted relations to other role-defined paraphernalia” (IAS 152). The socially 
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instituted sense that something (a tool) can be “for” something (a use) is, for Haugeland, 
a crucial distinction, because it sets up a very preliminary sense of objectivity. According 
to social norms, where proper performance is subject to positive reinforcement and 
improper performance is subject to censure, a tool can be what it is “objectively” in the 
sense that it ought to be used for some purposes and not for other purposes.130 And with 
this preliminary sense of “objectivity” in the use of tools that are cognized “for” a 
specific purpose as defined by “the instituted relations among public paraphernalia,” 
Haugeland establishes the basis of intentionality for neo-pragmatism (IAS 152-3). 
Socially instituted objectivity and full-blooded intentionality come with language, 
but language is a “(very) special case” of tool use in that language is a “double-use tool” 
(IAS 153). The “tool” in a linguistic utterance is the sound made, and the two uses of this 
tool are (1) the uttering of the sound and (2) the response to the utterance (IAS 153). 
Thus, to utter the word “stop” is to use the word as a tool in the first sense and to respond 
to the word “stop” by stopping is to use the word in the second sense. Haugeland adds, 
“the basic point of linguistic tools is to connect the two uses: utterances are ‘meant’ to be 
responded to, and the responses are to them as uttered,” and, moreover, both uses are 
“governed by norms” (IAS 153). The purpose of these linguistic tools—what they are for 
in the given circumstances—is to realize the normative behavior involved in both uses of 
the tool. From this point, as Haugeland acknowledges, his discussion of language leads, 
more or less, into the semantics that Brandom develops in Making It Explicit; Haugeland 
offers a brief discussion of the commitments and entitlements, assertions and beliefs, and 
the normative statutes of language-users, involved in the double-use of these linguistic 
                                                
130 Crucially, although he recognizes that animals seem to use tools, he does not think that animals have any 
sense that a tool is for some purpose. I return to this question below, as I think this is a central and 
important point of contention between Haugeland and Camp. 
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tools (IAS 154-6).131 Original intentionality, he concludes in “The Intentionality All-
Stars,” is the kind of intentionality that comes with the social institution of the use of 
language, i.e., a set of public symbols (IAS 156). 
4.2 Integrating Camp’s Concepts with Haugeland’s Normativity 
Now the task is to integrate Haugeland’s notion of socially instituted normativity with 
Camp’s theory of concepts. Unlike with conformism, where there appeared to be no real 
conflict between them, Camp would likely find elements of the intellectualism she aims 
to resist in Haugeland’s theory of socially instituted normativity. In pointing them out, I 
side with Camp. However, importantly, none of the Camp-inspired adjustments I make to 
Haugeland’s account of normativity substantially changes his view of normativity. The 
central claim of Haugeland’s that I do give up is the idea that original intentionality is an 
essentially linguistic affair. 
To begin with, while she does not use the term “intentionality,” Camp strongly 
implies that we should understand original intentionality to begin with what she calls 
basic cognition, the capacity for revisable, systematically recombinable representations of 
things or states of affairs an animal encounters. This is not a conceptual ability, on 
Camp’s theory, because it is not necessarily stimulus independent. Nonetheless, Camp 
takes revisable, recombinable representations of things or states of affairs to count as 
intentionality because the combinations of representations that arise according to 
environing stimuli are about or of the animal’s environment and are a part of the animal’s 
goal-directed activity of satisfying its basic, biological needs. This commitment to 
attributing intentionality to animals whose behavior appears to be goal-directed is what 
                                                
131 If I give this aspect of Haugeland’s early view short shrift here, it is because I am more interested in the 
account he develops later and that I discuss below, which involves a split with Brandom on what 
constitutes the objectivity of rational humans. 
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classifies Camp as a “neo-behaviorist” by Haugeland’s lights, in “Intentionality All-
Stars.”132 Thus, for Camp and in the view I am urging here, there is a form of original, 
animal intentionality that is more basic than Camp’s criteria for conceptual 
representations. Rather than make discursive, rational conceptuality original 
intentionality as Haugeland does, the idea is to stress that human intentionality is a 
development of animal intentionality. 
The second point of contention, which I flagged above, is Haugeland’s claim 
about what distinguishes human tool use from the apparent use of tools in animals, such 
as chimpanzees. The difference, Haugeland argues, concerns the “propriety” governing 
uses of tools in human practice that is absent from anything one might call “tool use” 
among other animals. Propriety is what institutes tools as “for” a specific purpose, which 
is reinforced by imitation and censure. As Haugeland puts it, propriety “is what separates 
human use of tools from the uses animals sometimes make of handy objects. A monkey 
might be both clever and successful at getting some bananas with a stick, but in no sense 
is that what the stick is properly ‘for’; equivalently, a monkey could not abuse a stick, no 
matter what it did” (IAS 152).133 This imagined scenario of monkey stick use, I think, 
underestimates the complexity of, for example, the chimpanzee tool production and use 
to which Camp refers (see PTW 294).134 The observation that these chimpanzees not only 
coordinate the use of two different tools—a stout stick and a brush-like implement—and 
select specific materials for the brush from a specific location, but also alter that material 
                                                
132 Intentionality is not term that Camp uses, but her discussion of representations does implicitly commit 
her to a kind of neo-behaviorism about intentionality. 
133 Haugeland is perhaps obliquely referring to Köhler’s account of Sultan the chimpanzee’s problem-
solving abilities in The Mentality of Apes. 
134 Camp refers to the astonishing and “culturally” unique problem-solving abilities of one community of 
chimpanzees discussed in Sanz, Morgan, and Gulick, “New Insights into Chimpanzees, Tools, and 
Termites from the Congo Basin.” 
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in a particular way to “make” the brush useful for the specific purpose of fishing for 
termites seems to undermine Haugeland’s attempt to distinguish human from nonhuman 
animal tool use. Against Haugeland’s claim, even if we assumed there were no sense in 
which one chimpanzee in this group would or could take another to be “abusing” one of 
these tools, it is not at all clear this would mean the tools are not “for” a purpose in the 
relevant sense; what constitutes the abuse of a tool is a matter of the social practices 
surrounding tool use, and perhaps the chimpanzees simply don’t care about the “abuse” 
of tools. Indeed, perhaps they have no reason to, if the tools are suitably abundant. The 
“abuse” criterion that Haugeland introduces is highly questionable. Even without tool 
“abuse,” it is perfectly reasonable that a troup of chimpanzees can select and shape tools 
that are “for” a very distinct purpose and therefore evince the propriety that Haugeland 
insists makes human tool use distinct. 
Camp’s discussion of instrumental reasoning sheds light on this issue of treating a 
thing as being “for” some purpose according to socially instituted norms. Not all 
instrumental reasoning and instances of animal tool use should count as socially instituted 
or involving propriety. An example here is the New Caledonian crow that spontaneously 
bends a piece of wire to retrieve food.135 In this example, there is instrumental reasoning 
and tool use but (it appears) no conformism or social institution. In the case of the 
termite-fishing chimpanzees, however, it really does appear that conformism and social 
institution play a role in establishing a resilient disposition to catch termites by acquiring 
and creating specific tools “for” that purpose. New and young members of this 
community are drawn into the practice through conformism (imitation and censure) and 
using their capacity for instrumental reasoning, leading them to acquire materials and 
                                                
135 See Weir, Chappell, and Kacelnik, “Shaping of Hooks in New Caledonian Crows.” 
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make tools to fish for termites. As the young chimpanzees watch the older ones engage in 
this activity, it seems reasonable to assume they recognize what the stout stick and the 
brush stick are “for,” thus they pick up on the social propriety governing the use of these 
paraphernalia. It may take years of practice before the young manage to catch many 
termites using this technique, but slow learning does not undermine the point (and the 
poor return on investment of failed techniques underscores the power of conformist 
inclinations). 
Haugeland’s insistence that “the uses animals sometimes make of handy objects” 
does not qualify as tool use seems to fall apart in the face of empirical accounts of this 
chimpanzee community’s complex termite-catching technique. And because, in 
Haugeland’s early view, social propriety is tied to a preliminary sense of “objectively” 
grasping things (IAS 152), the empirical evidence seems to require early Haugeland to 
extend to these chimpanzees an objective (in some sense) grasp of what they are doing. 
By contrast, in his late view, Haugeland avoids the implication that termite-fishing, tool-
using chimpanzees have any kind of objective grasp of what they are doing. As I discuss 
below, Haugeland’s later discussion of conformism introduces new criteria that allow us 
to distinguish between the highly sophisticated tool use of chimpanzees in the Congo 
river basin and objectivity. 
 Reading Haugeland in light of Camp’s theory of concepts and instrumental 
reason, the main point to carry forward regarding the normativity that arises out of 
conformism and the tool use that goes along with it is that they’re both features of the 
lives of intelligent animals generally, and not of rational, human lives specifically. The 
list of abilities and proclivities that intellectualists reserve for humans but that, on closer 
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inspection, belong to a wider variety of intelligent animals has grown: concepts, 
instrumental reason, normativity, and tool use are all things that seem to be shared and 
cannot therefore be used to make a rational, objective grasp of the world distinct. The 
question looms not least because, as I argued in the previous chapter, Camp herself 
cannot offer a satisfactory answer. In “Intentionality All-Stars,” Haugeland appeals to 
integral socially instituted norms to draw a line, but the real distinction he is after is 
linguistic. As I mentioned above, Haugeland endorses the idea that primary intentionality 
resides in normatively governed linguistic practices, or what he calls “the public use of 
symbols” (IAS 156). Haugeland’s later view, however, is more nuanced, critical, and yet 
somewhat more relaxed about language as he shifts his attention from intentionality to 
objectivity, especially in “Objective Perception” and “Truth and Rule-Following.” 
Crucially, in his later work Haugeland rejects the idea that propriety is sufficient to 
account for the kind of objective grasp of the world that rational humans have. I turn to 
the latter essay next to show how Haugeland downplays language (compared to Brandom 
and McDowell, at least) to build objectivity out of a theory of skills. For my purposes, 
this theory of objectivity fills a gap left by Camp’s account. 
 
5. Constitution 
When Haugeland returns to the question of normativity in “Truth and Rule-Following,” 
he focuses on positing a pragmatist and quasi-existentialist theory of objectivity rather 
than setting out a neo-pragmatist approach to intentionality. Haugeland’s theory of 
objectivity substantially breaks with Brandom by arguing that Brandom’s approach to 
objectivity is insufficient. On Brandom’s view (and on the view Haugeland developed 
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earlier in “The Intentionality All-Stars”) propriety is sufficient to account for an objective 
grasp of the world. Put simply, provided we are following all of the normative rules 
(whether implicit or explicit) governing perceptions and judgments about how things are, 
then we are correct about how things are. There is no possibility of a well-thought wrong 
thought: following the rules and getting things wrong. Provided we follow all of the 
established social norms governing objective claims in our given circumstances, we 
cannot be wrong, because there are no criteria independent of social institutions to speak 
against them. 
In “Truth and Rule-Following,” Haugeland argues that to have objectivity in the 
full sense—a sense that is required for human reason and scientific knowledge—there 
must be two sources of normative constraint on knowledge: social institution and also 
objective correctness. Haugeland pitches this idea in historical terms that show up a 
parallel between Haugeland’s response to Brandom’s neo-pragmatism and Kant’s 
response to naturalistic psychologism: 
1. Naturalistic psychologists such as Hume argued that cognition follows 
rules of natural law. 
2. Anti-psychologists such as Kant “retort” that for rationality to make any 
sense, “there must be two fundamentally distinct sorts of necessary order: 
the laws of nature and the laws or norms of reason.” (TRF 317) 
Kant made this distinction to avoid destroying “the essential character of thought” (TRF 
317). However, as many have complained since Kant, transcendental idealism seems to 
make the norms of reason supernatural, because wholly detached from natural regularity. 
A “pragmatist” parallel emerges as a way of responding to what is untenable about 
Kant’s position: 
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3. Neo-pragmatists like Brandom “agree [with Kant] that thought is 
essentially norm-governed, but hold that normativity” should itself be 
understood as compatible with naturalism. (TRF 317) 
4. Haugeland’s “retort” (parallel to Kant’s retort) claims that Brandom, 
despite endorsing normativity as distinct, fails to recover the treasure from 
the rubble of Kant’s dualism: “there must be two fundamentally distinct 
sorts of normative constraint: social propriety and objective correctness 
(truth).” (TRF 317) 
In other words, Haugeland argues, Brandom is right to embrace Kant’s idea that rational 
normativity is distinct while abandoning Kant’s metaphysical dualism. But Brandom is 
wrong to think in jettisoning metaphysical dualism we must also give up on the idea that 
there are two distinct kinds of normative constraint on what we think is true of the world. 
Like McDowell, Haugeland thinks it is not sufficient for noninferential judgments to be 
reliably keyed to the causal processes of environing stimuli. Rationality, objectivity, and 
the essential character of thought require that things we encounter in our experience stand 
up against the norms governing how we judge them. Somehow, if there is to be 
objectivity, the objects must stand up against the norms governing how we judge them. 
Haugeland’s ultimate aim in this essay is to make sense of and do justice to our 
rational, scientific approach to grasping how things are. He hopes thereby to make sense 
of scientific revolutions, how the social propriety governing our understanding of nature 
can be challenged by things in the world, by objects we grasp. In this respect, Haugeland 
aims to vindicate what he takes to be Thomas Kuhn’s approach to scientific objectivity. 
However, “scientific” should also be understood in a very broad sense that includes 
instances where we risk our commitments, beliefs, or social institutions and test their 
propriety against how things turn out in the world. A cook who makes hash browns by 
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several methods to determine the best way to give them the crispness he likes, or a master 
chess player who tests in tournament play his theory on how best to defeat a certain style 
of play are both—at least potentially—approaching their practices scientifically in the 
relevant sense. Both the cook and the chess player are testing and willing to sacrifice their 
beliefs about how to ply their trades and, crucially, by doing so, both allow the world to 
speak against the social propriety or received wisdom of how to conduct their practices. 
Scientific practitioners must be committed first and foremost to coherence and 
consistency in the corner of the world they are exploring and willing to give up 
commitments they have to the social propriety, norms and institutions governing their 
sphere of practice. To be scientific, again, is to be willing to sacrifice social propriety in 
the interest of forming a coherent and consistent worldview—and knowing when it is 
appropriate to do so.  
In the “scientific” situation described above, what is at stake is the social 
propriety, the received wisdom generally taken to be true, norms that more or less 
everyone in the community accepts. Again, Haugeland’s interest is in situations where 
objects stand up against universally accepted norms, and he thereby takes a stand against 
Brandom. By insisting on there being two forms of normative constraint, he is addressing 
situations where everyone is wrong to ensure it is possible the world can stand up against 
mistaken yet universal social propriety. And yet, there is another dimension to 
Haugeland’s claim that is important to McDowell’s commitment to the idea that 
experience has a rational form. In defending the idea that there must be two sources for 
normative constraint on what we believe, he writes, “[T]o collapse correctness into 
propriety is to obliterate the essential character of thought.” Crucially, Haugeland does 
  197 
not say that the collapse obliterates the essential character of science; the collapse is more 
general: thought itself. In other words, by including two sources of normative constraint 
on what we think is true of the world, Haugeland makes it possible for objects to stand up 
not just against universally held norms governing how we take things to be, but takes 
objects to stand up against our judgments—to provide friction with the world—in 
instances where we are simply misapplying or applying mistaken norms governing how 
to grasp the world. Haugeland’s defense of scientific objectivity doesn’t just allow 
objects to speak against universally held but false socially instituted norms; it also allows 
objects to speak against my failure to follow socially instituted norms. In brief, what 
Haugeland pulls off by ensuring that the world can stand up against universally held 
beliefs—something McDowell nowhere considers—is additionally a defense of 
McDowell’s commitment to giving objects the power to stand up against our individually 
mistaken beliefs (even if our failure is really just a failure to follow universally held rules 
governing the kinds of judgment we tried to make). In this way, Haugeland’s theory will 
be a crucial part of my accommodation of McDowell’s commitment to empiricism 
below, even though Haugeland himself was not interested in the commitment as 
McDowell pursues it. 
A full explanation and defense of Haugeland’s theory of objectivity would go 
beyond the scope of my dissertation. Throughout the rest of this chapter, I focus on what 
are, for my purposes, the crucial aspects of Haugeland’s late view, namely, his discussion 
of four kinds of constitutive rule-following. The result is a theory of interdependent skills 
involved in gaining an objective grasp of the world that, despite their interdependence, 
are endowed with enough independence to stand up against each other in cases where 
  198 
they conflict. The brilliance of Haugeland’s view is, in part, that it offers a way out of the 
trap that Dreyfus and McDowell both struggle to escape, namely, the trap of gaining 
friction with the world by running minds up against bodies. On Haugeland’s view, by 
contrast, minds and bodies are treated as one, and the friction is between distinct skills 
that all seamlessly involve both minds and bodies as one. To conclude the chapter, I 
discuss how to integrate Haugeland’s explanation of objectivity in terms of constitution 
with Camp’s theory of concepts and instrumental rationality. This sets up the discussion 
in Chapter V, where I propose an answer Dreyfus’s challenge of explaining how rational, 
conceptual understanding develops out of more basic abilities we share with other 
animals while reconciling this explanation with McDowell’s and Brandom’s respective 
commitments. 
5.1 Constitutive Regulations and Standards 
Haugeland begins with constitutive regulations and standards. Constitutive regulations 
are the kinds of governing rules that actually constitute an activity as the kind of activity 
it is, for example, the rules of a game (TRF 320). The constitutive regulations of a game 
are those that one must follow and enforce in order to count as playing the game at all. In 
chess, Haugeland’s favorite example, such rules govern how the pieces move and 
determine the objective of the game, etc. 
Constitutive standards relate to but are distinct from constitutive regulations. 
Constitutive standards, Haugeland writes, “govern all the phenomena that occur within 
the game, and determine what they are” (TRF 320). Whereas constitutive regulations bear 
upon what a player can do in any given circumstance—by regulating behavior—
constitutive standards have, by contrast, an ontological significance by determining the 
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phenomena of the game as what they are in and for the game. So, while there are 
constitutive regulations governing what a player can do with a rook, there are also, 
implicitly, constitutive standards determining what a rook is or determining that 
something one encounters is a rook. Haugeland’s talk of constitutive standards is his 
revised way of talking about socially instituted “role-defined paraphernalia” (IAS 152). 
As Haugeland points out, it can be hard to see how constitutive standards and 
regulations are distinct; they seem to be two manifestations of the same rules, yet the 
distinction becomes clearer when Haugeland points out the many facts we assume when 
we play a game (TRF 320). To play a game of poker, for an absurd example, the cards 
cannot turn over by themselves or speak what they are; we could not play poker with 
such a deck, it would be a different game, if indeed it were still a game at all. Less 
absurdly, the cards cannot be translucent. Constitutive regulations do not cover such 
details, because, again, they are concerned with what players can do. Constitutive 
standards for poker require that cards are inert, silent, and opaque. 
5.2 Mundane and Constitutive Skills 
Having introduced standards, Haugeland shifts to skills to differentiate the basic 
“mundane” skills involved in perceiving and acting from the “constitutive” skills 
involved in upholding constitutive standards. Generally, a skill is “a reliable, resilient 
ability to abide by a governing rule correctly and reliably” (TRF 322). Mundane skills are 
those reliable abilities to accomplish basic physical and cognitive tasks according to 
normative social practices, like recognizing and interacting with things and other 
community members. The mundane skills required to play a game, Haugeland writes, 
“are the resilient abilities to recognize, manipulate, and otherwise cope with phenomena 
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within the game, including other players, as required and permitted by the rules—in 
effect, the ability to engage in play” (TRF 323). Conformist animals with social norms—
such as humans, chimpanzees, crows, elephants, etc.—develop mundane skills in this 
sense. Such animals imitate and censure one another’s mundane skill performances 
according to their communal norms. Thus, there are socially instituted mundane skills 
governing behavior, social interaction, and the use of material things, but also socially 
instituted mundane skills governing the how and when to engage in positive and negative 
censuring of behavior. 
The negative censuring of conformism ensures that social conflict is a part of life 
for all social animals. There is also the potential for “internal” conflict between two or 
more mundane skills that an animal has developed. A conflict between socially instituted 
mundane skills might lead the animal to pause or even be “confused” in some sense. 
Crucially, however, an animal with only mundane skills (and no constitutive skills) can 
never encounter that conflict between skills as a conflict. The most the animal can do is 
exercise one or neither of the two conflicting skills. To encounter a conflict between 
skills as such is to have constitutive skills. 
Constitutive skills comprise the ability to tell whether recognizable things reflect 
and align with constitutive standards that govern them. By introducing constitutive skills 
as distinct from mundane skills governing how to behave and how to respond to one 
another’s behavior, Haugeland means to introduce something new that we do not share 
even with the most intelligent, nonhuman animals. “A constitutive skill,” he writes, “is a 
resilient ability to tell whether the phenomena governed by some constitutive standard 
are, in fact, in accord with that standard” (TRF 323). So, for example, there are many 
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mundane skills involved in the game of chess that allow us to manipulate and recognize 
different pieces. These mundane skills conform to the constitutive standards of the game 
of chess. But in determining, for example, what a rook is in a game of chess, constitutive 
standards also establish that rooks cannot do certain things and still be rooks (or to still be 
playing a game of chess); rooks cannot move diagonally. A constitutive skill in chess is 
the ability to tell when, for example, a rook is moved illegally. This is more than the 
mundane skill of recognizing a rook, for it involves recognizing something that has 
moved like a bishop as nonetheless being a rook. Using only mundane skills, one might 
take the piece to be an oddly shaped bishop or a strangely moving rook, but what one 
cannot do—and what Haugeland introduces constitutive skills to explain—is to grasp that 
the rook is indeed a rook, yet it has run afoul of the constitutive standards of chess. 
Mundane skills only follow rules. Constitutive skills enforce them.136 
Given that constitutive standards are a kind of governing rule, one might think 
that to enact a constitutive skill is simply to follow the rules of constitutive standards, but 
Haugeland is careful to tease these apart: the constitutive standards that determine the 
phenomena in question are one set of rules, but the rule-following that occurs with 
constitutive skills are another, distinct set of rules (TRF 323). Rules governing what 
something is are not the same as the kinds of steps one must follow to correctly determine 
whether or not a thing reflects the rules that are supposed to govern what it is. 
                                                
136 The behavior of intelligent animals that live in hierarchical social groups might seem to pose a problem 
here in the following way: one might think that when a chimpanzee observes its fellow as breaking with the 
social norms of the community and moves to negatively censure the behavior, it is exhibiting constitutive 
skills, because its performance reinforces the standards that constitute the social order. However, nothing 
like constitutive skills are needed here. The censuring chimpanzee herself can be understood to be 
performing normatively governed mundane skills for reacting to other chimpanzees breaking with another 
set of normatively governed mundane skills. The conflict here is between two individual animals, whereas 
the conflict that constitutive skills are introduced to explain is between the skills themselves. 
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Another important point is that to have constitutive skills does not require that one 
have an explicit understanding of constitutive standards. Constitutive skills, Haugeland 
says, are “know-how.” Knowing how to tell when someone makes an illegal move in a 
game is not the same as knowing the explicit rules of the game, though they are, as 
Haugeland acknowledges, interdependent. Constitutive skills have, Haugeland argues, a 
“practical priority” over explicitly knowing the constitutive standards: one can learn the 
constitutive skills and play a game without explicit knowledge of constitutive standards, 
but one cannot play a game without the know-how of constitutive skills even if one has 
explicit knowledge of constitutive standards (TRF 323). Language use among children 
offers a nice example of this. A typical seven-year-old lacks explicit knowledge of the 
constitutive standards of correct and coherent speech (involving specific terminology, 
grammatical rules, etc.), but nonetheless has sufficient constitutive skills to speak both 
correctly and coherently and also to correct the obvious misuse of words and 
grammatically incoherent statements typical of younger children. Indeed, in the case of 
language, it seems necessary to cultivate a high degree of constitutive skills concerning 
language use prior to gaining an explicit understanding of the constitutive standards of 
language. 
Crucially, constitutive and mundane skills are interdependent. Without mundane 
skills to recognize what something is, constitutive skills would have nothing to assess 
according to constitutive standards (TRF 324). Similarly, without constitutive skills for 
enforcing constitutive standards, mundane skills would not be able to function in their 
recognitive capacity (TRF 324).137 Or, to put the same point in Kantian terms: 
                                                
137 One might ask, if constitutive and mundane skills are mutually dependent, then how can it be that 
nonrational animals have mundane skills without having any constitutive skills? The answer, I think, is that 
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constitutive skills without mundane skills are empty; mundane skills without constitutive 
skills are blind. The Kantian analogy here should not be taken too far, however. Unlike 
Kant, Haugeland does not think concepts and intuitions spring from two metaphysically 
distinct sources like spontaneity and receptivity. For Haugeland, constitutive standards 
determine what things are and constitutive skills, in practice, carry that determination into 
making the phenomena what they are, constituting the objects themselves as what they 
are according to those standards. But in constituting objects, these skills also constitute 
the mundane skills that allow us to recognize them. As Haugeland says, “We might 
instead think of mundane skills as ‘co-constituted’ along with the phenomena that their 
exercises respond to, manipulate, and cope with” (TRF 324). And yet, despite that co-
constitution of objects and the skills involved in recognizing and coping with them 
according to constitutive skills, the whole point of Haugeland’s exercise is to show how 
mundane skills and constitutive skills come apart, how inconsistency can arise between 
mundane skills that force their revision, or even the revision of constitutive skills 
themselves. Ultimately, Haugeland wants to claim that constituted objects can stand up to 
and push back against the skills involved in coping with them and constituting them. The 
distinction between interdependent constitutive and mundane skills sets up the notion of 
object that Haugeland is after. Constituted phenomena  
are “objective phenomena” in the following three-fold sense: (i) mundane 
skills are responsive to and/or can affect them (they are accessible); (ii) 
they have normative status as criterial for the correct exercise of objective 
                                                                                                                                            
mundane skills cannot function as part of an objective grasp of the world without their interdependence 
upon constitutive skills. Haugeland did not introduced mundane skills as a way to talk about animal 
abilities, but rather as a way to explain objectivity. So while I attribute mundane skills yet deny constitutive 
skills to nonhuman animals, I do not think it undermines Haugeland’s point. Haugeland’s point about the 
interdependence of mundane and constitutive skills does not deny nonhuman animals mundane skills but 
stipulates that the particular mundane skills of animals with an objective grasp of the world must be 
interdependent with its constitutive skills. 
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skills (they are authoritative); and (iii) they are independent not only of 
particular exercises but also of any mere consensus (they are autonomous). 
The idea then is: constituted phenomena, and only constituted phenomena, 
can thus stand as accessible independent criteria, hence be objects—and 
therefore also that this is what we ordinarily and scientifically understand 
by “object.” (TRF 325) 
In other words, mundane skills enable us to recognize and cope with phenomena, but the 
phenomena themselves have normative authority by virtue of being constituted by 
constitutive skills. So constituted, objects (qua objects) can push back against how we 
cope with and recognize them if our coping and recognizing runs afoul of what these 
objects are according to the standards that constitute them. The objects themselves can 
therefore be or offer criteria for assessing the mundane skills that allow us to cope with 
them. 
5.3 Constitutive Commitment 
The fourth of Haugeland’s quartet of ways to follow rules that are necessary for 
objectivity and truth-telling he calls “constitutive commitment” (TRF 340-1). 
Constitutive commitment is essentially a commitment to upholding constitutive 
regulations and standards. It is, in this sense, a driving force guiding and upholding the 
constitutive skills that monitor mundane skills for coherence and consistency among 
objects of a given domain, whether they are game phenomena or the objects of scientific 
inquiry. Constitutive commitment is the network of poles structuring the tent of 
objectivity, without which constitutive and mundane skills would not stand up against 
one another when discrepancies arise. 
In explaining what he means by constitutive commitment, Haugeland teases apart 
two senses of commitment: deontic and existential commitment. The deontic sense of 
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commitment concerns taking on socially instituted obligations to do certain things or 
comport oneself in certain ways (TRF 341). Realizing one’s deontic commitments is a 
matter of living up to the expectations of one’s community in any given set of 
circumstances: knowing how one is expected to act according to the norms of one’s 
community, and acting in accordance with them, regardless of any inclinations to do 
otherwise. 
Existential commitment contrasts with the external authority of deontic 
commitment; the authority of existential commitment is self-generated, comes from 
within (TRF 341-2). Rather than being a communal obligation, Haugeland writes, 
existential commitment is “more like a dedicated or even a devoted way of living: a 
determination to maintain and carry on. It is not a communal status at all but a resilient 
and resolute first-personal stance” (TRF 341). It is a commitment to a certain form of life 
that “is prepared to insist on that which is constitutive of its own possibility, the 
conditions of its intelligibility” (TRF 341). Moreover, as a self-generated commitment, 
one can add (beyond what Haugeland explicitly states) that existential commitment 
means fully embracing what one is, being the self one takes oneself to be; in other words, 
it is existential in the sense of being definitive of one’s very being; one would not be who 
or what one is without this existential commitment. 
This sense of existential commitment sets up what Haugeland is after, namely, 
existential constitutive commitment. Constitutive commitment, in this existential sense, 
concerns a commitment to the constitutive standards of a given sphere of human activity. 
It is not just a commitment to those standards as such, but also to maintaining a coherent 
and consistent set of constitutive standards, i.e., to ensuring that the sphere of activity is 
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not incoherent and inconsistent. That is, it is a constitutive commitment to there being a 
truth or fact of the matter, independent of what one may think, that orders and guides the 
process of refining, revising or rejecting mundane or constitutive skills in the face of 
contradictions one may encounter. As Haugeland puts it,  
the content of—the issue for any—existential constitutive commitment is 
maintenance of the relevant precarious equilibrium. It is this commitment 
that stands behind the unacceptability of incompatible mundane results, as 
determined by exercises of constitutive skills. Accordingly, it also stands 
behind the ability of objects to resist mundane findings, to show them up 
as incorrect. And therefore, finally, it is the driving force behind all efforts 
to resolve apparent incompatibilities, whether by exposing them as merely 
apparent (revising incorrect results), or by repairing the system so as to 
avoid such results in general (changing the mundane or constitutive skills 
themselves). (TRF 342) 
Ultimately, existential constitutive commitment is what backstops the authority of objects 
to stand up against mundane and constitutive skills. Haugeland is worth quoting at length 
as he puts the finishing touches on his account of objectivity: 
The normative authority of objects, by virtue of which they can stand as 
criteria for the correctness of mundane results—and thus as binding on 
judgements and assertions—devolves upon them from the commitment to 
the standards in accord with which they are constituted. Note that this is 
not to suggest that the authority of objects is somehow “delegated” or 
“ceded” to them by those committed to the standards. That would be to 
suppose that the latter already had the relevant authority and could then 
give it away, neither of which makes clear sense. Rather it is to say that, in 
committing to a constituted domain, and thereby finding objects, those 
who are thus committed necessarily also find the objects as authoritative, 
and acknowledge them as such. The authority is implicit in the structure of 
the finding. That normative authority of the discovered objects, derived 
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from but not at all the same as the sui generis normative authority of the 
constitutive commitment, then takes its effect via the responsible 
responsiveness of the mundane skills. (TRF 343) 
One might think constitutive skills should suffice on their own without constitutive 
commitment to upholding them; after all, constitutive skills are supposed to be resilient in 
and of themselves. Isn’t that resilience enough? Perhaps, in a narrow sense, it is, in the 
instance of a game where the rules are fixed and the constitutive skills are never 
challenged. But Haugeland is after the kind of objectivity necessary for a scientific grasp 
of the world, and in science, it is always possible for constitutive skills themselves to 
stand in need of revision. The rules themselves must be abandoned and reformed when 
the objects (and the mundane skills we use to recognize and cope with them) band 
together and stand up against the constitutive skills and standards and regulations that are 
supposed to constitute objects in a sphere of inquiry in a coherent and consistent way. In 
cases such as these, it is the constitutive commitment to upholding consistency and 
coherence in our worldview that allows us to abandon or refine constitutive standards and 
skills when needed. In other words, in order for our knowledge to adapt and change not 
just within but also across paradigms, there must be a form of commitment that 
transcends any given perspective on the world that constitutive skills and standards set 
up. 
 
6. Integrating Constitution and Concepts 
I’ve spelled out the four kinds of constitutive rule-following that Haugeland puts forward 
as the structure of our objective understanding of the world. My aim in this chapter is to 
integrate Camp’s theory of concepts with Haugeland’s theory of objectivity, as a way of 
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supplementing what I found lacking in Camp’s view in Chapter III. Here, then, is a way 
to integrate their views that builds on the strengths of each view and helps to set up an 
answer to Dreyfus’s challenge. 
6.1 Separating Constitutive Standards and Constitutive Commitments 
Haugeland’s late view introduces constitutive forms of rule-following as a set devised to 
explain what goes into an objective grasp of the world. Given Haugeland’s aims, it makes 
no sense to attribute constitutive standards where there are no constitutive commitments. 
In making use of Haugeland’s view to propose an answer to Dreyfus’s challenge, 
however, I suggested above that constitutive standards and constitutive commitments can 
be carefully separated. To set up how I want to integrate Haugeland’s objectivity with 
Camp’s theory of concepts, I need to return to this point. 
In §4, I claimed that tool-making and tool-using chimpanzees qualify as having 
tools in a robust sense, based on the definition of human tool use Haugeland offers in his 
early view. That created a problem for his early view by robbing it of one of the key ways 
it distinguishes a human orientation to the world. In Haugeland’s later view, his 
introduction of constitutive standards and constitutive commitments sets up a new way of 
drawing a bright line between an objective human grasp of the world and the normative 
social practices of nonhuman animals. As I suggested above, one can attribute tool use, 
instrumental reasoning, concepts, and even a certain limited form of constitutive 
standards to termite-fishing chimpanzees, yet deny that these chimpanzees have anything 
like the existential, constitutive commitment Haugeland deems necessary for objectivity. 
It is possible for nonhuman animals to have constitutive standards for tools they use in 
part because Haugeland has not made having an explicit grasp of constitutive standards 
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necessary for them to be operative as governing rules in the lives of animals. And this 
also allows us to say of human infants that, on the way to acquiring the constitutive 
commitment necessary for objectivity, we first pick up numerous constitutive standards, 
which seems both intuitively compelling and empirically true for reasons Camp gives 
(and which I canvas in Chapter III when discussing the acquisition of concepts in 
children). 
However, to do justice to Haugeland’s view, we should differentiate between 
constitutive standards that are answerable to constitutive commitment for their 
consistency and coherence, and constitutive standards in the absence of constitutive 
commitments, whereby there is no overarching enforcement of their internal coherence 
and consistency. Again, Haugeland’s own introduction of constitutive standards is part of 
a larger picture he is building in which constitutive standards are introduced for the 
specific purpose of explaining what is distinctive about our objective grasp of the world. 
For Haugeland, to count as having constitutive standards, one must be capable of revising 
those standards in the interest of maintaining a shared, cohesive and consistent 
worldview. Some chimpanzee communities do have constitutive standards in the limited 
sense that involves the social, behavioral re-enforcement of what objects are for, and they 
do conform and cultivate dispositions to form a socially coherent and consistent way of 
life insofar as their social practices aim at social cohesion (no matter how inequitable that 
might be). But what Haugeland is after goes beyond mere social cohesion to include 
something more, something that is, perhaps for Haugeland, ontologically distinct: 
cognitive cohesion, wherein our conceptual grasp of how things are aims to overcome 
inconsistencies, instances where one thing purported to be true undermines another thing 
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purported to be true. This is what I alluded to earlier as a government of (what Camp 
calls) concepts. It is not just, as with chimpanzee communities, that there is social, 
behavioral cohesion that bears on and shapes the acquisition and use of concepts that 
Camp takes them to have; rather, a human, objective grasp of the world draws the 
concepts themselves explicitly into the social arena as part of our existential commitment 
to coherence in the very use of concepts themselves. 
We can attribute constitutive standards to nonhuman animals like chimpanzees 
based on empirical observation of their behavior, and at the same time deny them 
constitutive commitments based on the same observations. Chimpanzees do not 
demonstrate any ability to encounter a discrepancy between mundane skills on the basis 
of constitutive skills, nor any inclination to revise their mundane skills in the interest of 
gaining a rationally coherent grasp of their environment. Just as they lack 
metarepresentations, so they lack constitutive commitment. This is not, moreover, a 
coincidence. To recognize via constitutive skills that two mundane skills are conflicting 
is to engage a metarepresentational grasp of how things are, where how things are is 
itself recognized as being subject to institutional norms. It is not enough to be able, as a 
chimpanzee is, to follow social norms to represent ways to solve problems because 
merely following these norms does not surface the norms themselves as norms. Rather, to 
cognize a conflict between mundane skills, one must be able to represent some of one’s 
representations as either true or false according to social norms to which one is 
existentially committed. Constitutive commitment is the introduction of social norms as 
social norms; it is essentially metarepresentational insofar as it requires the ability to 
represent norms as such. 
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The point, for my purposes, is that constitutive standards, in the absence of 
constitutive commitments and objectivity, can help to explain how the social norms of 
animals with elaborate tool-use practices shape instrumental reasoning, giving them a 
sense of what a tool is “for.” Yet, paired with constitutive commitment, constitutive 
standards and skills are deployed as part of an objective grasp of the world that uncovers 
conflicts among mundane skills and give objects the power to stand up against our 
beliefs. 
6.2 Instrumental Reasoning and Concepts Without Constitutive Standards 
For Camp, recall, instrumental reasoning and concepts go together. The first thing to 
point out is that instrumental reasoning is independent of constitutive standard and 
constitutive skills, because social norms are not necessary for instrumental reasoning. For 
example, again, a New Caledonian crow that bends a piece of wire (makes a tool) in 
order to retrieve a piece of food it cannot otherwise reach is an example of instrumental 
reasoning and tool use, but not necessarily an example of constitutive standards. The 
reason is that, in the crow’s case, there are no social norms lending a shared sense of 
what the bent wire is “for.” Indeed, the same can be true in humans: I can engage in 
conceptual problem-solving in an entirely novel, unshared way, such that there are no 
constitutive standards governing my activity. If, on a camping trip, I cut a tree branch and 
carve a notch into it in order to use it to lift and suspend my food from another branch so 
that bears cannot get into it while I sleep, I am using instrumental reasoning and making a 
tool, in one sense. But I am alone and my “tool” does not institute or reflect any 
constitutive standards governing what my notched stick is “for.” The next group of hikers 
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might arrive on my spot, find other means to safeguard their food from bears, and use my 
“tool” as fuel in their fire. 
The general point is that socially instituted, constitutive standards that make 
something for something are not necessary for instrumental reasoning, but all constitutive 
standards involve concepts, in Camp’s sense, because constituting something as being for 
something—as in sufficiently complex tool use—inevitably involves the capacity for 
instrumental reasoning. Thus, we can add, a corresponding claim about animals: not all 
animals with concepts and instrumental reasoning have constitutive standards, but all 
animals with constitutive standards have concepts and instrumental reasoning. 
6.3 Instrumental Reasoning, Concepts, and Constitutive Standards Without 
Constitutive Commitments 
When instrumental reasoning, in the form of tool use, is governed by social norms about 
what materials to use as tools, where to find them, and how to shape them on the way to 
actually using them in a specific way, then instrumental reasoning involves constitutive 
standards. The primary example I used above, again, is the community of termite-fishing 
chimpanzees. 
Appealing to the empirical complexity of tool use in termite-fishing chimpanzees 
has allowed me to show that, in a limited sense, there are constitutive standards 
governing their behavior, even if they lack any overarching constitutive commitment that 
governs their constitutive standards. This complex animal tool use is a perfect example of 
the instrumental reasoning that counts as conceptual on Camp’s definition. In the interest 
of integrating their respective views, it is reasonable to claim that behavior governed by 
constitutive standards in complex, tool-using animals involves concepts, as Camp defines 
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them. Termite-fishing chimpanzees gain the constitutive standards that allow them to 
grasp a tool as being “for” a certain purpose at the same time as they acquire the concepts 
involved in termite fishing and the ability to treat objects as a means to an end, wherein 
subsidiary goals of finding and shaping tool material draw the animal temporarily away 
from the primary goal of catching termites. 
6.4 Constitutive Commitments, Metacognition, and Objectivity 
While I side with Camp in attributing concepts, by her definition, to animals with 
instrumental reasoning, and (contra Haugeland) attributing constitutive standards where 
social norms govern animal tool use, I nonetheless endorse Haugeland’s way of 
articulating how only human animals have metacognition, along with existential, 
constitutive commitments, and thereby an objective grasp of the world. 
Drawing on Davidson, Camp agrees that objectivity and metacognition go 
together. She thinks of objectivity in terms of the capacity for metarepresentation, i.e., the 
capacity to represent our representations and the relations between them. This capacity, 
along with concepts about truth and falsity that deal with metarepresentations, gives us 
the kind of objective grasp of the world that we have. Camp further suggests that 
language is necessary for metarepresentations of this kind. However, recall from Chapter 
III Camp’s idea that the important difference between humans and other animals is the 
vast expansion of our conceptual repertoire and its social coordination, and her insistence 
that metacognition and the awareness of error are not the important features of that 
expansion. Camp does not spell out what she thinks that social coordination entails, but 
she seems to think something like mere conformism is sufficient to explain the social 
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coordination of concept use, or at most constitutive standards that normalize what words 
are for, without a need for metacognition.  
It is difficult to imagine a social coordination of concepts—through language—
that does not depend upon metacognition. The idea that metacognition is not a crucial 
aspect of what sets humans apart from other animals is one Haugeland would reject, and 
here I side with Haugeland. Built into Haugeland’s view is the insight that the expansion 
of human concepts Camp thinks makes the crucial difference in fact depends upon 
objectivity and metacognition. Only constitutive standards and skills explicitly governing 
our use of concepts according to objective standards—as opposed to governing merely 
the behavior concepts enable—can make the vast expanse of human concepts useful in 
the ways that they are. And the overarching existential, constitutive commitment that 
Haugeland makes crucial to objectivity is precisely the means for the government of 
concepts that constitutes our objective grasp of the world. It won’t do to claim, with 
Camp, that the expansion of human concepts makes the meaningful human difference 
because that expansion requires coordination that assumes metacognition, objectivity, 
and constitutive commitment. 
Haugeland’s structure of constitution is a means to understand the kind of 
metarepresentation that Camp, via Davidson, appeals to as the capacity that makes the 
rational, human grasp of a world possible. All socially instituted mundane skills that bear 
on problem-solving and involve instrumental reasoning are thoroughly conceptual, in 
humans and other animals alike. The structure of constitution that makes objectivity 
possible is a further development and elaboration of these conceptually articulated 
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mundane skills. The question is how that development happens. This is the new 
formulation of Dreyfus’s challenge to which I turn in Chapter V. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The purpose of Chapter IV has been to integrate Camp’s instrumentalist theory of 
concepts with Haugeland’s theory of objectivity. The motivation for this integration is 
that Camp’s theory of concepts, by itself, does not answer one of the primary concerns 
that motivates intellectualists to reject the kind of instrumentalist approach to concepts 
that Camp offers. Integrating Camp’s approach to concepts with Haugeland’s account of 
objectivity allows me to combine what is most useful in each for my purposes, as I 
propose a way to answer Dreyfus’s challenge while reconciling McDowell’s and 
Brandom’s respective commitments. 
In §2, I considered how Camp and Haugeland might critique each other’s view, 
and highlighted how their respective ways of thinking about human and nonhuman 
animal cognition are complementary, for my purposes. I then argued in §3 that Camp’s 
theory of concepts integrates well with Haugeland’s notion of conformism and that the 
two views mutually reinforce one another. However, this complementarity proves to have 
its limits. In §4, I considered how Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts undermines 
Haugeland’s early work on normativity and his claims about what makes socially 
instituted intentionality unique. In §5-§6, I turned to Haugeland’s late essay “Truth and 
Rule-Following” where he develops his mature theory of objectivity, and argue that the 
constitutive structure of objectivity that Haugeland advances in this essay accommodates 
Camp’s theory of concepts while nonetheless clearly establishing the difference between 
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socially instituted animal norms and having a rational, human, objective grasp of the 
world. 
All of this is to lay the groundwork for Chapter V, where I offer a way to 
reconcile Brandom and McDowell’s commitments while proposing an answer to 
Dreyfus’s challenge, to explain how rational human understanding develops out of lesser 
abilities we share with prerational humans and nonrational animals. Having shown that 
Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts is compatible with a promising way of making 
rational understanding distinct, I’ve established that it is useful for the kind of answer to 
Dreyfus’s challenge I propose. 
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CHAPTER V: RELAXED HOLISM  
 
1. Reconciling Commitments 
I began with the aim to reconcile three intellectualist commitments: 
Dreyfus’s commitment: to explain how rational, conceptual understanding 
emerges out of lesser abilities we share with human infants and other 
animals. 
McDowell’s commitment: to give normatively governed concepts a role in 
experience and action. 
Brandom’s commitment: to clearly define the function of concepts in a 
way that helps make rationality distinct. 
Although each of these commitments is attractive, they appear irreconcilable with one 
another. My contention is that what makes them appear irreconcilable is the one 
intellectualist commitment all three philosophers share, namely, a commitment to the 
idea that language is necessary for having concepts, that to have a concept is to have 
mastered the use of a word. I mean to reject this shared, intellectualist commitment, and 
with it the astringent form of conceptual holism found in Sellars, Brandom, McDowell, 
and (perhaps) Dreyfus. I do not intend to defend conceptual atomism in place of holism. 
Rather, the view I propose below represents a more relaxed form of holism that I take to 
complement some of the advantages of the Sellarsian view espoused by Brandom, 
McDowell, and (to some extent) Dreyfus.138 
                                                
138 As I indicated in the introduction to this dissertation, I am appropriating “atomism” and “holism” in the 
following way: (1) atomism holds that concepts can have a meaningful use independent of other concepts; 
(2) holism means concepts only have a meaningful use insofar as they are recombined with other concepts; 
(3) astringent holism holds that the capacity for explicit, rational discourse is necessary for the meaningful 
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I spent the first two chapters motivating the rejection of intellectualism by 
discussing problems that arise when we combine intellectualism about concepts with 
these commitments. In Chapter III, I turned to Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts, 
an approach that specifically aims to reject intellectualism while retaining a genuinely 
useful insight in the intellectualist approach to concepts. Camp defines concepts as 
revisable, recombinable, stimulus-independent representations that function as the 
elements of instrumental reasoning. The intellectualist insight, again, lies in the robust 
stimulus independence of cognition: to be able to think means having enough distance 
from the environment to spontaneously deploy one’s cognitive abilities. By Camp’s 
definition, to have concepts is to have a spontaneous cognitive capacity geared toward 
problem-solving, a capacity that is shared by human children long before they master a 
natural language, along with a number of other intelligent species including great apes, 
elephants, and corvids, among others. 
The problem with Camp’s argument, as I showed, is that it neglects to give a 
satisfying account of what distinguishes rational, human, conceptual understanding from 
that of other animals. In response to that neglect, I turned to Haugeland’s theory of 
objectivity, to integrate it with Camp’s instrumentalism as a way of establishing what 
makes properly rational human cognition distinct. 
In adopting Camp’s theory of concepts, along with Haugeland’s theory of 
objectivity, I have made them central to my attempt to reconcile the commitments of 
Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus. Here it is worth restating the criteria I take on board 
                                                                                                                                            
use of concepts; and (4) relaxed holism holds that the meaningful use of concepts does not require a 
capacity for explicit, rational discourse. Camp’s theory of concepts exemplifies relaxed holism because the 
animal use of concepts in problem-solving requires that, for representations to count as concepts, they must 
be spontaneously, systematically recombinable. 
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for reconciling these three commitments: (1) To satisfy Dreyfus’s commitment I need to 
make plausible the idea that there is a way to answer his challenge that shows how the 
cognitive abilities we share with prerational children and nonrational animals could be 
understood to develop into the rational, conceptual understanding we expect to find in 
mature, rational humans. (2) To satisfy McDowell’s commitment, the theory must 
explain how these normatively governed concepts are also operative in our experience 
and action, such that as rational animals what we think is true of the world is rationally 
constrained by experience. And (3) to satisfy Brandom’s commitment, the theory must 
offer a clear definition of concepts that gives them an explicit function in cognition yet 
also supports an account of what makes human rationality distinct. 
My aim in this chapter—and the aim of this dissertation generally—is to reconcile 
these three commitments. In §2, I propose a way to answer Dreyfus’s challenge by 
exploring three elements of an answer that integrate insights from Camp, Perner, and 
Haugeland (among others). These three elements—representations, concepts, and 
metacognition—are intricately linked, and these links constitute a suggestive outline for 
an answer to Dreyfus’s challenge. These three elements lay the groundwork for 
reconciling McDowell’s and Brandom’s respective commitments. In §3, I spell out how 
one can accommodate McDowell’s commitment by reiterating Haugeland’s way of 
retaining a minimal form of empiricism and drawing on Camp’s instrumentalism to 
explain how the normative, metacognitive use of concepts in judgment refines and 
constrains the instrumental role that concepts play in our experience and perception. And 
in §4, I show how one can accommodate Brandom’s commitment by explaining how the 
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normatively governed use of concepts in rational judgments is different in kind from the 
merely instrumental use of concepts in experience and action. 
The keystone of the chapter is my account of representation, concepts, and 
metacognition as three elements that are integral to one plausible way to answer 
Dreyfus’s challenge, so let me address at the outset one concern a reader might have 
about my approach.139 In the view I am defending, rational, discursive thoughts are 
composed of concepts, yet concepts also have a function in the cognitive lives of 
nonrational animals and not-yet rational human children. If concepts are a part of rational 
thought, why should we think animals that lack rational thought have concepts? 
My proposal draws on Josef Perner’s theory of representation (which informs 
Camp’s theory, as I mentioned in Chapter III). Perner aims to “investigat[e] how children 
develop an understanding of the mind as representational,” and appeals to empirical 
evidence to argue for three distinct levels of representational ability (URM 1, 6-7). 
Primary and secondary representational abilities are empirically useful for explaining the 
behavior of other animals and prerational human children, whereas the highest 
metarepresentational ability appears only as children begin to meaningfully participate in 
the life of a rational animal (around age four). Importantly, on Perner’s account, the 
development of these representational abilities is cumulative: secondary representational 
abilities presume primary ones, and metarepresentational abilities presume secondary 
ones (URM 7). It is this cumulative effect—which has proven useful for explaining 
behavior—that recommends attributing the components of rational cognition to 
nonrational animals. Or better yet: the components of cognition most useful for 
explaining the complex problem-solving behaviors of highly social animals turn out to be 
                                                
139 Many thanks to Zed Adams for pushing me to articulate an answer to this question. 
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the building blocks that socio-linguistic norms arrange into the structure of rational 
human understanding. 
Given that Perner’s theory of representation informs Camp’s instrumentalism 
about concepts, it is not surprising to find a similar cumulative effect in her theory of 
concepts, such that metaconceptual abilities assume and build upon conceptual ones. The 
point, again, is that on these accounts, the building blocks of rationality are shared with 
nonrational animals, whereas the necessary structure of rationality is not, and, 
ontogenetically, this transition is in large part dependent upon social practices. A human 
infant deprived of any and all examples of metarepresentational behavior will likely gain 
secondary representations, but will not develop recognizably metarepresentational 
abilities. What I offer in the following section is a way to see how social practices, 
constitutive skills, and commitments turn animal concepts involved in problem-solving 
and means-ends thinking into a rational understanding of the world. 
 
2. A Proposal for Answering Dreyfus’s Challenge 
Dreyfus’s challenge is a serious one, and historically persistent.140 It is not my aim to put 
it to rest; the general challenge has proven independent of the varying terms in which it 
                                                
140 It is the historical persistence of the challenge that Brandom seems to bristle against when he elects to 
methodologically abandon the question, preferring “differentiation” and “discontinuity” of the conceptual 
over “assimilation” and “continuity” (Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, 2–
3). Later, Brandom identifies assimilationist thinking as the classical American pragmatists applied the 
lessons of natural selection to understand cognition as a form of adaptation (Brandom, Perspectives on 
Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary, 5). There he writes, “This insight is encapsulated in the 
concept of habit, and the picture of individual learning as the evolution-by-selection of a population of 
habits. This master idea made possible the naturalistic construal of a cognitive continuum that runs from the 
skillful coping of the competent predator, through the practical intelligence of primitive hominids, to the 
traditional practices and common sense of civilized humans, all the way to the most sophisticated 
theorizing of contemporary scientists. All are seen as of a piece with, intelligible in the same general terms 
as, biological evolution” (ibid. 5-6). However, despite recognizing this insight and applauding the 
pragmatists for their attention to the continuity of rational, human cognition with that of children and other 
animals, he also criticizes them for failing to sufficiently “demarcate” our rational capacities, i.e., explain 
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has been raised over centuries. Rather, I want to propose a way to answer the challenge in 
the specific form it takes among the contemporary intellectualist interlocutors I am 
responding to here. As I mentioned above, my task is to sketch a plausible way to answer 
Dreyfus’s challenge that can nonetheless be reconciled with, and reconcile, McDowell’s 
and Brandom’s respective commitments. At the very least, I need to establish that an 
answer to Dreyfus’s challenge is possible, to counter Brandom’s claim that it is not. 
To this end, drawing resources from the previous two chapters, what follows is a 
series of three elements that could be usefully integrated into an answer to Dreyfus’s 
challenge: representation, concepts, and metacognition. Part of what makes them useful is 
that the elements build upon each other: the instrumental use of concepts builds on and 
overcomes the limitations of basic representations, and metacognition builds on and 
overcomes the limitations of the merely instrumental use of concepts.  
2.1 Representations 
The first element of the developmental story is the capacity for representation. What a 
mental representation is, and whether machines, organic mechanisms, animals, or only 
people have and use representations has been intensely debated, much in the same way 
                                                                                                                                            
what makes rationality wholly distinct (ibid. 27-28). This failure motivates Brandom’s emphasis on our 
discursive practices. Contra Brandom, I would situate the tendency of the classical pragmatists to place 
continuity, habit, and adaptation in the center of their views more broadly as an American manifestation of 
ideas that had already been percolating in Europe as a way of extending Kant’s critical philosophy (not to 
mention critiquing Kant). That is, I find the same tendency to play up habit, adaptation, and continuity 
especially in Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger; and in Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty (Hegel, 
Philosophy of Mind: Translated from the 1830 Edition, Together with the Zusätze, 25–215; Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, 151–61; Husserl, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of 
Logic; Heidegger, Being and Time; Ravaisson, Of Habit; Bergson, Matter and Memory; Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception). It is worth noting the influence, cited by both Hegel and Ravaisson, of On 
the Soul. In a brilliant and persuasive essay that served as a catalyst for this dissertation, Kolakowski adds 
Marx’s manuscripts of 1844 (Kolakowski, “Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth”; Marx, 
“Economic Philosophic Manuscripts”). No doubt other philosophers could be added to this list (Condillac, 
Maine de Biran, Herder, Schelling, and Dilthey all spring to mind). 
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concepts have been.141 I am not attempting to settle these debates, but rather helping 
myself to the notion of representation that best supports my attempt to make plausible a 
way of answering Dreyfus’s challenge. 
The notion of representation I adopt here is broad compared to notions that would 
limit representation to exclusively rational forms of cognition. One worry about 
definitions of representation that attribute them to a wide range of animals is that they 
then become indistinguishable from mere operant conditioning, a capacity found in 
animals, plants, and even microbes.142 Attributing representations to dogs makes sense 
because dogs behave as though they represent things in the world around them, but if the 
criteria that attributes them to dogs also attributes them to single-celled organisms, 
something seems wrong. 
What are the criteria for a broad notion of representation that distinguishes it from 
operant conditioning? Recall from Chapter III Camp’s definition of “basic cognition.” 
She develops it to establish a kind of baseline for what it takes “For a state or disposition 
to even be a candidate for being conceptual.” Her baseline draws, in part, on 
“teleosemantic” approaches to cognition,143 and while she ultimately rejects the idea that 
basic cognition should count as conceptual, it turns out to be useful for showing how 
representational abilities are distinct from mere operant conditioning. In spelling out 
basic cognition, Camp “assume[s] that cognitive states and abilities have the function of 
indicating or representing aspects of the world, and are capable of interacting with a 
                                                
141 For a fascinating introduction to one recent set of debates about mental representation, see Clark et al., 
Philosophy of Mental Representation. 
142 Many thanks to Zed Adams for pushing me on this question. 
143 Camp is primarily thinking of Fred Dretske and Ruth Millikan, referring, for example, to Dretske, 
“Putting Information to Work”; Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (PTW 
279). Camp also points out that, despite his opposition to teleosemantics, Fodor agrees that “beliefs and 
desires themselves have the function of indicating” (PTW 279n4). See, for example, Fodor, A Theory of 
Content and Other Essays. 
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range of other such states and abilities to produce action aimed at achieving the creature’s 
goals,” and, moreover, that such abilities are “applicable on the basis of, and revisable as 
a result of, a range of different experiences” (PTW 279). I take this point that 
representational abilities must be “revisable” to mean that it is part of the function of 
mental representations to be continually refined, on the basis of experience, to facilitate 
the animal gaining greater advantage from its environmental and social conditions. And I 
also assume that effectively representing a dynamic environment requires that mental 
representations, along with their effective recombination, must be learned.144 Perhaps 
most importantly (for distinguishing a representational ability from mere operant 
conditioning), basic cognition requires satisfying the generality constraint—on the loose 
interpretation favored by Camp and Carruthers. That is, for an ability to count as 
representational, it must involve cognitive states that are systematically recombined, 
giving the animal a more nuanced grip on and greater ability to take advantage of its 
surroundings. In short, the criteria for what counts as a representational ability for my 
purposes are the same as the criteria Camp develops for what she calls basic cognition, 
and these criteria function as a bulwark against worries that the notion of representational 
ability in play is indistinguishable from operant conditioning.145 
Another standard for an ability to count as representational is for 
misrepresentation to be possible.146 Note that misrepresentation does not include the 
                                                
144 As Camp points out, Dretske also argues that systematically recombinable cognitive states must be 
learned (PTW 279n4). For Camp, this “learning” requirement is implied in her theory of concepts, but it is 
not clear from her essay whether she thinks it is also a requirement for representation in general. 
145 Physiologically, my guess is that, in effect, basic cognition makes having a central nervous system a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an organism to have a representational ability. 
146 Recall that Brandom’s notion of sentient awareness also allows for a form of misrepresentation by 
making possible “a distinction between appearance and reality” (SDR 134). On Brandom’s interpretation 
of the recognitive structure of self-consciousness, this distinction at the basic level of sentient awareness 
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necessity of understanding, or representing, misrepresentation (a point that will become 
clear below). For my purposes, misrepresentation occurs when what is represented turns 
out to be incompatible with how it is represented. This is a common theme in the 
literature on representation. Dretske discusses representation as involving both a 
reference (what is represented) and a sense (what the referent is represented as being 
like), where misrepresentation is a mismatch between the reference and sense.147 
Similarly, Cummins discusses representation as involving both a target (what is 
represented) and content (how it is represented), where misrepresentation is a mismatch 
between target and content.148 One “canonical” example that is trotted out by 
teleosemanticists is a frog that catches flies, but that responds to BB gun shot as if the 
steel balls were flies.149 The example suggests that it is part of the frog’s cognitive life to 
represent flies as food and occasionally misrepresent BB shot as food—clearly, ingesting 
small, steel balls cannot be in the interest of the frog. However, for my purposes and 
based on the criteria above, unless the frog is capable of refining its behavior on the basis 
of this misrepresentation and thereby coming to avoid catching BB shot, it cannot count 
as misrepresenting the shot as food or therefore as representing flies as food. The same is 
true of another example, where prairie dogs are said to misrepresent kites and predators 
                                                                                                                                            
lays the groundwork for what will eventually amount to a distinction between what is true and what is false 
in rational understanding. 
147 Perner inherits talk of the “sense” and “reference” of a representation from Dretske. To quote Dretske: 
“There are always two questions that one can ask about representational contents. One can ask, first, about 
its reference—the object, person, or condition the representation is a representation of. Second, one can ask 
about the way what is represented is represented. What does the representation say or indicate (or, when 
failure occurs, what is it supposed to say or indicate) about what it represents? The second question is a 
question about what I shall call the sense or meaning of the representational content. Every representational 
content has both a sense and a reference, or, as I shall sometimes put it, a topic and a comment—what it 
says (the comment) and what it says it about (the topic)” (Dretske, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a 
World of Causes, 70). 
148 See Cummins, Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. 
149 Here I refer to an unpublished paper by Zed Adams and Chauncey Maher, “Frogs, Birds, and Prairie 
Dogs: Do Biological Functions Suffice for Perceptual Representation?,” 1. 
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by diving underground: if prairie dogs cannot come to refine how they represent kites 
over time, through repeated exposure to these innocuous objects (assume the kites never 
forcefully land or present some other danger to prairie dogs), they cannot be said to 
misrepresent kites as predators.150 
For a hypothetical example of misrepresentation, imagine a bird species that 
evolved to eat red, green, and yellow butterflies.151 One day, a new species of yellow 
butterfly moves into the bird’s feeding area that is identical (for these birds) to existing 
yellow butterflies but poisonous to the birds—their poison causes the bird to experience 
severe pain and hallucinations for three to four days, and therefore renders the bird 
mostly incapable of safe flight and feeding. The ratio of yellow butterflies quickly 
changes from all safe and no threats to one-third safe and two-thirds threats, and the birds 
quickly learn that, often enough, eating yellow butterflies is a huge mistake. In general, 
eating yellow butterflies quickly becomes a risky activity best avoided. The upshot is that 
the birds mostly cease to eat any yellow butterflies. The point, here, is that the birds 
initially represent yellow butterflies as a reliable source of food, then the situation 
changes, and the representation of yellow butterflies as a reliable source of food becomes 
an instance of misrepresentation because they so often make the birds sick.152 The birds 
                                                
150 Adams and Maher, “Frogs, Birds, and Prairie Dogs: Do Biological Functions Suffice for Perceptual 
Representation?,” 9. Adams and Maher refer to Cummins, “Haugeland on Representation and 
Intentionality,” 132. 
151 Here I am significantly modifying an example Haugeland deploys against teleosemanticists. (See 
Haugeland, “Truth and Rule-Following,” 309–10.) Because Haugeland thinks normativity is necessary for 
misrepresentation, he sets the bar high for representation, whereas teleosemanticists such as Cummins think 
that mere organic mechanisms and organs can count as representing and misrepresenting. 
152 Note that this formulation, “reliable source of food,” dodges worries that the birds, in revising how they 
represent yellow butterflies in general, come to misrepresent the one third of yellow butterflies that are not 
poisonous. What enables this dodge is that—unlike Haugeland and Cummins in their disagreement over 
how to understand Haugeland’s simpler version of the yellow butterfly example—I am not discussing mere 
responsive mechanisms built into the bird’s anatomy. Rather, I am appealing to the intelligent and 
sophisticated responsive behavior that many bird species seem to have. It is part of Haugeland’s point that 
mechanical accounts of representation won’t work, and on this I agree. Where I disagree with Haugeland is 
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revise their representational capacities and come to represent yellow butterflies as not a 
reliable source of food, and avoid them. 
Generally speaking, misrepresentation happens when there is a mismatch between 
the target of the representation and how it is being represented. And the criteria I’ve 
offered here for how that happens is that the target and content of a representation come 
apart when the animal fails to realize its aims because of how it represents something, in 
such a way that the animal will be disinclined to represent that target in that way in the 
future. One objection to this approach is that it cannot account for instances where an 
animal misrepresents something and still successfully realizes its goal, and instances 
where an animal accurately represents something yet fails to realize its goal.153 My 
response to that concern is that it does not undermine the idea that the animal can 
represent and misrepresent its surroundings on its own terms. The objection imports 
criteria that are external to the animal’s system of representation—namely, our external 
grasp of an instance of an animal representing or misrepresenting something—that are 
not relevant to the point. The fact remains that the animal has a representational ability 
that helps it systematically improve its grip on its ever-changing surroundings by revising 
how the animal represents things when it fails to realize its goals. In cases of 
misrepresentation that count, the animal is materially confronted by the upshot of 
misrepresentations: the really important cases of misrepresentation are those that actually 
undermine the animal’s ability to thrive, such as misrepresenting poisonous prey as 
reliably good to eat. These cases are important because they highlight the biological 
advantage of having revisable representational abilities at all. Misrepresenting things can 
                                                                                                                                            
that I am arguing that we should understand representation in terms of the criteria assembled above, which 
limits representation to flexible, revisable, and systematically recombinable cognitive states and abilities. 
153 Many thanks to Zed Adams for bringing this objection to my attention. 
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be costly, and revising misrepresentations to more accurately represent the animal’s 
environmental and social circumstances can better enable the animal to realize its ends of 
successful feeding, harm avoidance, procreation, etc. 
This notion of a basic, representational ability that coincides with Camp’s criteria 
for basic cognition also coincides (more or less) with Perner’s notion of “primary 
representation” (URM 6-7). To show briefly how they overlap, on Perner’s account, 
human children typically develop their primary representational ability before the age of 
two. This ability involves the revision and recombination of cognitive states, modeling 
the child’s surroundings in order to better facilitate the child’s ability to navigate those 
surroundings and meet her needs. Primary representations are capable of 
misrepresentation, are causally keyed to environing stimuli, and causally influence 
behavior (URM 24). Thus primary representations underwrite a single, updating model of 
things or situations the child (or animal) encounters (URM 45). Finally, primary 
representations and single, updating models are not stimulus-independent in the relevant 
sense (for my purposes). Human infants and other animals with only a single updating 
model of their surroundings can represent things in the absence of the stimuli that 
typically give rise to those representations (URM 45-6). However, they are nonetheless 
dependent upon environing stimuli for entertaining those representations, lacking the 
ability to spontaneously model counterfactual situations.154 
Recall the discussion of Haugeland’s notion of conformism from Chapter IV. In 
his early work, Haugeland appeals to a natural, animal proclivity to conform to ground 
his restrictive view of intentionality (I discuss this in Chapter IV, §3.1). He defines 
conformism as a combination of “imitativeness,” or the inclination to copy the behavior 
                                                
154 This is a key point in Camp’s definition of concepts, discussed above in Chapter III. See PTW 287-91.  
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of other members of a social group, and “censorious,” or “a positive tendency to see that 
one’s neighbors do likewise, and to suppress variation” (IAS 147). Conformism 
presupposes two abilities that the capacity for representation also presupposes: the ability 
to respond differentially to different stimuli, and the ability “to learn, as in conditioning 
or habit formation” (IAS 147). This makes the capacity to conform a “complex second-
order disposition,” i.e., a disposition that builds on other dispositions, but is nonetheless 
natural (IAS 147). The upshot is a “systematic peer pressure within the community” that 
establishes “a kind of mutual attraction among the behavioral dispositions of the different 
community members” (IAS 148).  
Primate social behavior provides perfect examples of what Haugeland means, but 
presumably many highly social species of mammals, birds, and other animals exhibit 
tendencies Haugeland would call conformism. Conformism offers advantages to social 
animals with basic cognition and primary representations because, for example, by 
imitating others, animals can discover new advantages in their environment, such as a 
source of food previously unnoticed. It presumably allows animals to establish stable, 
shared dispositions to respond to predators in the same way, such that animals that cannot 
sense a lurking predator can nonetheless respond to the predator responses of other 
members of the community. 
The point here is that, while not all animals with representational abilities are 
necessarily conformist on Haugeland’s account, all conformist animals (presumably) 
have representations in the sense defined above. Moreover, anticipating the following 
discussion of secondary representations and concepts, it seems as though all animals with 
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concepts (by Camp’s definition) are also conformists. This makes conformism a 
significant part of the developmental story whose elements I am assembling here. 
While primary representational abilities and conformism confer an array of 
advantages on the animals and prelinguistic children that have them, they are limited. 
With only a single, updating model of one’s surroundings, one cannot entertain both how 
things are and how they were, or will be. The representation of how things are simply 
changes. With only primary representations, children and animals represent what they 
want but cannot go out of their way to alter their surroundings as a means to get what 
they want. Put another way, a child or nonhuman animal with only primary 
representations can flexibly respond to its environment, but has no meaningful distance 
from its environment. 
2.2 Concepts 
The second element of the developmental account is conceptual cognition, as Camp 
defines it, which I take to be bound up with a capacity for Perner’s secondary 
representations. As will become clear below, Perner’s definition of secondary 
representational abilities and Camp’s definition of conceptual abilities make them distinct 
in theory. However, I treat them as a single element in my account here because they 
appear to come packaged together.155 I discuss secondary representations first, then 
                                                
155 For one thing, all of the animal species exhibiting behavior that seems to warrant the attribution of 
secondary representational abilities also seem to warrant the attribution of concepts. Suddendorf and 
Whiten write, “At present we argue that the best (evolutionarily parsimonious) explanation for the ape data 
is that all great ape species have the fundamental capacity to entertain secondary representations” (“Mental 
Evolution and Development: Evidence for Secondary Representation in Children, Great Apes, and Other 
Animals,” 644). They also suggest it is likely that a short list of other animals, including crows and 
dolphins, may well turn out to qualify as having secondary representations (“Mental Evolution and 
Development: Evidence for Secondary Representation in Children, Great Apes, and Other Animals,” 
641ff). Great apes, dolphins, and New Caledonian crows all seem to satisfy Camp’s criteria for having 
concepts, insofar as they pursue subsidiary goals that temporarily take them away from a main goal as a 
means to achieve the main goal. Another point is that the difference between secondary representations and 
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review Camp’s notion of concepts before considering how Haugeland’s conformism and 
normativity fit into the picture. 
To have secondary representations is to have, crucially, the ability to entertain 
multiple models, multiple representations of the same thing. As Perner argues, at around 
age two, the primary representations of typical human children are augmented by 
secondary representations. The capacity for secondary representations assumes and builds 
on the capacity for primary representations in the sense that secondary representations are 
best understood as primary representations given a secondary function (URM 7). The 
secondary function is that they can be decoupled from their primary function as causally 
triggered responses to environing stimuli. Simply put, they can be used to represent states 
of affairs that do not presently obtain. But if they could not also function as primary 
representations in other circumstances, they would not have much (if any) use as 
secondary representations. Thus while I refer to “secondary representations” (following 
Perner), they are not an entirely different kind of representation with a wholly different 
function from primary representations, but rather an expanded use of primary 
representations. 
                                                                                                                                            
concepts in theory might only indicate two distinct ways to track a single cognitive ability that manifests 
itself in multiple ways. As Suddendorf and Whiten argue, there are several criteria to be satisfied for an 
animal to count as having secondary representations (including passing hidden displacement tests, engaging 
in pretense, mirror self-recognition, recognizing mental states). For Suddendorf and Whiten’s criteria, see 
“Mental Evolution and Development: Evidence for Secondary Representation in Children, Great Apes, and 
Other Animals,” 641. Note that what Suddendorf and Whiten count as means-ends reasoning, as a feature 
of secondary representational ability, does not count as instrumental reasoning by Camp’s standard because 
it does not require the degree of stimulus independence that Camp requires (see “Mental Evolution and 
Development: Evidence for Secondary Representation in Children, Great Apes, and Other Animals,” 632). 
As Camp argues, there is only one criterion for having concepts. Yet, although no single criterion offered 
by Suddendorf and Whiten counts as having concepts by Camp’s standards, it seems unlikely that an 
animal could satisfy all of the criteria for secondary representations and fail to have concepts. So, while 
Camp agrees that Perner’s secondary representational abilities “underwrite” conceptual cognition (PTW 
293), it may be more accurate to claim that they are one and the same. I do not have a large stake in which 
option is the right one, but for the sake of simplicity, I package secondary representational abilities and 
conceptual abilities together into a single element here. 
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Secondary representational capacities underwrite a variety of behaviors common 
to children ages two to four, some of which are also found in other great apes and other 
species, including passing hidden displacement tests; engaging in pretense; means-ends 
reasoning; mirror self-recognition; reading the emotions and recognizing the mental 
states of other members of a social group.156 These abilities are a powerful and profitable 
advance on merely primary representations because they give their possessor a much 
greater ability to take advantage of their physical and social environments. It is 
reasonable to assume that the secondary representations of human children are shaped by 
their exposure to social norms, but that does not mean that only humans have secondary 
representations; there is increasing evidence that other great apes, for example, should be 
understood to have secondary representations.157  
Whereas primary representations afford a single, updating model for what an 
animal encounters, secondary representations afford multiple complex models. Multiple 
models make instrumental reasoning possible, because they allow an animal to both 
represent how things are and also counterfactual states of affairs—specifically, how they 
could be made different. This gives the animal an advantage, for example, by enabling a 
chimpanzee to stack and climb wooden crates as a means to reach bananas suspended 
                                                
156 Thomas Suddendorf and Andrew Whiten, who are interested in the secondary representational abilities 
of nonhuman animals, follow Perner in counting these behavioral abilities (among others) as evidence of 
secondary representations (see “Mental Evolution and Development: Evidence for Secondary 
Representation in Children, Great Apes, and Other Animals,” 641). 
157 Thomas Suddendorf and Andrew Whiten argue, “for most instantiations of secondary representational 
skill in toddlers there is now evidence from great apes,” and, moreover, given the available evidence, “the 
best (evolutionarily parsimonious) explanation for the ape data is that all great ape species have the 
fundamental capacity to entertain secondary representations” (“Mental Evolution and Development: 
Evidence for Secondary Representation in Children, Great Apes, and Other Animals,” 644). It follows that, 
to the extent that other species appear to exhibit secondary representational skills, it is well worth 
entertaining the hypothesis that they do, and investigating further. 
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overhead.158 Secondary representations also offer significant advantages in the social 
arena, by allowing human children from around age two (and likely great apes and some 
other social animals) to attribute to others mental models and feelings they themselves 
have. The advantage is being able to understand social behavior, to anticipate what 
another member of a social group is likely to do, and where a given social situation is 
likely to lead. The idea is that secondary representational abilities and multiple models 
underwrite “some notion of the mental as familiar from inner experience, which they can 
use as a theoretical construct in explaining and understanding other people’s experiences, 
thus in turn explaining their actions” (URM 10-11). Children (and some other animals) 
demonstrably anticipate the feelings and models of others. 
To be clear, on Perner’s analysis, this secondary representational ability does not 
amount to having a theory of mind, but merely a theory of behavior.159 That is, it is not a 
grasp of other minds or inner life as such, or of the representational abilities of other 
animals per se. Rather, it is a grasp of the behavior of others, one that is afforded by a 
practical ability to project elements of one’s own inner life and representational abilities 
onto others. It is not what is projected that is understood or grasped, but rather, what is 
projected is a means to understand what others are doing or are inclined to do. 
Camp considers Perner’s secondary representations to “underwrite” what she 
defines as a conceptual ability (PTW 293), yet (as I explained above) I treat conceptual 
cognition and secondary representations as aspects of a single ability here. Here, I review 
Camp’s criteria for a representational ability to count as conceptual. 
                                                
158 I refer here to Wolfgang Köhler, The Mentality of Apes, 139–78. 
159 Perner distinguishes between having a mentalistic theory of behavior and a representational theory of 
mind (URM 11). The former is an ability to represent behavior and behavioral intentions. The latter is an 
ability to represent representations and representational intentions, and only comes with what Perner calls 
metarepresentation. 
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Recall from Chapter III that Camp considers instrumental reasoning as clear 
evidence that an animal has concepts because it establishes that the animal has active and 
spontaneous control over how, when, and which representations it recombines. She 
defines instrumental reasoning as an ability to pursue subsidiary goals as a means to 
realize an end goal even when the subsidiary goal takes an animal temporarily away from 
its main goal. Making tools is a perfect example of instrumental reasoning. Instrumental 
reasoning requires a high degree of stimulus independence in that it involves actively 
recombining representations to model a counterfactual state of affairs as a means to 
solving a complex problem. By contrast, while animals with merely basic cognition (i.e., 
representation but lacking secondary representation) can represent distal states of affairs, 
what they represent and when remains under the control of environing stimuli. 
Perner’s criteria for secondary representation and Camp’s criteria for concepts 
both demonstrate clear advantages over primary representations. Perner’s notion of 
secondary representations shows a clear link with primary representations: in effect, 
secondary representational abilities are a secondary, stimulus-independent use of primary 
representations. This establishes clearly that the second element in my account builds on 
the first element. Furthermore, animals and human children that satisfy Perner’s criteria 
for secondary representations also satisfy Camp’s criteria for having concepts. Camp’s 
theory of concepts highlights a substantial form of stimulus independence, one that 
allows animals to actively take spontaneous control over their representational abilities, 
turning them into a system for solving problems. If a representational ability satisfies the 
criteria for secondary representations and the criteria for conceptual cognition, then it 
counts as a form of conceptual cognition overall. That is, an animal or human child can 
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be said to have conceptual cognition in general, even when it is not actively engaged in 
behaviors considered here to indicate secondary representations or concepts. And, 
moreover, to have concepts constitutes an enormous advantage over having mere 
representations because this active use of cognitive capacities allows animals (and 
children) to solve problems and generally take greater advantage of their surroundings.  
In the previous section, I discussed how representation and conformism work 
together to confer advantages beyond what representation provides by itself. Similarly, 
combining conceptual cognition with conformism also extends the advantages of having 
concepts. For example, tool-using chimpanzees conform to the instrumental problem-
solving behaviors of others in their social group by using the same types of materials in 
the same ways to catch termites. The combination of instrumental rationality with the 
inclination to conform allows effective skills to be shaped and transmitted across 
generations, conferring significant advantages on animals that have these abilities. 
On Haugeland’s view, conformism is a natural underpinning for normativity. As I 
discussed in Chapter IV, §4.2, Haugeland’s early criteria for distinguishing an objective 
form of normativity appealed social propriety that governs things like tool use: implicit 
rules that institute the use and misuse of objects for specific purposes. Moreover, this 
robust normativity involved a “highly integrated and structured” form of life insofar as 
“the norms which make it up are intricately interdependent” (IAS 151). This “highly 
integrated and structured” way of life should be understood to mean that normatively 
governed dispositions draw together almost all of the possible activities the animal can 
find itself engaged in. As I argued earlier, this criteria is not sufficient for distinguishing 
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the rational, objective form of normativity humans have.160 It could well turn out that, for 
example, chimpanzee communities with complex tool-making and tool-using practices 
really do have social institutions—by Haugeland’s standards—that establish a sense of 
the proper use of these tools. 
The point here is that the combination of conceptual cognition with conformism 
and normativity allows animals to treat other members of the community as means 
toward ends, such as preferable treatment in the social hierarchy, and also treat materials 
they encounter as means to ends, such as gaining food. Among the advantages animals 
gain by combining conceptual cognition with conformism is to share techniques for 
problem-solving that develop out of their capacity for instrumental rationality. 
Presumably, in cases where multiple different materials are sourced and made into tools 
that are then used systematically to catch food like termites, the complexity of the 
practice has developed over time as different techniques are systematically combined 
with each other. 
Prerational human children also combine their capacity for conceptual cognition 
with conformity and normativity in powerful ways. Anyone who knows or has known 
children aged two to four—possessed of concepts but incapable of rational reflection—
knows how willful they are. The have the power to use their concepts to model and 
anticipate the behavior of others, and solve problems by representing counterfactual 
states of affairs and treating things and situations as means to their ends. At the same 
time, they are under enormous pressure from authorities (mostly caregivers) to conform 
to social norms governing their behavior, restricting what objects they use and how, and 
                                                
160 As I discussed in Chapter IV, Haugeland’s later work on constitution, by contrast, does establish a 
meaningful difference between the normativity of highly intelligent, concept-wielding animals and rational, 
objective normativity. 
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what activities are appropriate for different situations. The idea here is that, under these 
conditions, they gain a concept of what it is to have and wield authority. Their natural 
drive toward conformity does not merely result in reflecting the social norms to which 
they are forced to conform; they also seek to conform to the models of authoritative 
behavior they witness in the authorities in their lives. That is, they seek to model the 
authoritative behavior itself and gain the social advantages that come with that behavior, 
which, in practice, is the same as seeking to be an authority. In effect, children desire to 
be right, and recognized as right, about how things are and how things ought to be, and to 
be treated as other authorities are treated—all before they have a clear sense of the 
distinction between right and wrong, true and false. 
Concepts, combined with social instituted norms, offer powerful advantages over 
primary representations and basic forms of conformity. Crucially, unlike mere 
representations, concepts open up a distance from the environment, allowing the animal 
to twist its representational capacity free from environing stimuli and make active use of 
it. Gaining this distance from the environment affords the animal distinct advantages not 
available without concepts. 
However, conceptual cognition, as such, is limited. Social conformity and 
normativity of the kind described above directly affects behavior and only thereby 
indirectly affects how animals use their capacity for conceptual cognition. A far greater 
power to enforce social norms—and thereby gain the advantages of highly complex 
forms of cooperative action—could be had if there were a means to directly govern the 
use of concepts. In other words, the social power to govern the behavior of problem-
solving animals with conceptual cognition is significant, but it pales in comparison to the 
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social power that stems from governing conceptual cognition itself. This possibility only 
arises with the transition to the third element of this developmental account, which opens 
up the possibility for objectivity. 
2.3 Metacognition 
The third element of the developmental account is metacognition, i.e., metaconceptual 
understanding. The transition from concepts to metacognition corresponds to a transition 
from secondary representations to metarepresentation, from a mentalistic theory of 
behavior to a representational theory of mind, and from cognition of surroundings and 
opportunities to cognition that is about cognition. It is, essentially, a conceptual capacity 
to reflect on our use of concepts. And when combined with an overarching, constitutive 
commitment to doing things a certain way, to a specific set of practices or form of life, it 
makes objective understanding possible. 
To set up this overview of metacognition, recall the distance metaphor that comes 
up in McDowell’s debate with Dreyfus in Chapter II. The idea, which McDowell gleans 
from Gadamer, is that animals attend only to their immediate biological imperatives and 
have no distance from their environment, whereas humans have language and thereby 
gain not just a distance from our environment but also a world. I think the distance 
metaphor is useful, but McDowell’s use of it is too simple. Following Camp (in §2.1 
above), I characterized mere representations as having no distance from an environment, 
whereas (in §2.2) I characterized concepts (in Camp’s sense) as establishing a distance 
from one’s environment. This distance reflects the ability to spontaneously deploy 
cognitive abilities independently of environing stimuli. Metacognition constitutes a 
second distance, this time from the concepts that structure an animal’s instrumental 
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engagement with its surroundings. So whereas concepts allow for a first distance from the 
environment, metacognition allows for a second distance from concepts, and it is this 
second distance, combined with the first, which opens up space for a world. This second 
distance opens up space to reflect on how we use concepts, to think about how and what 
we perceive and think. 
I lead with my elaboration of this distance metaphor because it nicely frames the 
following, detailed account of metacognition and the space to reflect on our concepts as 
concepts. Here I consider Perner’s notion of metarepresentation and retrace Haugeland’s 
notion of constitution to present the most important features of this proposed transition 
into a rational, objective grasp of a world. 
Metarepresentation is the capacity to represent other beings as representing 
something and to understand misrepresentation (URM 7, 35). Since representations and 
representational abilities are now in view—no longer just a means of representation but 
part of what is represented—a shorthand definition of metarepresentation is the capacity 
to represent a representation as a representation. To have a capacity for 
metarepresentation is to understand the distinction “between what is represented 
(referent) and as what it is represented (sense)” (URM 7).161 
To clarify what metarepresentation is, then, it is useful to work through how the 
distinction between sense and referent (or, to use Cummins’ preferred terms, content and 
target) functions at each level. Recall that the distinction between sense and referent was 
useful to clarify what it is to have primary representations, because to have primary 
                                                
161 Perner is thinking of Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung; however, as he notes, he is more 
specifically following Dretske to “use the word ‘referent’ when I want to say what a representation 
represents and the word ‘sense’ when talking about things being represented as being a certain way” (URM 
20). Perner refers to Dretske, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, 70. 
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representations is to be capable of revising representations as a result of being foiled by 
instances of misrepresentation. This is a fact about what it is to have primary 
representations even though the one representing (an animal or an infant) cannot cognize 
this sense/referent distinction itself. Also recall that with secondary representations it is 
possible to represent counterfactual states of affairs, entertain multiple models of the 
same situation, and represent the behavioral intentions of others by treating others as 
though they have certain mental states or representations that one has oneself. But 
crucially, representing the behavioral intentions of others falls short of representing 
others as having representations because the former does not involve representing 
representations as representations. Finally, representing a representation as a 
representation, again, requires actually cognizing the distinction between sense and 
referent, i.e., metarepresentation.162 In sum, to have primary representations is to be able 
to differentially respond to sense and referent being incompatible; to have secondary 
representations is to able to exploit the incompatibility of sense and referent (e.g., 
entertaining multiple models, representing counterfactual situations, tactical deception); 
and to have metarepresentation is to be able to understand the distinction between sense 
and referent. 
The distinction between having secondary representations and metarepresentation 
underwrites (or at least corresponds to) the distinction between having a mentalistic 
theory of behavior versus a representational theory of mind. With merely secondary 
representations, human children can form a mentalistic theory of behavior, but with 
                                                
162 While there is already a distinction between sense and referent operative in primary representation, the 
capacity for primary representation affords no awareness of that distinction. Likewise, while a capacity for 
secondary representation makes it possible to entertain more than one sense of the same referent, it falls 
short of representing the relation between senses and the referent. What distinguishes metarepresentation is 
actually representing and understanding that a sense represents a referent. 
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metarepresentation they can form a representational theory of mind (URM 11).163 Human 
children with secondary representational abilities can begin to develop a “mentalistic 
theory of behavior” insofar as they can use their own mental states, arising from their 
own experiences, to model the intentions of others and anticipate their behaviors (URM 
10-11). Children under the age of four “start to use mental terminology to make sense of 
people’s behavior, (URM 242). But, having only a mentalistic theory of behavior (i.e., 
lacking a representational theory of mind), a child cannot understand how mental states 
can misrepresent (URM 11), because she cannot represent representations as 
representations. Once the child starts to develop a capacity for metarepresentation, there 
is an opportunity to develop a representational theory of mind, “in which mental states 
are understood as serving a representational function” (URM 11). At this stage, the child 
comes to understand representation in terms of the distinction between sense and referent, 
which plays “a catalytic role in children’s reconceptualization of what the mind is” 
(URM 11). 
With the transition from primary to secondary representations, recall that Perner 
argued primary are necessary for secondary representations because what makes 
secondary representations useful is the fact that they are, in effect, primary 
representations that gain a secondary function insofar as they come to be deployed 
independently of environing stimuli. In the transition from secondary representations to 
metarepresentations there is a corresponding dependence of the latter on the former. 
Perner writes that the ability to cognize the distinction between sense and referent that 
                                                
163 Perner is critical of broad claims that attribute a theory of mind to other species (see URM 240; Perner 
refers to Premack and Woodruff, “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?”). According to Perner, 
it is not “mind” that toddlers (or other animals) “theorize” about, but behavior, deploying their mental 
models as a means to anticipate and make sense of the behaviors of others. For Perner, to have a theory of 
mind is to have a theory of the mental (and material) use of representations. 
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defines metarepresentation “can only be understood with secondary representations. 
Hence, secondary representations are a prerequisite for metarepresentation” (URM 11). 
This is a cumulative effect, where each stage or level depends upon development of the 
prior stage. 
Finally, the capacity for metacognition is, by definition (i.e., Camp’s definition), 
conceptual, for it involves a capacity for stimulus-independent representations: one 
cannot represent a representation—that is, represent the relation between sense and 
reference—if one’s representational ability remains entirely under the control of 
environing stimuli, because there are no stimuli for the relation between the sense and 
reference of a representation. The relation of sense and reference, content and target, is 
constituted by a cognitive act. Whereas with practical instrumental reasoning—e.g., 
manipulating objects to attain food—concepts were deployed as a means to take better 
advantage of one’s physical circumstances, with metacognition, concepts are deployed to 
understand the deployment of concepts. 
How does normativity fit into this picture? Absent metacognition, only behavior 
was subject to normative constraint and approval. With metacognition, our conceptual 
capacity itself becomes folded into the growing field of normative constraint. The 
government of behavior—which arises with conformism, norms, and social practices 
surrounding conceptually-structured instrumental reasoning—broadens to become a 
government of conceptual thought, just as conceptual thought, largely through language, 
becomes a form of behavior. How does this come about? 
Recall the example in the previous section of the child (with concepts and 
instrumental reasoning, but no metacognition) who does not merely conform to authority 
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by doing what is expected, but also conforms to authoritative behavior by behaving 
authoritatively. There I suggested that children desire to be recognized as normative 
authorities—as right about stuff—before being capable of understanding what it means to 
be an authority, or even differentiate right from wrong, true from false. What must the 
child do to satisfy her desire to be an authority? 
For one thing, to be an authority about how to do something—say, clap a simple 
rhythm—a child must more or less conform to social norms regarding how to do it, 
thereby actually treating the authority as an authority. She cannot become an authority by 
merely imitating the authoritative behavior of showing how others should clap the rhythm 
if she cannot actually clap the rhythm. Indeed, if she is in the midst of a lesson on how to 
clap the rhythm she will be censored for acting like an authority. This is what is so odd 
about authority: whereas other behaviors you can get right by imitating them, you will be 
censored if you imitate the authoritative behavior of showing someone what the norm is 
rather than just learning to follow the norm. 
For another thing, the child must learn to differentiate between an attempt to 
follow a particular norm and a successful following of the particular norm. To do so, she 
must, once again, treat the authority as an authority—this time as an authority on who 
does and who does not follow the norm properly. By following the authority, she gains 
the ability to recognize an attempt at playing the rhythm that does not count as an 
instance of playing the rhythm. 
Once she gains the ability to reliably play the rhythm, and recognize attempts to 
play the rhythm, and to assess whether or not those attempts are successful, according to 
norms, she will get what she wants: she will be treated as an authority with respect to 
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playing the rhythm and gain a concept of herself as an authority. Moreover, beyond 
merely representing a target (the rhythm properly played) by means of some content (an 
attempt to play the rhythm), she will understand the normatively governed relation 
between them, and more generally that there are norms governing how we represent 
things. She will have a concept for the rhythm that allows her to recognize instances of 
the rhythm being played and a metaconceptual grasp of that concept that allows her to 
differentiate failed from successful instances of someone playing the rhythm. She will 
have a socially instituted, objective grasp of this rhythm. 
What is the nature of the commitment that allows her to conform her way into 
authority? And how is it possible to use concepts to assess the use of concepts? 
Haugeland’s late theory of objectivity, discussed in Chapter IV, helps to answer 
these questions. The crucial, overarching, and abiding commitment must be constitutive 
of who a person is. It cannot be merely a commitment to being an authority, which led 
the girl in the example to imitate authority rather than the norms the authoritative person 
was trying to teach. Rather, it must be a commitment to actually getting things right as a 
way of life, and to weeding out inconsistency and incoherence in our views as they 
arise.164 
Constitutive commitment is an overarching disposition that orients our mundane 
and constitutive skills. Recall that mundane skills are basic rule-following abilities to 
perform actions and recognize familiar things, for example, the ability to play a rhythm 
and to recognize the rhythm. A constitutive skill is the ability to detect whether or not 
                                                
164 Crucially, for Haugeland this opens up the possibility of getting things right in a way that runs afoul of 
social norms, where one can follow all of the rules and the object can stand up against them, forcing us to 
refine our mundane and constitutive skills and standards. Haugeland deems this possibility to be necessary 
for the kind of objectivity science requires. 
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rule-governed things, like the performance of a given rhythm, do in fact accord with the 
applicable normative standards. Concepts, as Camp defines them, can be usefully 
understood in relation to both mundane and constitutive skills. Mundane skills deploy 
concepts when we recognize things or carry out familiar activities. Similarly, constitutive 
skills deploy concepts by which we grasp whether or not something conforms to rules 
and norms. Concepts—such as the concept of the rhythm in the example above—would 
be deployed by both mundane and constitutive skills sets. 
To Haugeland, as I discussed in Chapter IV, the minimal, socially instituted sense 
of objectivity involves a commitment to getting things right according to social norms. 
The skills involved can be understood to deploy concepts. In its robust sense, objectivity 
is a commitment to revising mundane skills and even, if necessary, giving up constitutive 
standards in the face of contradictions and incoherence among or between mundane and 
constitutive skills. This also means assessing and revising the concepts mundane and 
constitutive skills deploy. To monitor mundane skills with constitutive skills is, by its 
nature, metaconceptual and metacognitive, because it brings conceptual abilities to bear 
on assessing the accuracy and intelligibility of our conceptual grasp of our activities and 
surroundings. By expanding the governance of behavior to include our conceptual grasp 
of our surroundings, objectivity achieves the governance of our use of concepts. 
2.4 Summary 
My aim here has been to propose a way to answer Dreyfus’s challenge by appealing to 
three distinct but related elements of cognition that can serve as the “steps” in a “step-by-
step” explanation of how rational understanding develops out of more basic capacities we 
share with children and other animals. The three elements—representation, concepts, and 
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metacognition—are related insofar as the second builds on the first and the third builds 
on the second. Representation is a natural and widespread ability to systematically 
recombine cognitive states and revise them, and how they are combined, based on 
whether they help bring about the animal’s goals. Concepts and secondary 
representations open up a distance between an animal and its environment, as they twist 
free of environing stimuli and become useful for representing counterfactual states of 
affairs, especially in instrumental reasoning. And metacognition takes instrumental 
reasoning and folds it back on itself, opening up a second distance that allows us to 
reflect on, assess, and refine our use of concepts according to social norms, but also in 
light of an overarching commitment to ensuring our use of concepts is coherent and 
consistent. Thus I am satisfying Dreyfus’s commitment by showing how the “higher” 
capacities of rational understanding can be understood to develop out of “lower,” shared 
capacities: concepts are representations that come to be used independently of environing 
stimuli for the purpose of getting a better grip on our surroundings; and rational, 
conceptual understanding is the reflective act of folding our conceptual grasp of things 
back on concepts themselves for the purpose of sharing and coordinating, assessing and 
revising how we use them under an overarching, existential commitment to a coherent 
and consistent worldview. 
 
3. Integrating McDowell’s Commitment 
Recall that McDowell is committed to a minimal form of empiricism that gives 
normatively governed concepts a role in experience and action. The same concepts we 
would use to make a rational, determinate judgment about a state of affairs structure our 
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experience of that state of affairs such that, when we appeal to experience to justify an 
empirical claim, the judgment we make deploys some of the same concepts that structure 
the experience. The upshot is that experience, because structured by normatively 
governed concepts, falls within the space of reasons. 
McDowell’s view stands up against Brandom’s “pinched” view of human 
rationality (to use Haugeland’s term) as narrowly confined to linguistic activity.165 Most 
importantly for McDowell, if we can see how our experience is structured by normatively 
governed concepts, then we can make sense of the idea that, for the most part, when we 
perceive, we perceive things as potential reasons for thinking things are the way we 
perceive them to be. 
To put things this way is to adopt McDowell’s own way of putting things. Critics 
have demanded (I think fairly) that McDowell unpack these ideas in considerably more 
detail. In reconciling McDowell’s commitment with my answer to Dreyfus’s challenge 
and my way of accommodating Brandom’s commitment (to be spelled out in the 
following section) I must depart from McDowell’s view in significant ways, not least 
because I aim to avoid the criticism I leveled at McDowell’s early and late positions in 
Chapter I.166 My main criticism there is that, under scrutiny, McDowell fails to 
sufficiently distinguish between experience and judgment. McDowell’s underdeveloped 
notion of how concepts are involved in experience makes perception indistinct from 
judgments, i.e., judgment in all but name. 
My aim here is to accommodate McDowell’s commitment to minimal empiricism 
without inheriting problems created by McDowell’s way of making that commitment. As 
                                                
165 Haugeland’s actual line accuses Brandom of a “pinched and shallow conception of human life and 
personhood” (Haugeland, “Two Dogmas of Rationalism,” 302). 
166 See Chapter I, §3.1. 
  248 
I mentioned above, I take as my criterion for satisfying McDowell’s commitment that I 
must explain how the normatively governed use of concepts can operate in our 
experience and action, such that as rational animals we can perceive what we perceive as 
rationally constraining what we think is true of the world. To this end, I draw on the 
insights of Camp’s instrumentalism about concepts, Perner’s claims about how we gain a 
representational theory of mind, and Haugeland’s theory of objectivity to explain how it 
is that normatively governed concepts that we use in a judgment about p are involved in 
an experience of p.  
3.1 Instrumentalist Insights 
Recall Perner’s account of the transition from a mentalistic theory of behavior to a 
representational theory of mind. The former, underwritten by secondary representational 
abilities, is a capacity wielded by two- to four-year-old children, other great apes, and 
likely other species as well. The latter seems exclusive to humans and comes only with an 
onslaught of metarepresentation around age four in humans. We can only represent 
representations as representations, and represent others as representing things, insofar as 
we can understand the distinction between sense and referent, which is to say, grasp that 
representations can be right or wrong according to social norms. 
Having secondary representations and concepts already establishes some distance 
from one’s environment because such representations can be spontaneously deployed 
independently of environing stimuli to represent counterfactual states of affairs. As I 
claimed above, in acquiring a representational theory of mind, I gain a second distance, 
this time a distance from my own concepts. In other words, I gain the power to reflect on 
how I conceptualize the world. But that is not to say that I am always in the mode of 
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reflecting on my concepts, and assessing the validity of my use of them according to 
social norms; it only means that I am capable of such reflection. (This is, more or less, to 
echo Kant’s point that the I think must be capable of accompanying all of my 
representations.) 
McDowell’s commitment to giving concepts a role in embodied coping is a 
commitment to there being an unreflective role for normatively governed concepts. It 
seems to me reasonable to agree with Dreyfus and McDowell that much of human 
activity is not reflective at all, and that correspondingly we are not engaged in 
metacognition or metarepresentation for much of the time. The default cognitive capacity 
that presents itself, it seems to me, is that when we are not reflecting or thinking in 
explicit, discursive terms, we proceed with secondary representations and concepts (as 
Camp defines them), or perhaps even primary representations that remain beyond our 
capacity to spontaneously recombine. What is crucially important here, however, is that, 
to accommodate McDowell’s commitment, there must be a role for normatively governed 
concepts in our embodied coping—the nonmetaconceptual use of concepts upon which 
we can discursively reflect. 
To use Dreyfus’s terms (i.e., his interpretation of Heidegger’s distinctions 
between Zuhandenheit, Unzuhandenheit, and Vorhandenheit), it seems as though when 
things are ready-to-hand, we can carry out familiar, even skilled activities, such as 
hammering a nail, largely by responding to environing stimuli. In one sense, this makes 
the activity similar to the behavior of an animal with only basic cognition and primary 
representations, because it can proceed without independence from stimuli. In another 
sense, however, many human activities are skilled in the sense that they could only have 
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been learned and become habitual through higher-order conceptual and metaconceptual 
abilities. That means even if we are engaged in an activity in such a way that we are 
entirely guided by environing stimuli and not actively recombining our conceptual 
capacities and establishing a distance from our environment, the representations involved 
are conceptual in the sense that we can spontaneously recombine them in cases where we 
encounter trouble that causes our activity to halt. Moreover, insofar as reflective, 
metaconceptual cognition was involved in learning the skill (for example, we learned the 
skill in part by following linguistic instructions), the concepts involved in the activity will 
be normatively governed. 
Now, suppose we do encounter trouble that causes our activity to halt—i.e., we 
find that things are unready-to-hand. This forces us into the spontaneous, stimulus-
independent, conceptual grasp of our situation wherein we actively deploy our capacity 
for instrumental reasoning. We represent counterfactual states of affairs, and subsidiary 
goals to a main goal. If the nail is bent and won’t go into the board, we pull it out and 
hammer it straight first, and then bang it into the board. By engaging our conceptual 
abilities in problem solving, we take a step back from our environment. We are capable 
of raising the concepts involved in the problem-solving activity into explicit, reflective 
thought and we understand the normative constraints on the use and misuse of those 
concepts in discourse, and in our practical activity.167 
                                                
167 It is worth pointing out here that this way of understanding embodied coping allows me to accommodate 
an important criticism of Dreyfus’s view by Barbara Montero. Montero rejects what she calls Dreyfus’s 
“principle of automaticity,” the idea that “when all is going well, expert performance significantly involves 
neither self-reflective thinking, nor planning, nor predicting, nor deliberation, nor mental effort” (Montero, 
“A Dancer Reflects,” 304). Taking on board Camp’s notion of concepts and conceptual thought allows me 
to agree that such activities involve mental effort that includes the active, spontaneous recombination of our 
conceptual capacities—albeit, not necessarily metaconceptual thought. Contra Dreyfus, thought—on this 
broader picture that is not exclusively metacognitive—may be constitutive rather than inhibitive of highly 
skilled embodied activities in which we are pushing the very limits of what we can physically achieve. 
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If we are still stymied by our situation and cannot solve it through the 
instrumental deployment of our concepts, we can take a further step back to reflect on our 
conceptual representation of our situation. That is, we can think about it in explicit, 
reflective terms. In doing so, we make things present-at-hand. And it is at this level that 
we engage in rational discourse with each other, that we give and ask for reasons and 
assess our use of our concepts. 
Here it pays to reiterate the linked, cumulative nature of these abilities. The higher 
achievements reshape the lower ones that served as the stepping stones. This is obvious 
insofar as secondary representations are primary representations that have come to be 
deployable independently from environing stimuli. Insofar as metacognition and social 
norms shape our behavior and practices, they revise our concepts and how we 
systematically recombine them in perception and action. 
For example, suppose as a one-year-old I become obsessed with pressing elevator 
buttons. They light up! Grownups do it! I have a primary representation for elevator 
buttons that is mostly reliable. I don’t really grasp what they are for, but I do like to press 
them. Later, as a two-year-old, I come to understand that pressing elevator buttons is a 
means to an end, the way to get the elevator to go to the place we are going. I am 
indiscriminate about which button, but I do understand that pressing an elevator button is 
a subsidiary goal on the way to the main goal of getting to a certain floor, i.e., using 
elevator buttons is part of my capacity for instrumental reasoning. If the elevator is not 
moving, I will be inclined to press a button to make it move. While I still very much like 
to press elevator buttons, I am not yet capable of assessing instances of correct or 
incorrect uses of elevator buttons (which makes me a nightmare to share an elevator 
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with). Later, between four and five years old, I take an interest in the numbers and letters 
on the elevator buttons, as I come to realize they mean something. As I grow into a 
representational theory of mind, I come to understand that specific numbers and letters 
mean things to other people, and so they come to mean something to me. Now, when 
someone says, “Ninth floor, please,” I can recognize what they want, find the “9” button, 
and press it for them. Or if my younger sibling heeds the request for the ninth floor by 
pressing the “7” button, I can assess that as the wrong response to the request. In other 
words, I am capable of reflecting on what people mean, and judging correct and incorrect 
claims and behaviors according to social norms. 
The point of this elevator button example is to show how my ability to recognize 
something (in this case, elevator buttons) has been with me since I was capable of 
nothing more than primary representations, yet with each successive advance I made—
first to secondary representations and then to metarepresentation—my attitude toward 
and inclinations to use the buttons changed. Pressing elevator buttons went from 
something fun to do, to a means to an end, to an act whose rightness or wrongness is 
assessable according to social norms. According to Camp, I already had a concept (in her 
sense) of elevator buttons at age two, when they became a means to an end. But—and 
here is the crux of the matter—once I gained metarepresentation and a representational 
theory of mind, my concept of elevator buttons, specifically, how and when exactly to 
use them, changed. Once I gain a representational theory of mind and take my first steps 
into the space of reasons, I begin to revise the concepts that have animated my 
surroundings to date. And as that process takes off, even when I am not reflecting on my 
or anyone else’s claims or actions, when I am merely engaged in embodied coping, the 
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concepts that structure my engagement with the world are largely the ones that have been 
revised according to social norms. 
So to refer back to my earlier point about ready-ness-to-hand and present-at-hand, 
pressing the familiar button on the elevator as part of my routine involves no thought or 
reflection or even problem-solving. My responsiveness is not so different from having 
merely a primary representation. The difference is that (1) if there is a problem, I can 
deploy my concepts for elevator buttons to solve my problem and (2) if there are claims 
or acts involving elevator buttons I am prepared to assess whether they are correct or 
incorrect according to social norms. What this account shows is that the same concepts 
by which we judge or reflectively think about a situation are involved in our embodied 
coping. 
3.2 Haugeland’s Objective Perception 
McDowell—or at least a nonquietist avatar of McDowell—could respond that appealing 
to Perner and Camp is all well and good, but on their view it is not sufficiently clear what 
makes rational capacities rational, and objective thought objective. Recall that this is the 
problem I identified with Camp’s instrumentalist view of concepts at the end of Chapter 
III and addressed in Chapter IV by integrating it with Haugeland’s theory of objectivity. 
Here, I recapitulate what is crucial about Haugeland’s view for my way of 
accommodating McDowell’s commitment. 
Recall that Haugeland does not make concepts a thematic centerpiece of his 
theory of objectivity, but rather treats concepts as what we have when we have developed 
an objective grasp of the world. To encounter an object is to deploy mundane skills by 
which we recognize or make use of it, where those skills are governed by constitutive 
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skills, according to a set of constitutive standards that belong to an overarching existential 
commitment to a way of life that constitutes not just what we do and how, but also who 
we are. This package of constitutive skills and commitments forms a self-correcting 
enterprise that makes it possible for us to have objective perception of what we encounter 
and objective knowledge of the world. Thus not only does Haugeland endorse (in his own 
distinct way) the idea—central to Mind and World—that concepts and rational 
comportment to a world pervade our experience, he goes beyond McDowell by 
explaining how this is possible, by building a theory of objectivity out of a structure of 
interdependent skills. 
Haugeland argues that human experience has a rational form in “Objective 
Perception” and “Truth and Rule-Following.”168 In these essays, he explores how 
following social norms in our interaction with objects constitutes them as the objects they 
are. His favored example is chess: by following the rules of chess play, we treat things we 
encounter as the paraphernalia of chess. In following these rules, we come to have an 
objective grasp of the world in our perception and action. Moreover, to have such an 
objective grasp of things is tantamount to having a conceptual grasp; again, objectivity 
and conceptuality are co-extensive for Haugeland. Haugeland puts the empiricist insight 
that McDowell aims to defend like this: “there must be two fundamentally distinct sorts 
of normative constraint: social propriety and objective correctness (truth)” (TRF 317). In 
other words, there must be, on one hand, the kind of normative constraint that determines 
what judgments we are entitled to make about things we encounter; in this case the 
direction of force runs from norms to the world by imposing rules on how one ought to 
                                                
168 Haugeland, “Objective Perception”; Haugeland, “Truth and Rule-Following.” 
  255 
judge.169 On the other hand, there must also be a distinct kind of normative constraint that 
concerns actually getting things right about the world; in this case the direction of force 
runs from the world to our norms by forcing a re-evaluation of the validity of the norms 
themselves. The latter form of normative constraint requires experience to have a rational 
form. Haugeland is here arguing against views like Brandom’s, which only allow for one 
form of normative constraint, namely, social propriety. As Haugeland puts it, “To 
collapse correctness [the former] into propriety [the latter] is to obliterate the essential 
character of thought” (TRF 317). It is by incorporating this aspect of Haugeland’s view 
that I retain McDowell’s commitment to empiricism and the rational form of experience. 
Experience is rational because objects can stand up against our beliefs about them. 
Here is what I take to be a crucial difference (for my purposes) between 
McDowell’s view and Haugeland’s view: whereas McDowell locates the friction between 
mind and world between the passive use of concepts in experience and the active use of 
concepts in judgment, Haugeland locates the friction between mind and world between 
constitutive and mundane skills. The contradictions between mundane skills show up in 
light of the overarching constitutive skills that govern them—though more rarely a block 
of mundane skills can stand up against and force a refinement of the constitutive skills 
themselves. By setting things up this way, Haugeland allows that an object can stand up 
and speak back against what we take it to be. What we encounter in the world when an 
object stands up against the mundane and/or constitutive skills that enable us to grasp it 
objectively is a kind of rupture of the rational coherence to which we are existentially 
committed. The friction between a mind and a world is constituted within the structure of 
                                                
169 Haugeland picks up the “direction of fit” language from Searle (Haugeland, “Truth and Rule-
Following,” 305–6; there, Haugeland refers to Searle, Expression and Meaning, 1–29). I prefer, however, 
direction of “force” because it resolves the ambiguity of what is fit to what. 
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skills that give us access to the world in the first place, the very conditions of having a 
world at all. To worry that this is not sufficient friction with the world is just to fail to 
grasp the transcendental conditions of having a world. It is enough for Haugeland to give 
an account of the structure of objectivity that enables things we encounter in the world to 
stand up against our beliefs. This is all that transcendental friction needs to be on his 
picture and it is this picture that I endorse here in my way of accommodating 
McDowell’s commitment to minimal empiricism. 
3.3 Summary 
To sum up my accommodation of McDowell’s commitment, then, my claim is that our 
nascent conceptual grasp of our surroundings as toddlers begins as we gain stimulus-
independence for our representations and begin to deploy them in instrumental reasoning, 
treating things as means to our ends and representing counterfactual states of affairs. As 
we gain self-consciousness and develop a representational theory of mind through social 
and linguistic practices, we gain the ability to represent our representations as 
representations, and grasp our concepts by means of other concepts. With these abilities, 
we become aware of our use and misuse of our concepts, and revise our use of them 
according to social norms. These normatively governed concepts are not just means for 
explicit judgment but are practical, insofar as they continue to structure our embodied 
coping and facilitate our nonverbal grasp of our surroundings, thereby giving our 
perception, experience, and action a rational form. And what makes these concepts 
objective and rational is that the various mundane skills that deploy them are kept in 
check by constitutive skills geared toward enforcing constitutive standards and an 
overarching constitutive commitment to a rational way of life. Thus I am satisfying 
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McDowell’s commitment by showing how the rational government of concepts that 
comes with our metacognitive, metaconceptual grasp of their use shapes the role they 
play in our embodied coping, giving rational form to our experience and securing a 
minimal form of empiricism. 
 
4. Integrating Brandom’s Commitment 
Brandom is committed to clearly defining the function of concepts in a way that helps 
make rationality distinct. The criterion I established to determine what would count as a 
reasonable accommodation of this commitment is to explain how the development of 
rational capacities out of lesser capacities amounts to not merely a difference in degree 
but a difference in kind. 
4.1 What Makes Rational Metacognition Distinct 
The key here lies in focusing, once again, on the distinction between concepts in their 
instrumental use and in their metacognitive use. Concepts are used instrumentally insofar 
as they are deployed as part of a capacity for instrumental reasoning, to represent 
counterfactual situations, subsidiary goals on the way to achieving a main goal. Concepts 
are used metacognitively insofar as they are deployed to reflect on or cognize 
representations as representations, and to grasp concept and thoughts as such. Appealing 
again to the metaphor of distance, one can make the distinction between instrumental and 
metacognitive use of concepts like this: the instrumental use of concepts allows us to step 
back from our surroundings to take advantage of opportunities that would not otherwise 
appear to us; by contrast, the metacognitive use of concepts allows us to take another step 
back, this time from our representations, concepts, and thoughts, to assess their merit 
  258 
according to socially instituted standards of correctness. Because metacognition is 
developed, shaped, and governed by rational norms, to engage in the metacognitive use 
of concepts is to participate in the space of reasons. What makes rationality distinct is 
precisely this capacity to reflect on the use of concepts and thoughts as concepts and 
thoughts, and to assess our thoughts and those of others according to rational norms. 
I’m claiming that I’ve defined concepts in a way that is useful for explaining what 
makes rationality different in kind from the “lesser” abilities we share with prerational 
humans and nonrational animals. They are different in kind because there is no room for 
a third possibility between the merely instrumental use of concepts in problem-solving 
and the metacognitive use of concepts that brings the use of concepts to light and makes 
it assessable as right or wrong, according to normative standards. Conceptual acts are 
either metaconceptual or instrumental. There are likely degrees of the ability to engage in 
metacognition, and I take it that childhood—from age four through to rational maturity 
(though some never get that far)—is typically defined by steadily increasing the degree of 
one’s ability to effectively engage in normatively governed metacognition. Yet, again, 
metacognition itself is distinctive and different in kind from instrumental concept use. To 
be rational in the sense that interests Brandom entails mastering the metacognitive use of 
concepts. 
This approach to distinguishing rationality bears some similarities to Brandom’s 
approach but also relies on a key difference. On the view I am defending here, contra 
Brandom, it is not the definition of concepts that makes rationality distinct. Recall that 
Brandom defines concepts narrowly for the explicit purpose of making rationality 
distinct, so that we only use concepts when and insofar as we make explicit judgments. 
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By contrast, here (following Camp) I have defined concepts as the systematically 
recombinable cognitive components of instrumental reasoning—a capacity we share with 
nonrational animals. What makes rationality distinct is not the use of concepts per se, but 
the metacognitive capacity for thinking with normatively governed concepts. This broad, 
instrumental definition of concepts is useful for my way of making rationality distinct, 
because it makes them an essential component of normatively governed metacognition 
that does make rationality distinct. The idea is that, as we transition from a mentalistic 
theory of behavior and a merely instrumental use of concepts into a representational 
theory of mind and a normatively governed, metacognitive understanding of concept-use, 
we are drawn into the space of reasons. Concepts, as I define them, are an essential part 
of this picture, a hinge between “natural” problem-solving and its “cultural,” 
metaconceptual refinement. This is a definition of concepts that plays a positive role in an 
account of what makes rationality distinct, but one that is quite different from Brandom’s 
account. 
4.2 Language and Constitution 
Brandom makes language central to his definition of concepts—again, for him as for 
Sellars, McDowell, and Dreyfus, having a concept means mastering the use of a word. If 
language is not central to the definition of concepts, then I owe an account of the role of 
language in what makes rationality distinct on the view I offer here. To answer this 
question, I draw on both Haugeland and Perner. Haugeland does not appeal explicitly to 
language when he offers an account of objectivity (which I count as his way of 
distinguishing rationality). One could—in principle—gain objective perception provided 
one developed the appropriate skills, namely, mundane skills for engaging in a well-
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defined social practice, constitutive skills for assessing these mundane skills for accuracy 
and propriety (in ourselves and others) as we engage in this social practice, and an 
overarching constitutive, existential commitment to getting things right, even to the point 
of standing up against incoherent social norms. Language is not, in principle, necessary 
for developing these skills. Yet, I take Haugeland to also imply that, for us humans, 
language is always, in practice, involved in developing these skills. 
Perner’s theory of representation confirms the importance of language, by giving 
it a crucial role in the transition from a mentalistic theory of behavior to a 
representational theory of mind. A variety of nonlinguistic species seem to have more or 
less limited use of secondary representations and a mentalistic theory of behavior, but 
human children begin to acquire language at this stage. That is, the first use of words and 
phrases children use and respond to come before metacognition and a representational 
theory of mind. Moreover, on Perner’s account, the transition into a representational 
theory of mind coincides with the explosive growth and sophistication of language use 
that comes around the age of four (URM 9). 
Taking Haugeland and Perner together, then, the minimal claim is that developing 
a natural language is deeply bound up with the development of our metacognitive, 
rational capacities. A stronger claim that is also consistent with the view I am proposing 
is that language is necessary for the development of human rational abilities. Where I 
differ from Brandom is that, along with rejecting the idea that language is necessary for 
having concepts, I am also rejecting the idea that language-use is definitive of human 
rationality. This, again, is Haugeland’s subtle point: it is not that language is definitive of 
rationality—rationality is defined as an always-improving structure of interdependent 
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skills. Rather, language happens to be the way humans break into the structure of 
rationality. Language is the human means to bring reflective, shared, rational order, and 
structure to our use of concepts.170 
Another way to articulate what makes rationality distinct comes from Haugeland. 
In order to count as rational, one must be capable of objective perception and objective 
thought. This requires an existential, constitutive commitment to making thoughts, 
perceptions, and beliefs cohere with one another, such that they form a mutually 
reinforcing whole, absent detectable contradictions among them. It is a commitment to 
the idea that our beliefs are answerable to how things are, that we must sacrifice our 
beliefs in the face of evidence to the contrary. Crucially it is a commitment that allows 
objects to stand up against the skills by means of which we grasp them, by showing up 
inconsistencies among those skills. And it is a commitment to recognizing and resolving 
incompatibilities among our concepts and revising how we use them both in our explicit, 
metacognitive understanding of the world and in our instrumental conceptual engagement 
with our surroundings in our embodied coping. What makes rationality distinct, 
ultimately, is this overarching, existential commitment to getting things right, to giving a 
damn about the truth. 
                                                
170 I’ve arrived at this conclusion without investigating whether or not the view I am presenting 
recommends a particular definition of language. This is a huge topic that is beyond the scope of my 
dissertation. However, to sketch a line of inquiry worth considering, it seems to me there could be a 
definition of language in the offing that makes language necessary for metacognition, and therefore 
rationality. There are many domains of human activity that involve rule-bound, symbolic activity. Tagging 
someone in the game of tag means something according to the rules of tag. Drawing an “x” in a game of 
tic-tac-toe means something according to the rules of tic-tac-toe. However, the symbolic resources of tag 
are not useful for representing the state of affairs in a game of tic-tac-toe, nor vice-versa, and nor are either 
sets of symbolic resources particularly useful for representing sets of affairs in other human activities 
(except, perhaps, in the artistic appropriation of these symbolic resources, but this is another complicated 
question). The point is that what seems to distinguish language from other rule-bound systems of symbolic 
activity is that it is geared toward representing other systems of symbolic activity. In other words, language 
is anything that makes norm-governed metacognition possible. If this is what defines language, then 
language is indeed necessary for rationality, not just the incidental the human means of breaking into the 
space of reasons. 
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4.3 The Recognitive Structure of Self-Consciousness 
By reconciling Brandom’s commitment to defining concepts in a way that helps make 
rationality distinct with a proposed answer to Dreyfus’s challenge, I’m doing something 
Brandom rejected as impossible. Distinguishing between the instrumental and 
metacognitive uses of concepts allows me to assimilate human cognition with that of 
other animals while still differentiating human understanding and rationality. Ironically, 
as I show briefly below, the three distinct abilities (representation, concepts, and 
metacognition) that I appeal to in order to reconcile Brandom’s and Dreyfus’s 
commitments closely correspond to the three distinct abilities in Brandom’s 
reconstruction of Hegel’s recognitive theory of self-consciousness. 
The form that Brandom’s reconstruction of Hegel takes is a historical narrative 
that brings us face-to-face with the kinds of development that have been necessary for us 
to stand where we are, as normatively governed subjects that encounter normatively 
governed objects. As Brandom writes, the point of this abstract, historical narrative is to 
“[understand] oneself as an essentially historical, because essentially self-conscious, sort 
of being. To be for oneself a historical being is to constitute oneself as in oneself a special 
kind of being: a self-consciously historical being” (SDR 128). The three developmental 
stages that lead from desire to self-consciousness in Brandom’s account mirror—with 
sometimes astonishing precision—the three stages of Perner’s developmental account of 
human representational abilities. That is, there is a close correspondence between (1) 
Brandom’s sentient awareness and what I discussed above as representation, especially 
insofar as both are revisable abilities to “take something to be something” in a way that 
can fail because it results in (what I call) misrepresentation, as the failure to satisfy a 
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desire (as Brandom puts it); (2) between Brandom’s simple recognition and what I 
discussed above as concepts, especially insofar as simple recognition enables one to 
recognize another as a being motivated by desire (as Brandom puts it) or to represent the 
behavioral intentions of another animal (as I put it above); and (3) between Brandom’s 
robust recognition and what I discussed above as metacognition, especially insofar as 
recognizing another as a normative authority on who is an authority on how things are (as 
Brandom puts it) corresponds to an ability to step back from and reflect on our use of 
concepts and understand the norms governing how we conceptualize things. 
Developing an account that substantially integrates Brandom’s insights into the 
recognitive structure of self-consciousness with an attempt to answer Dreyfus’s challenge 
is beyond what I can accomplish here.171 The point of bringing it up is to underscore 
another way to differentiate our rational, conceptual grasp of a world. Rational cognition 
is different in kind because it involves the achievement of both subjectivity and 
objectivity, where to recognize an object as an object, with skills and concepts refined 
according to socially instituted norms, is also to recognize oneself as a subject who is 
answerable to the norms of one’s community. As subjects, we are answerable to the 
normative demand that we revise and repair our conceptual grasp of the world in the face 
of contradictions, whether those contradictions show up in the norms governing our 
                                                
171 To fully integrate Brandom’s account of the development of self-consciousness out of desire and the 
development of metacognition out of representation would involve—as I see it—an argument that, 
structurally, they are the same achievement. This is closely related to the view, endorsed by Brandom, 
Haugeland, and others, that subjectivity and objectivity are two sides of the same achievement. The idea is 
that the shift from concepts and a “mentalistic theory of behavior” to a metaconceptual understanding and a 
“representational theory of mind” necessarily involves gaining the ability to represent oneself and others as 
representing how things are. In a slogan: the ability to represent representations as representations entails 
the ability to represent representers as representing because they are structurally the same ability. Giving a 
fleshed out argument for this idea would take me beyond my focus here. 
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understanding of nature, defining the world of cultural artifacts, or characterizing how a 
person should be. 
4.4 Summary 
To sum up my accommodation of Brandom’s commitment, my claim is that adopting 
Camp’s broad, instrumentalist definition of concepts allows me to show how rationality 
is distinct. What makes rationality distinct is the normatively governed, metacognitive, 
metaconceptual use of concepts. This is an ability not merely to use concepts for 
problem-solving, getting a better grip on our surroundings, and navigating the social 
structure of our communities, but also to use concepts to understand these conceptual 
structures themselves. Rationality, as a distinctive capacity, involves acquiring language 
and massively expanding, coordinating, refining, and assessing our use of concepts; but it 
is also an existential commitment to coherence and consistency in our use of them, a 
willingness to revise conceptual structures even when we’ve come to rely on them. 
Rationality is also distinctive, following Brandom, insofar as it involves the recognitive 
development of self-consciousness. Thus, I am satisfying Brandom’s commitment not by 
making concepts exclusive to rational understanding (as Brandom himself does) but by 
giving concepts a function in the cognitive lives of problem-solving animals, and making 
rationality distinct as a normatively governed problem-solving ability folded back on and 
applied to itself, yielding an explosive and powerful difference of kind. 
 
5. Conclusion 
My aim has been to reconcile the respective commitments of Dreyfus, McDowell and 
Brandom. Drawing on Perner, Camp and Haugeland, I proposed what I take to be three 
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crucial elements of an answer to Dreyfus’s challenge that can be reconciled with 
McDowell’s and Brandom’s respective commitments. Representations give rise to 
concepts as they become deployable independently of environing stimuli, and concepts 
give rise to metacognition as we learn to fold our conceptual capacity back on itself, to 
reflect on our thoughts. The first transition opens up a distance between the animal and its 
environment, whereas the second transition establishes a second distance between the 
animal and its own conceptual abilities. 
Although I reject the Sellarsian idea that having language is necessary for having 
concepts, I do not thereby abandon holism about concepts altogether. Rather, I reject only 
the astringent form of holism embraced by Brandom and McDowell (and seemingly 
Dreyfus). The resulting view is a relaxed form of holism. Because having concepts 
entails an ability to spontaneously, systematically recombine them, having one concept 
implies having many concepts. 
These three elements gave me resources to discuss how normatively governed 
concepts are involved in our embodied coping. When we enter the space of reasons, we 
come armed with countless concepts already, stimulus-independent representations that 
have formed as part of our instrumental reasoning as we navigate and take advantage of 
our surroundings. On this account, McDowell’s appeal to Bildung can be explained as a 
long and sometimes painful process of coming face to face with all of the conceptual 
baggage we arrived with when we broke into metacognition. Our newfound 
metacognitive ability allows us to revise our concepts, to refine them (or not) according 
to social norms. How we represent and conceptualize the world comes to reflect and be 
answerable to the norms of our communities. Revising our concepts at the explicit, 
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metacognitive level means that they likewise alter how we represent the world in our 
embodied coping, when we are not engaged in representing representations as 
representations, but merely navigating our familiar surroundings. My induction into the 
government of concepts ensures that these concepts are available to my metacognitive 
reflection and assessment, that all of my representations can, in principle, be 
accompanied by an I think. This metaconceptual accounting and refinement of our 
concepts secures McDowell’s goal of a minimal form of empiricism, such that our 
experience and perception take on a rational form. 
Finally, these three elements of a potential answer to Dreyfus’s challenge also 
allowed me to reconcile Brandom’s commitment to defining concepts in a way that 
enables us to make rationality distinct. Concepts are defined, again, as systematically 
recombinable, stimulus-independent representations that are useful for instrumental 
reasoning and problem-solving. This definition of concepts is useful for making 
rationality distinct because rationality, on this account, is constituted by an ability to fold 
conceptual cognition and instrumental reasoning back on itself, to conceptualize 
conceptual understanding as such. To use Perner’s language, the metacognition of our 
rational understanding is different in kind from secondary and primary representations by 
virtue of what it represents: the lower abilities are restricted to representing actual or 
potential states of affairs, whereas metarepresentation takes a step back into the sphere of 
normativity to represent representations as representations. Drawing on Haugeland, what 
makes rationality distinct is the objectivity that we achieve by virtue of the constitutive 
skills and commitment we make to getting our conceptual capacities right and refining 
them when they are wrong. And drawing on Brandom himself, I showed how 
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metacognition, objectivity, and rationality coincide with the recognitive achievement of 
self-consciousness, which, once achieved, distinguishes rational from nonrational animals 
because it becomes essentially definitive of who and what we are. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It comes to this: if we wish to answer Dreyfus’s challenge while reconciling that answer 
with the commitments made, respectively, by Brandom and McDowell, then the proposal 
for the relaxed conceptual holism outlined in Chapter V makes it possible. It seems 
intuitively compelling to think that we should (1) explain our capacity for rational 
understanding from the bottom up (as opposed to taking a top-down approach); (2) make 
sense of the idea that our experience, perception, and action are a part of our rational 
comportment to the world by recognizing the role concepts play in them, and thereby 
retaining a minimal form of empiricism; and (3) be able to explain just what it is that 
makes rationality distinct and that a clear definition of concepts should be a useful part of 
that explanation. 
I have not ruled out that there might be other ways of answering Dreyfus’s 
challenge that can be reconciled with Brandom’s and McDowell’s commitments; I just 
cannot imagine another way. First and foremost, it seems necessary to give up on the 
Sellarsian idea that language is necessary for having concepts, that one only has a 
concept insofar as one has mastered the use of a word. That strongly suggests a broader 
notion of concepts than the ones Brandom, McDowell, and Dreyfus entertain. If concepts 
do not have their primary function in making discursive judgments, then what is their 
primary function? The answer I opt for here is one that helps me answer Dreyfus’s 
challenge: it gives concepts a clear function in the cognitive lives of an array of highly 
social and astonishingly intelligent problem-solving animals, including children who do 
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not yet count as having mastered the use of any words in the relevant sense of 
understanding the commitments one makes by using those words. 
The question becomes, then, how does this widely shared capacity for conceptual 
cognition develop into the rational understanding that adult humans typically enjoy? My 
proposal in Chapter V outlines an ontogenetic (as opposed to phylogenetic) answer to 
Dreyfus’s challenge. By drawing on Perner, Camp, and Haugeland to present three 
crucial elements of an answer—representation, concepts, and metacognition—I show 
how the conceptual abilities of prerational children can be leveraged into the rational, 
objective grasp of a world proper to human subjects. The answer includes a vital role of 
our social norms and practices and an existential, constitutive commitment to a coherent 
understanding of self and world. Language is, no doubt, an integral part of this process, 
and I acknowledge that the theory I offer here calls for further reflection on this question 
of language. 
McDowell’s, Brandom’s, and Haugeland’s arguments about objectivity and 
knowledge are all transcendental arguments, in a broad sense. They assume it is possible 
for us to justify our claims to objective knowledge and unpack the necessary conditions 
for this possibility. I consider the relaxed holism I propose here to also traffic in 
transcendental arguments in this sense. However, my proposal avoids the disadvantage of 
intellectualism that marks McDowell’s, Brandom’s, and Haugeland’s views, namely, the 
questionable gap they open up between rational humans, on the one hand, and prerational 
children and nonrational animals on the other hand. Rather than impose a gap, relaxed 
holism highlights what we share with our non- and prerational fellows, while retaining a 
way to explain what makes rational human understanding distinct. I’ve traded the 
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metaphor of a “gap” for a “fold.” The human animal is an animal folded back on itself 
and made aware of and answerable to how and what it thinks; its conceptual 
understanding is likewise folded back on and applied to itself to assess the use, misuse, 
and abuse of concepts, according to social norms. 
This returns me to the brief discussion of Sellars’s manifest image that I began 
with in the introduction. There, I framed what I am doing as an attempt to overcome 
Sellars’s idea that the manifest image is beset with an “irreducible discontinuity” in the 
world that results from a “radical difference in level between man and his precursors.”172 
This discontinuity and radical difference is Sellars’s language for the gap that Brandom 
and McDowell perpetuate in their work. If my proposal of a relaxed conceptual holism 
can be fleshed out in greater detail, it ought to undermine the idea that there is an 
irreducible discontinuity in the manifest image (and with it, perhaps, the distinction 
between the manifest and scientific image). It would do so, in part, by attending to and 
accounting for the marvelous cognitive abilities of other animals that are so often 
overlooked in the intellectualist circles of philosophy of mind. A fully developed, relaxed 
conceptual holism would contribute a new way to solve the problem Sellars sets out to 
address in “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” by reconciling our capacity for 
objective thought with our animality and illuminating our continuity with other animals. 
 
                                                
172 Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” 6. 
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